PSYC 2270H Lecture 3: Week Three
14 Nov 2018
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Document Summary
It would be contradictory to imagine the physical facts obtaining without the corresponding mental facts: there is some necessary connection between the physical state and the conscious state. If consciousness logically supervenes on lower-level physical states, then we would say that consciousness can be reductively explained explained wholly in terms of lower-level physical states of affairs. Chalmers" theses: denial of logical supervenience: the physical facts don"t entail facts about consciousness, denial of reductive explanation: consciousness can"t be reductively explained. The arguments: zombies are logically possible conceiveable. Zombie: someone physically identical to me, but lacking conscious experience altogether: chalmers doesn"t think these zombies exist and are walking around. It is possible to imagine that there are physical states that are not accompanied by conscious states change in conscious states without a change in physical states: inverted spectrum twins are logically possible. Epistemic asymmetry: a case where knowledge about one thing does not amount to knowledge about another thing.
