POLS1002 Chapter Notes - Chapter 2: Nato
COLOMER ‘The Science of Politics’ – Ch 2
Collective Action
• An explanation for such unequal distribution of public resources is that small groups and their
lobbies are often much more powerful politically than large groups
The collective action function
• The common interest of a group can be defined as a public good
• Collective action to provide public goods depends on individuals’ decisions
• Collective action is participation by individual members of a group to the provision of public
goods
• R = EXPECTED REWARD
• B = BENEFITS
• C = COSTS
• PRIVATE GOODS: R = B – C
- If R is positive – that is, if the expected benefits of a good are higher than its cost
– it will be rational for the individual to perform such an action
• More formally, the individual logic of deciding whether to participate can be represented by
this collective action function:
• R = B X P – C
- The reward for an individual for participating in collective action (R) equals the
expected benefit from accessing the public good (B) times the probability of his
action being effective for the provision of the good (P) minus the cost of
participating (C)
- If R is positive, participating is a good decision, but if R is negative, participation
may not be worth the effort
- The same function can be used for private goods but P always equals one since for
private goods the individual action always makes a difference to obtain the good
The Free Rider
• Free rider – someone able to use the public good without contributing to is provision
Selective Incentives
• One mechanisms to make people contribute to the provision of public goods may be the
conditional supply of private goods to the participants in collective action – this can
create selective incentives for individuals to cooperate
• The addition of this variable can turn around the sign of the basic individual function of
collective action (presented earlier) making a negative result a positive one:
• R = B X P – C + D
- D = SELECTIVE INCENTIVES
• Incentives provided selectively by any kind of group only to those individuals participating in
collective action can either be material or moral as well as positive or negative
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Document Summary
Colomer the science of politics" ch 2. Collective action: an explanation for such unequal distribution of public resources is that small groups and their lobbies are often much more powerful politically than large groups. If r is positive that is, if the expected benefits of a good are higher than its cost. It will be rational for the individual to perform such an action: more formally, the individual logic of deciding whether to participate can be represented by this collective action function, r = b x p c. If r is positive, participating is a good decision, but if r is negative, participation may not be worth the effort. The same function can be used for private goods but p always equals one since for private goods the individual action always makes a difference to obtain the good. The free rider: free rider someone able to use the public good without contributing to is provision.
