PHIL 111 Chapter Notes - Chapter 5: The Lonely Crowd, Nathan Glazer, Mind Control
The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 7 April 25, 1967
152
Same Student: Isn’t the point there in Locke that that man is no longer a man? I mean,
he no longer has the essential nature of humanity.
LS: Ya. But then, yes and no. Kant would say you cannot renounce it. Well, there would
be the case of insanity, and then he is really no longer a rational being and that is a moot
question. But if you think only of what the Nazis did with insane people and how it was
viewed upon by all non-Nazis
77
, ya? You know what they did and then you see that there
is a difficulty even here: whether even in a human being who has become insane one
should not respect, as it were, the reflection of a former sanity—to say nothing of the
fact, of which we are reminded by Kant, that we cannot tell. The man may regain his
sanity even if all psychiatrists tell us he can’t, because psychiatrists are not omniscient
and there are always exceptions to rules.
Now we have to read something on page 431.
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Let us read only the second half of this
paragraph.
79lx
Mr. Reinken: First paragraph.
Objectively the ground of all practical legislation lies (according to the first
principle) in the rule and in the form of universality, which makes it capable of
being a law (at most a natural law); subjectively, it lies in the end. But the subject
of all ends is every rational being as an end in itself (by the second principle);
from this there follows the third practical principle of the will as the supreme
condition of its harmony with universal practical reason, viz., the idea of the will
of every rational being as making universal law.
lxi
LS: No, literally, “as a will legislating universally.” Now this is what Kant calls in the
sequel “autonomy,” “self-legislation.” Every rational being, and therefore in particular
man, is moral only to the extent to which he is autonomous. Now what does this mean?
Autonomy is used in contradistinction to heteronomy, that someone else imposes this
law. And needless to say that not only divine laws,
80
which are imposed by God on man,
and man not being also legislating, and laws based on nature, moral laws in the
traditional sense, imply heteronomy.
81
There are some people today, I have been given to understand, who make the distinction
between “self-directed” and “other-directed.”
lxii
That is descendant from Kant’s
distinction between autonomy and heteronomy. And “tradition-directed,” which is the
third kind of direction these people speak of, is of course also heteronomy, because when
tradition directs you, you do not direct yourself.
82
That is frequently misunderstood. And
Kant makes this clear in a later writing, The Metaphysics of Morals itself. Now autonomy
as Kant understands it means self-compulsion. The word “compulsion” did occur, but
translated sometimes as “necessitation” and so on. “Compulsion” is a much better
translation.
lx
There is some confusion about the passage that Strauss wants Mr. Reinken to read; the several
lines of the transcript in which this is addressed have been deleted.
lxi
Ibid., 49.
lxii
David Riesman, Nathan Glazer, and Reuel Denney, The Lonely Crowd (1950).
The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 7 April 25, 1967
153
Now what does this mean?
83
It is a principle of great practical importance. We all hear all
the time of compulsion exerted, say, in concentration camps, prisoners of war camps, and
brainwashing and this kind of thing. Now Kant makes this point: another being can
compel me to do something
84
which is not my purpose, for example, to crawl on my
belly, or still more terrible things. But another being can never compel me to make this
particular thing, say, crawling on my belly, my purpose. For if he compels me to do
something which I do not like to do, my purpose in giving in to the compulsion is to
escape death, torture, etc., etc., whereas his purpose is to extract information or to
humiliate me or so. No one can ever compel a man—that’s Kant’s key point
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—to make
what he wills his purpose. That can only be an act of the agent.
86
Therefore, even if God
would command us something,
87
God could not strictly speaking compel us to do it.
88
It
would have to become our act, our purpose; and this purpose is not subject to
compulsion.
Now let us read on page 432, the first paragraph. “For if we think such a will, namely a
will legislating universally—”
89
Mr. Reinken:
90
But if we think of a will giving universal laws, we find that a supreme legislating
will cannot possibly depend on any interest, for such a dependent will would itself
need still another law which would restrict the interest of its self-love to the
condition that [the maxims of this will] should be valid as universal law.
Thus the principle of every human will as a will giving universal laws in all its
maxims—
lxiii
LS: “Through all its maxims.” That is very important, because the maxims come
necessarily first, and
91
the maxim must be capable to become a principle of a universal
legislation. Yes?
Mr. Reinken:
is very well adapted to being a categorical imperative, provided it is otherwise
correct. Because of the idea of universal lawgiving, it is based on no interest—
lxiv
LS:
92
Let us stop here. Namely, like that interest which I have to give in to that torturer or
murderer in a concentration or prisoner of war camp. The interest I have is to escape from
the torturer, etc. But
93
an action can only be mine and can be genuine if the purpose
originates in me without such a previous interest, i.e., in obedience to the moral law. Now
in the sequel, yes?
Student: Does that mean that anyone who does anything under orders therefore would
not be morally responsible? Anyone that does anything under an order is not morally
responsible—
lxiii
Ibid., 50.
lxiv
Ibid.
