PHIL 200 Chapter : The Philosophy of Sex 48
12 Jun 2018
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recognition when preferences are transformed into individual duties and public policy.
Utilitarians are thus instructed to ignore the preferences of child molesters in seeking to maximize
happiness.
Why leave anyone free to indulge indefensible desires? In fact visceral, unreasoned preferences
deserve as much deference as any others.
To see why, it is necessary first to distinguish irrational preferences from merely nonrational ones.
A rational preference may be defined as one commanded by reason, and an irrational one as
forbidden by reason, perhaps because reason commands a contrary.
Nonrational preferences, by contrast, are neither commanded nor forbidden by reason, neither
rational nor irrational.
Irrational preferences are obviously to be avoided, but on reflection there is no similar imperative to
avoid or disdain the nonrational.
There are two standard theories of how reason can issue commands, both of which tend to count
unconditioned preferences as nonrational.
The first holds that preferences can be as intrinsically rational or irrational as cognitive states.
Even those who maintain that some desires either follow from or contravene reason in this sense
admit that not all do.
Reason is mute about a desire to chew gum, or unconditioned tastes such as fondness for sugar.
Dislike of homosexuals is not inherently against reason.
Most philosophers today reject this rationalist theory of preferences in favor of Hume's, that actions,
choices, and preferences can be rational or irrational only in the derivative sense of aiding or
impeding the satisfaction of more deeply entrenched preferences.
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Document Summary
Recognition when preferences are transformed into individual duties and public policy. Utilitarians are thus instructed to ignore the preferences of child molesters in seeking to maximize happiness. In fact visceral, unreasoned preferences deserve as much deference as any others. To see why, it is necessary first to distinguish irrational preferences from merely nonrational ones. A rational preference may be defined as one commanded by reason, and an irrational one as forbidden by reason, perhaps because reason commands a contrary. Nonrational preferences, by contrast, are neither commanded nor forbidden by reason, neither rational nor irrational. Irrational preferences are obviously to be avoided, but on reflection there is no similar imperative to avoid or disdain the nonrational. There are two standard theories of how reason can issue commands, both of which tend to count unconditioned preferences as nonrational. The first holds that preferences can be as intrinsically rational or irrational as cognitive states.
