POLSCI 160 Lecture 9: Commitment Problems in Bargaining
23 Jan 2019
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Document Summary
Lack of enforcement can eliminate zone of agreement war. Revival after defeat (ex: iraq military strengthened again post- gulf war) New regime (ex: hitler"s new goals, broken promises) In situation a settlement no zone of agreement prefer war. Conflict popularity of politician before election october surprise . Commitment problems conflict when: 1 parties believe opposition will undermine. Commitment problem explains unresolved conflict, not origin of conflict. Persuasion & signaling: aim to convince target of threat"s credibility. Lock in: war inevitable b/c both sides refuse to back down. If one side believes lock in inevitable feign weakness (ex: pearl harbor) Risk of being too trusting > risk of being too suspicious (better safe than sorry) Do not want to reveal reservation point. Could back enemy into corner lock in. Commitment problems cycles of violence to advance bargaining position. Majority of both sides support 2-state solution. Potential for arab regime in which hostility toward israel .
