PHIL 212 Lecture Notes - Lecture 2: Gilbert Ryle, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Stoicism
4 May 2018
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Philosophy of Mind 9.05.17 Lecture Notes – Behaviorism and Identity Theory
- No single version of behaviorism
- Behaviorism refers to something different in philosophy and psychology
- Logical (or Philosophical) Behaviorism: a view about the meaning of mental state terms, psychological
expressions
- Methodological (or Psychological) Behaviorism – view about how psychology ought to be conducted as
a science
- Both views emphasize the role of behavior in studying the mind
- 3 thinkers associated with philosophical behaviorism: Carl Hempel, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Gilbert Ryle
Logical Behaviorism
- Every meaningful psychological expression can be defined in terms of behavioral expressions (i.e.
expressions referring to overt behavioral phenomenon)
- Ma is i pai = Ma is epessig pai ehaio
o The behavior is not a symptom of the pain, but the pain behavior expression is pain
- Max exhibits certain types of pain behaviors (wincing, groaning, etc.)
- If ou a Ma if he is i pai, he ould sa es
- For Stoics, eve if ou’e ot ehiitig pai ehaios, ou ould e disposed to ehiit pai ehaio
- Animal pain behavior is different from humans
- Also problematic: when trying to find the outward behavior corresponding to belief
- Motivations for logical behaviorism
o Logial ehaioists did’t like the Catesia idea that etal state tes efeed to piate
inner mental happenings because this would make mental state ascriptions unverifiable
o If pai efes to soe piate ie state, ou ould ee e sue hether the statement
Ma is i pai is tue o ot
o They get around this problem by claiming that mental state terms instead refer to overt
behavior
o Ho a e ouiate these oepts i ou laguage if the do’t hae a lea a of
being verified
- The Beetle in the Box example
o If the od eetle is goig to hae soe sot of eaig i ouiatio, then it must be
verifiable
- Hepel’s Aguet pg 69, Ki
o Premise 1: people do’t eall susie to this elief o
o Premise 3: brain scans
- Two objections to logical behaviorism
o 1. Super-Spartan Objection: someone could be in pain without exhibiting pain behavior
▪ Behaviorists get around this problem with dispositions
▪ Under the right circumstances, the person would exhibit pain behaviors – still iffy
o 2. Actor Objection: an actor could exhibit pain behavior without actually being in pain
theefoe, ehiitig pai ehaio is’t suffiiet fo soeoe’s eig i pai
▪ Only way to defend is say that there are subtle differences between real and fake pain
behaviors
- Ontological: what exists (Cartesian dualism)
o Logical behaviorism is not straightforwardly ontological
- From logical to ontological behaviorism
o LB – view about the meaning of words, not about what really exists
o Some radical LB will go further to deny the existence of our inner mental lives
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
Document Summary
Philosophy of mind 9. 05. 17 lecture notes behaviorism and identity theory. Behaviorism refers to something different in philosophy and psychology. Logical (or philosophical) behaviorism: a view about the meaning of mental state terms, psychological expressions. Methodological (or psychological) behaviorism view about how psychology ought to be conducted as a science. Both views emphasize the role of behavior in studying the mind. 3 thinkers associated with philosophical behaviorism: carl hempel, ludwig wittgenstein, gilbert ryle. If (cid:455)ou (cid:272)a(cid:374) ma(cid:454) if he is i(cid:374) pai(cid:374), he (cid:449)ould sa(cid:455) (cid:862)(cid:455)es(cid:863) Max exhibits certain types of pain behaviors (wincing, groaning, etc. ) For stoics, eve(cid:374) if (cid:455)ou"(cid:396)e (cid:374)ot e(cid:454)hi(cid:271)iti(cid:374)g pai(cid:374) (cid:271)eha(cid:448)io(cid:396)s, (cid:455)ou (cid:449)ould (cid:271)e disposed to e(cid:454)hi(cid:271)it pai(cid:374) (cid:271)eha(cid:448)io(cid:396) Animal pain behavior is different from humans. Also problematic: when trying to find the outward behavior corresponding to belief. Motivations for logical behaviorism: logi(cid:272)al (cid:271)eha(cid:448)io(cid:396)ists did(cid:374)"t like the ca(cid:396)tesia(cid:374) idea that (cid:373)e(cid:374)tal state te(cid:396)(cid:373)s (cid:396)efe(cid:396)(cid:396)ed to p(cid:396)i(cid:448)ate inner mental happenings because this would make mental state ascriptions unverifiable.
