How do socioeconomic factors considering rural areas with low income and vunerable senior citizen affect the ability to deliver healthcare?
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how to analysis production possibilities frontier and oopotunities cost?
How do opportunity cost and production possibilities relate to each other? Use examples from the problems below
Example Suppose there is an improvement in medical technology that enables more healthcare to be provided with the same amount of resources. How would this affect the production possibilities curve and, in particular, how would it affect the opportunity cost of education?
Individals are of two di §erent abilities: high (H) and low (L). An individual knows his or her own
ability but an employer does not. Employers believe that both types of individuals are equally likely
in the population, and therefore has an initial (prior) belief that an individual is high ability with
probability 1. Before an individual looks for a job, he or she has an opportunity to go to college. 2
Assume that attending college does not change an individualiÃs ability; this problem shows that even in
this circumstance, college can perform a useful social function. The e §ort cost of attending college is
di §erent for individuals of di §erent abilities. In order to attend college, high ability individuals must
expend e §ort 1, and low ability individuals must expend e §ort 1, where a < 3 (this means that a 3a
low ability individual has a higher cost of attending college). Not attending college costs 0. After
observing an individualiÃs education (that is, whether he or she attended college) an employer makes
the individual a job o §er. The wage that the individual receives is equal to the employeriÃs belief that
the individual is high ability, given the level of schooling that the individual has chosen to acquire. For
example, if the employer believes that a college graduate is high ability with probability 2 he will o §er 3
a college graduate a wage of 2 . If he believes that an individal with no college education is high ability 3
with probability 1 , he will o §er an individual without college a wage of 1 : An individualiÃs payo § is 44
equal to his wage, minus the cost of education..
First consider a separating equilibrium. In a separating equilibrium, high ability individuals attend college, but low ability individuals do not.
(a) If the employer observes that an individual did not attend college, what is his belief about the individualiÃs ability? What wage will he o §er individuals who do not attend college?
(b) If the employer observes that an individual did attend college, what is his belief about the indi- vidualiÃs ability? What wage will he o §er individuals who attend college?
(c) Given the wages paid to college graduates and those who do not attend, will the high-ability individual chooose to attend college? (Hint: compare the payo § of attending college for the high ability graduate to the payo § of not attending college)
(d) Given the wages paid to college graduates and those who do not attend, for which values of a will the low-ability individual chooose to attend college? (Hint: compare the payo § of attending college for the low ability graduate to the payo § of not attending college)
(e) In a separating equilibrium, a low ability individual does not attend college. For which values of a is this expectation consistent with the low ability individualiÃs strategy?
Now, consider a pooling equilibrium in which all individuals attend college; that is, both high and low ability individuals attend college. If some individual were to choose not to attend college, the employer would believe that he or she must be low ability, and would o §er a wage of 0.
(f) If the employer observes that an individual attended college, what is his belief about the individ- ualiÃs ability? What wage will he o §er to college graduates? (Hint: The employer expects that all individuals attend college. This means that attending college conveys no information about the individualiÃs true ability).
(g) Given the wages paid to college graduates (and the wage that would be paid to non-grads) would the high-ability individual choose to attend college? For which values of a would the low ability individual choose to attend college?
(h) In a pooling equilibrium, both high and low ability individuals attend college. For which values of a is this expectation consistent with the individualsiÃstrategies?
Finally, consider a sem-separating equilibrium in which high-ability individuals attend college (for sure), but low ability students attend college with probability 0 < s < 1:
(i) If the employer sees that an individual attends college what is his belief that the individual is high-ability? What is the wage to college graduates? (Hint: Remember, all high ability individuals attend, but low ability individuals attend with probability s. Divide the probability of an individual being high ability and attending college by the overall probability of an individual attending college).
(j) If the employer sees that an individual did not attend college, what are his beliefs about the individualiÃs ability? (Hint: all high ability individuals attend college)
(k) The low-ability individual is willing to randomize between attending college and not attending college. Use this to OÃËnd the probability that the low-ability individual attends in equilibrium.
Bonus: Comment on the purpose of college illustrated in this example. How is this purpose a §ected as college becomes easier for the low-ability type (i.e. as a increases)?
Mexico has two main government programs that transfer income to rural households. They are:
PROCAMPO, which pays a set amount per acre to farmers who grew basic grains in a base year prior to the elimination of guaranteed prices. Output price guarantees are not allowed under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) or the World Trade Organization (WTO) rules.The idea here was to replace the price support with a direct income payment to farmers, to compensate them for lower grain prices. Direct income payments are allowed, because unlike price supports, they are not expected to affect production (in ag policy jargon, they areâdecoupled.â) Most PROCAMPO payments go to corn farmers, big and small.
OPORTUNIDADES, a conditional welfare program that gives payments to poor women provided that their children are enrolled in schools and in the local clinic. The idea is to combat poverty in the short run (by giving money to women, the responsible ones!) and in the long run (by making sure kids get the human capital they need to be productive and make an income when they get older). This has become a model for welfare programs in less-developed countriesâand even in New York City!
a) How would you expect each one of these public transfer programs to affect (i) inequality and(ii) poverty in rural Mexico? Why?
