PSYC 213 Lecture Notes - Lecture 6: Molecular Machine, Turing Test, Mental Property
23 Jan 2016
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The same mental processes can be implemented in many different (cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:1) kinds hardware. We define though by its observable consequences (cid:1) (cid:1) The computational sufficiency thesis: a system can have mental states in virtues of running the right kind of computer program. The rights kind of computational structure suffices for the possession of a mind, and for the possession of a wide variety of mental properties. Among those who find dennett"s argument in where am i (cid:1) (cid:1) convincing: (cid:1) Beings with different physiology can have the same typed of mental (cid:1) states as humans (pain). If aliens can realize these mental states, then why not machines? (cid:1) (cid:1) (cid:1) Strong artificial intelligence: the appropriately programmed computer really is a mind, in the sense that it can be said to understand, learn and have other cognitive states. Weak ai: no claims for intelligence, can simulate and imitate.
