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28 Sep 2019
- Consider the infinitely repeated game of Prisoners Dilemma that has the following payoff structure. Each player has a discount rate r. Suppose both players are using the Tit-For-Tat strategy.
Column
Defect
Cooperate
Row
Defect
2, 2
10, 1
Cooperate
1, 10
6, 6
- (a) Under what condition does a player have an incentive to deviate once from cooperating and then revert to it? [4 points]
- (b) Under what condition does a player have an incentive to deviate from cooperating forever? [4 points]
- (c) Under what condition is it a Nash equilibrium that both players use the Tit-For-Tat strategy? [2 points]
- Consider the infinitely repeated game of Prisoners Dilemma that has the following payoff structure. Each player has a discount rate r. Suppose both players are using the Tit-For-Tat strategy.
|
Column |
||
|
Defect |
Cooperate |
|
Row |
Defect |
2, 2 |
10, 1 |
Cooperate |
1, 10 |
6, 6 |
- (a) Under what condition does a player have an incentive to deviate once from cooperating and then revert to it? [4 points]
- (b) Under what condition does a player have an incentive to deviate from cooperating forever? [4 points]
- (c) Under what condition is it a Nash equilibrium that both players use the Tit-For-Tat strategy? [2 points]
Joshua StredderLv10
28 Sep 2019