POLS2133 Study Guide - Final Guide: Peace Enforcement, Humanitarian Intervention, Peacekeeping
(WK 6) THE UN AND INTERNATIONAL PEACE SECURITY
Introduction: The Problem of war
The Problem of War
The original and still the most important problem of IR, theoretically and practically.
-Usefully analysed as a cooperation problem: “Rationalist Explanations for
War” (Fearon 1995) – given war is so costly, often an agreement exists where
the parties would be better off than if they fought.
Flurry of early and then mid-20th Century IO creation (League, then UN) followed
the two most destructive wars in history, and reflected the belief that all states had a
collective interest in countering aggression, a major cause of war.
Hope that the united threat of a military response mobilised through an IO would
deter potential aggressors.
-That “collective security” could replace balance of power politics, and would
be thus be worth states’ participation.
UN Charter, Art. 1
“The purposes of the United Nations are:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with
the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace.”
What does it mean to achieve “peace and security”?
Traditionally the priority was on security for and between sovereign states: secure
borders and freedom from outside interference.
However, ever-deepening globalisation and the development of human rights and
humanitarian norms have eroded traditional notions of sovereignty.
Now recognition that conflict and strife within borders increasingly have international
consequences – can constitute “threats to international peace and security”.
War in the 21st century
War (mostly) looks different today! Much less interstate war, much more internal
armed conflict, initially from the independence wave, lately from ethnic conflicts,
separatist movements, terrorism, and “failed states”.
These “new” wars come with a host of other challenges –including war crimes and
human rights violations, humanitarian crises and state collapse.
The contribution made by IOs in the security domain is therefore not just about
preventing and stopping wars, but shaping how they are fought and ameliorating
some of their negative impacts.
This topic in summary
1. There is no other national interest more important than security, making the task of
IOs to influence and constrain states’ self-interested behaviour arguably the toughest
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of all
2. However, the obligations states have assumed are still some of the most sovereignty-
constraining because they recognise the costs of war and the “promise” of collective
security.
3. Still, given (1), realists are on their strongest ground, because we are mostly likely to
observe the most powerful states asserting themselves. This creates two challenges:
i. How can we separate the impact of power from that of the UN?
ii. To what extent is the UN’s (successful) impact conditional on a particular
configuration of power and interests?
4. There are multiple ways to evaluate the UN’s record of “success”, given evolving
definitions of “security” and the transformation of peacekeeping since the end of the
Cold War.
5. We must therefore be precise in identifying the UN’s impact, and under what
conditions it arises. Sometimes it might be marginal, difficult to pin down
concretely, or easier to observe over the longer rather than shorter term. (Note
to certain nationalist politicians!)
Peace Enforcement
Peace enforcement
Coercive military interventions by states via a UN-authorised force, designed to
accomplish a specific set of political goals.
SC invokes Chapter VII to making a finding of a “threat to international peace and
security” and decides on measures to respond to it (Art 39), including sanctions (Art
41) and military force (Art 42).
This is the UN taking sides: “If the use of deadly force is to be legitimate killing
rather than senseless killing, it must serve the purpose of settling the war—which
means determining who rules, which means leaving someone in power at the end of
the day” (Betts, p. 22).
Actions under Chapter VII since end of Cold War
Authorising third-party enforcement: Authorising “all necessary means” e.g. to
reverse Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait in 1990 and to protect civilians in
Libya in 2011; NATO bombing of Bosnian Serb forces in 1995, and (probably) the
US invasion of Afghanistan following 9/11 (as an act of self-defence).
Economic sanctions: Numerous cases, most notably the response to increased terrorist
threat by sanctioning individuals and mandating policy frameworks within states (e.g.
relating to financing).
Creation of international criminal tribunals: ICTY, ICTR, SCSL.
State-building: Via the creation of transitional administrations (temporary
governments) in Kosovo and East Timor.
Expanding peacekeeping mandates (see below): UN flagged peacekeeping missions
in CAR, DRC and Mali.
Direct and indirect influence
Clearly, authorising the military defeat of a (rogue) state removes a threat and
represents direct IO impact.
“far more common to see the Council’s authority used as a resource or tool to shift
the political grounds of a dispute among states…”, having “learned to maximise its
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influence by leveraging its legal powers into the more subtle currency of political
persuasion” (Hurd, p. 87).
“the intention of the UN’s framers that the Security Council would be a place where
the political negotiations of the Great Powers over the management of the
international system would be framed within an explicit grant of legal authority by all
other states” (Hurd, p. 95).
Peace-enforcement as a tool of persuasion
Peace-enforcement via actual military intervention is rare. More common for the SC
to use the spectre of its enforcement power as political leverage to encourage states to
comply with their obligations.
This involves identifying a situation as a “threat to international peace and security”
under Art. 39, which is a clear signal that SC is on the path to a coercive military
intervention, if recalcitrant states do not comply.
Thinking theoretically
Even with an established organisation to coordinate activities, actually deploying
military force is really really complicated and hard – especially multilaterally.
It’s much easier for one country (with a really big military!) to do it, or a group of
allied countries (that already have institutionalised cooperation – e.g. NATO). Of
course, such third parties have to want to do it.
In such situations where one state (or a small group) does most of the actual work,
what is the cooperation problem being solved? Standards and signals? Expressions of
collective will? For you to think about...
Major constraint: The P-5 veto
Vetoes happen when it is in the interests of a P-5 member not to have the SC pass a
resolution on a matter. The ideological divide during the Cold War essentially
rendered the UNSC irrelevant.
UN response to North Korea’s invasion of South Korea only happened because the
USSR was boycotting the SC (protesting Taiwan’s presence on the Council; Moscow
subsequently learned its lesson!).
Some of the biggest conflicts of the Cold War therefore never made it to the UNSC,
such as the French and US wars in Vietnam and the Soviet interventions in Hungary
and Czechoslovakia.
Vetoes were declining over time; recent uptick (6 in 2017)
Cold War: USSR 68 vetoes, USA 61.
Recently: 2018: Yemen (R); 2017: Jerusalem (US); Syria (Rx4; R & C); 2016: Syria
(R; R & C); 2015: Ukraine (R), B&H (R); 2014: Syria (R, C); Ukraine (R), 2012:
Syria x 2 (R, C); 2011: Syria (R, C); Israel-Palestine (USA)
But they remain controversial
Guardian reporting from your readings: UNSC paralysed over the Syria situation,
with the US warning that the “blanket” use by Russia of the veto “will jeopardise the
SC’s long-term legitimacy”.
-Estimates of over 400,000 dead, 11 million displaced.
However, Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad is an ally of Russia’s President Putin. Russia
also argues the SC should not be a vehicle for regime change.
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Document Summary
(wk 6) the un and international peace security. The original and still the most important problem of ir, theoretically and practically. Usefully analysed as a cooperation problem: rationalist explanations for. War (fearon 1995) given war is so costly, often an agreement exists where the parties would be better off than if they fought. Flurry of early and then mid-20th century io creation (league, then un) followed the two most destructive wars in history, and reflected the belief that all states had a collective interest in countering aggression, a major cause of war. Hope that the united threat of a military response mobilised through an io would deter potential aggressors. That collective security could replace balance of power politics, and would be thus be worth states" participation. Traditionally the priority was on security for and between sovereign states: secure borders and freedom from outside interference.
