PHIL 102 Lecture Notes - Lecture 6: Alasdair Macintyre, Behavioural Sciences, Intentionality
30 Jul 2020
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As taylor maintains, of the animal we cannot say that he is aware of what for him is the same thing, under two different descriptions, simultaneously or on different occasions. Page | 1 object awareness that we can attribute to animals is awareness of the immediate relevance of objects to their behavior, what merleau-ponty calls "functional value. " It should not be difficult to account for this type of animal consciousness if we consider the wide range of routine human actions that belong to the same level of consciousness. For now, it does not seem appropriate to decide negatively a priori. The answer must be the result of empirical research regarding which explanation is more appropriate to account for animal behavior. Still, taylor reminds us that talking about intentionality in this case, consistent with the meaning of this notion in authors like merleau-ponty, does not mean equating it to what taylor calls.
