GOV 1290 Chapter Notes - Chapter 11: Universal Suffrage, Corporatism, Government Simulation Game

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Democracy)in)Africa:)Successes,)Failures,)and)the)Struggle)for)Political)Reform)

(!"##$#%&'(

The$resumption$of$the$Angolan$civil$war$in$1993

Rwandan$genocide$of$1994

1996:$Zambia's$Movement$for$Multi-Party$Democracy$(MMD)$--

initially$celebrated$ as$one$of$the$first$opposition$parties$in$Africa$to$

defeat$an$authoritarian$government$at$the$polls$-- was$undermined$

by$a$flawed$election$and$evidence$of$widespread$corruption

200:$Cote$d'Ivoire$descended$into$sivil$war$following$a$disputed$

election

Was$associated$with:

○

Kenya$(1999):$accusations$of$electoral$manipulation$led$to$a$

month$of$civil$conflict$where$1,000$people$lost$their$lives

□

Remain$prominent$feature$of$multiparty$politics$up$to$the$present$

day

These$democratic$breakdowns$not$just$the$result$of$teething$problems

○

Endemic$poverty,$weak$infrastructure,$pronounced$inter-communal$

tensions

Issues$with$implementing$multiparty$politics$on$the$continent:

○

Multiparty$elections$returned$in$the$early$1990's

•

Botswana

○

Mauritius

○

Two$states$have$enjoyed$$uninterrupted$multiparty$politics$since$independence

•

Despite$history$of$violent$divide-and-rule$politics,$South$Africa$has$

managed$a$stable$and$relatively$peaceful$transition$from$apartheid$to$

majority$rule

○

South$Africa

•

Transformation$from$a$political$ system$marked$by$coups,$military$rule,$

and$mismanagement$to$one$of$Africa's$leading$democratic$lights$is$equally$

striking

○

Ghana

•

African$elections$have$typically$been$won$by$those$already$in$power$-- but$

many$leaders$have$been$forced$to$stepdown$as$a$result$of$constitutional$

restrictions$on$their$time$in$office

○

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•

Few$African$societies$have$recognized$the$right$of$a$government$to$

exercise$ absolute$power

○

Authoritarian$rule$was$the$norm$on$the$continent$for$much$of$the$last$century•

"While$the$one-party$states$that$mushroomed$in$$the$1960s$both$

centralized$power$and$denied$citizens$a$choice$of$ruling$party,$many$

continued$to$hold$elections$for$constituency$MPs,$reflecting$the$desire$of$

ordinary$Africans$to$select$their$representatives.$These$regimes$were$far$

from$being$competitive$democracies,$but$single-party$systems$in$

countries$such$as$Kenya,$Senegal,$and$Zambia$were$nevertheless$

significantly$more$open,$tolerant,$and$responsive$than$was$typically$the$

case$in$their$Latin$American$and$Eastern$European$counterparts.$As$a$

result,$African$political$systems$were$sometimes$more$democratic$than$

they$seemed.$Although$they$are$typically$overlooked,$these$histories$of$

more$open$politics$are$important,$because$they$established$norms$

regarding$the$appropriate$-- and$inappropriate$-- actions$of$governments.$

In$turn,$these$norms$constrained$authoritarian$leaders$and$were$later$

harnessed$by$pro-democracy$campaigners,$facilitating$the$process$of$

political$change"$(3)

○

National$identity,$strong$and$autonomous$political$institutions,$a$

developed$and$vibrant$civil$ society,$the$effective$rule$of$law,$and$a$

strong$and$well-performing$economy

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Even$when$we$factor$in$these$prior$experience$ of$electoral$ politics,$the$

existence$of$democratic$states$in$Africa$is$still$remarkable.$Political$

scientists$have$identified$a$long$wish$list$of$factors$that$make$it$easier$to$

establish$and$consolidate$a$democracy

○

While$the$continent$has$endured$more$than$its$fair$share$of$brutal$dictators,$

Africa's$history$is$also$dotted$with$fragments$of$democracy

•

Political$reform$occurs$when$leaders$allow$it$to$(Volunteerist$argument$?)

○

Ghana:$flight$lieutenant$JJ$Rawlings$responded$to$pressure$to$democratize$

by$construcitng$an$increasingly$rule-bound$political$system$that$was$

responsive$to$people's$needs

○

Kenya:$President$Daniel$arap$Moi$adopted$a$radically$different$strategy,$

manipulating$state$resources$to$fund$his$party's$campaign$of$thuggery$and$

intimidation

○

Cote$d'Ivoire,$Rwanda,$Togo,$Zimbabwe:$incumbents$held$onto$power$at$

all$costs,$even$when$they$were$spawned$widespread$civil$conflict

○

Easy$for$them$to$walk$away$from$power$because$they$had$not$

committed$crimes$that$were$likely$to$make$them$targets$for$

domestic$and$international$prosecution$and$because$they$

trusted$future$governments$not$to$persecute$them

□

Both$presidents$lacked$the$resources$and$international$support$

required$to$overcome$the$sizeable$opposition$to$their$rule,$and$

understood$that$repression$was$not$a$viable$long-term$strategy

Benin$and$Zambia:$President$Kerekou$and$Kaunda$gracefully$accepted$

defeat$following$their$"founding"$elections

○

If$the$danger$of$electoral$defeat$is$more$acceptable$than$the$

costs$of$repressing$the$opposition,$incumbents$are$more$likely$

to$allow$for$free$and$fair$elections

□

Robert$Dahl:$leaders$are$more$likely$to$pursue$political$liberalization$

when$they$find$the$costs$of$reform$to$be$more$acceptable$than$the$

costs$of$repression

Main$factors$that$encouraged$incumbent$leaders$to$accept,$or$reject,$

democratization

○

The$strength$of$the$opposition□

Whether$leaders$have$the$funds$and$authority$to$be$able$to$

sustain$their$regimes$through$the$use$of$coercion

□

Factors:

In$cases$were$pro-democracy$forces$are$united,$better$funded,$and$

supported$by$a$vibrant$civil$society,$an$incumbent$must$expend$far$

greater$resources$in$order$to$contain$the$opposition

Egypt$and$Tunisia$(both$in$2011):$military$refuses$to$

participate$in$attacks$on$protestors

□

When$the$pro-reform$movement$is$so$strong$that$it$can$only$be$

defeated$through$force,$leaders$must$also$factor$in$the$likely$loss$of$

domestic$and$international$support$that$will$result

Pronounced$ethnic$and$religious$identities$can$make$it$

harder$for$a$united$opposition$to$emerge$and$so$reduce$

the$cost$of$maintaining$the$status$quo

Kenya:$Daniel$arap$Moi's$regime$actively$encouraged$different$

factions$of$the$opposition$Form$for$the$Restoration$of$

Democracy$to$register$as$separate$parties$for$the$1992$

fouding$elections

□

The$unity$of$the$opposition$is$also$critical$ (leaders$retaining$power$

by$playing$different$factions$of$the$oppositions$off$against$each$

other)

The$cost$of$repressing$the$opposition$also$depends$on$whether$a$

leader$enjoys$the$machinery$and$resources$necessary$to$rule$

through$force$-- effective$police$force$and$security$service,$finances

The$costs$of$repression

○

Democratization$and$Autocratization•

Neopatrimonial)Regimes)and)Political)Transitions)in)Africa)(B4&002'-&'3-N&'-K#-

O&..#(

From$prompt:$"Bratton$and$Van$de$Walle$argue$that$strong$state$institutions$are$

essential$for$successful$democratic$transitions.$In$their$view,$widespread$

neopatrimonialism$is$a$major$obstacle$to$stable$democratization$in$Africa.

•

Opens$the$article$by$admitting$that$in$explaining$the$demise$of$bureaucratic$

forms$of$authoritarianism$cannot$account$for$transitions$from$more$

personalistic$types$of$rule

•

"In$this$article,$we$examine$recent$patterns$of$political$change$in$Africa$and$on$

that$basis$propose$revisions$to$the$theory$of$political$transitions"$$(453)

•

1990-1993:$more$than$half$of$Africa's$52$governments$responded$to$

domestic$and$international$pressures$by$holding$competitive$presidential$

or$legislative$elections

○

Africa$responding$to$global$challenge$to$authoritarianism•

Some$cases$-- a$competitive$election$has$led$to$an$alternation$of$political$

leaders$and$the$emergence$of$a$fragile$democratic$regime

○

More$often$-- transition$has$been$flawed (with$the$incumbent$stealing$the$

election),$blocked$(with$the$incumbents$and$opposition$deadlocked$over$

the$rules$of$the$political$game,$or$precluded$(by$widespread$civil$unrest)

○

Outcomes$have$been$highly$variable:•

While$not$complete,$democratization$has$already$discredited$military$and$one-

party$regimes$-- few$of$which$are$likely$to$survive$intact

•

Why$do$some$regimes$undergo$transitions$from$authoritarian$rule$while$

others$do$not?

○

Are$there$different$paths$of$transitions?

○

Why$do$some$transitions$occasionally$result$in$democracy$but$others$fall$

short?

○

Why,$in$Africa,$are$transitions$to$democracy$generally$problematic?

○

Questions$the$authors$ask:•

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Also,$once$inclusionary$regimes$have$held$power,$the$

reimposition$of$an$exclusionary$regime$requires$heavy$doses$

of$state$coercion

□

She$finds$from$recent$LA$experience$ that$inclusionary$democracies$

tend$to$collapse$as$a$result$of$intrigue$among$the$political$elite,$

whereas$exclusionary$democracies$are$more$likely$to$succumb$to$

pressure$from$below

Karen$Remmer:$"once$one$recognizes$the$'enormous$range$of$variation$

concealed$within$the$authoritarian$(and$democratic)$categories,'$political$

outcomes$vary$systematically$with$regime$type"$(455)

○

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Huntington:$"'third$wave'$democratic$transitions$in$thirty-five$countries$

finds$little$overall$relationship$between$the$nature$of$the$incumbent$

authoritarian$regime$and$the$pattern$of$political$transition.$He$contends$

that$whereas$political$transitions$are$most$likely$to$be$initiated$from$the$

top$down,$such$dynamics$are$equally$likely$in$one-party$military$or$

personalistic$regimes.$

○

Regime$type$and$political$ transition•

Most$penetrating$and$influential$contemporary$work$on$this$subject

○

CONTINGENT$APPROACH

○

ARGUE$AGAINST$THIS,$THERE$HAS$TO$BE$A$SYSTEMIC$WAY$TO$LOOK$

AT$TRANSITIONS$IN$AFRICA,$THERE$IS$A$REASON$WHY$SOME$

SUCCEED$AND$SOME$DON'T$-->$NOT$COMPLETELY$RANDOM

Avoid$the$possibility$of$systematic$causality$and$instead$advance$what$can$

be$termed$a$contingent$approach$to$transitions.$They$argue$that$

transitions$are$abnormal$periods$of$"undetermined"$political$ change$in$

which$"there$are$insufficient$structural$or$behavioral$parameters$to$guide$

and$predict$the$outcome.$Compared$with$the$orderliness$of$authoritarian$

rule,$transitions$are$marked$by$unruly$and$chaotic$struggles$and$by$

uncertainty$about$the$nature$of$resultant$regimes.$Analysts$cannot$

assume$that$the$transition$process$is$shaped$by$preexisting$constellations$

of$macroeconomic$conditions,$social$classes$and$political$institutions.$

Instead,$formerly$cohesive$social$classes$and$political$organizations$tend$

to$splinter$in$the$heat$of$political$combat,$making$it$impossible$to$deduce$

alignments$and$actions$of$any$protagonist.$Political$outcomes$are$driven$

by$the$short-term$calculations$and$the$immediate$reactions$of$strategic$

actors$to$unfolding$events$(456)

○

Guillermo$O'Donnell$and$Philippe$Schmitter•

There$is$much$merit$in$this$contingent$approach,$which$captures$well$the$

chaotic$nature$of$regime$transitions,$but$we$remain$dissatisfied$with$the$

open-ended$implication$that$any$one$transition$process$or$outcome$is$just$

as$likely$as$any$other

○

Excessive$voluntarism of$O'Donnell$and$Schmitter's$framework

○

ARGUE$THAT$IF$THAT$REGIME$LACKS$SAID$STRUCTURES$AND$

POLITICAL$INSTITUTIONS,$IT$WILL$PROVIDE$CONDITIONS$FOR$

A$NEW$SYSTEM$TO$ARISE$-- SUCH$AS$ONE-PARTY$MILITARY$

RULE$OR$A$DICTATOR,$whereas$strong$instutions$will$allow$

the$state$to$develop$a$system$that$works$for$the$greater$

masses

□

"Even$in$the$midst$of$tremendous$uncertainty$provoked$by$a$regime$

transition,$where$constraints$appear$to$be$most$relaxed$ and$where$

a$wide$range$of$outcomes$appears$to$be$possible,$the$decisions$

made$by$various$actors$respond$to$and$are$conditioned$by$the$types$

of$socioeconomic$structures$and$political$institutions$already$

present"$(456)

Terry$Lynn$Karl:$

○

Bermeo:$"authoritarian$regimes$do$not$seem$to$collapse$during$

periods$of$relative$prosperity"$(457)

Karl:$"democratic$consolidation$depends$on$the$"absence$of$a$

strong$landowner$elite$engaged$in$labor-repressive$agriculture"

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To$date,$most$propositions$in$transition$literature$concern$the$effects$of$

deep$socioeconomic$structures

○

Response$to$O'Donnell$and$Schmitter•

Recent$literature$has$tended$to$assume$the$presence$of$the$corporatist$

institutions$that$predominated$in$the$bureaucratic$authoritarian$regimes$

of$Southern$Europe$and$Latin$America. In$Africa,$how$ever,$political$

institutions$have$on$the$whole$evolved$within$neopatrimonial$rather$than$

corporatist$regimes,$forcing$us$to$assess$the$impact$of$regime$type"$(457)

○

THIS$IS$PRIMARY$ARGUMENT$FOR$WHY$THESE$

NEOPATRIMONIAL$REGIMES$DIFFER$FROM$MILITARY$AND$

ONE-PARTY$REGIMES,$AS$THE$GOALS$ARE$THERE$

(SOMEWHAT),$HOWEVER$LEADERS$HAVE$GONE$ABOUT$

ACHIEVING$GOALS$DIFFERENTLY$-->$IN$THE$ABSENCE$OF$

BUREAUCRATIC$FORMULAS$TO$CREATE$INSTITUTIONS$OR$IN$

DISTRIBUTING$INFLUENCE$IN$CIVIL$SOCIETY

□

Leaders$of$postcolonial$African$countries$may$have$pursued$a$

corporatist$strategy$to$the$extent$that$they$promoted$an$organic$

ideology$of$national$unity$and$attempted$to$direct$political$

mobilization$along$controlled$channels.$But$African$leaders$have$

rarely$used$bureaucratic$formulas$to$construct$authoritative$

institutions$or$granted$subsidiary$spheres$of$influence$to$

occupational$interest$groups$within$civil$society

Do$not$display$formal$governing$coalitions$between$organized$state$

and$social$interests$or$the$collective$ bargaining$over$core$public$

policies$that$characterize$corporatism

African$regimes$are$distinctly$noncorporatist

○

VERY$IMPORTANT□

"In$neopatrimonial$regimes,$the$chief$executive$maintains$authority$

through$personal$patronage,$rather$than$through$ideology$or$law.$

As$with$classic$patrimonialism,$the$right$to$rule$is$ascribed$to$a$

person$rather$than$an$office.$In$contemporary$neopatrimonialism,$

relationships$of$loyalty$and$dependence$pervade$a$formal$political$

and$administrative$system$and$leaders$occupy$bureaucratic$offices$

less$to$perform$public$service$than$to$acquire$personal$wealth$and$

status.The$distinction$between$private$and$public$interests$is$

purposely$blurred.$The$essence$of$neopatrimonialism$is$the$award$

by$public$officials$of$personal$favors,$both$within$the$state$(notably$

public$sector$jobs)$and$in$society$(for$instance,$licenses,$contracts,$

and$projects).$In$return$for$material$rewards,$clients$mobilize$

political$sup$port$and$refer$all$decisions$upward$as$a$mark$of$

deference$to$patrons"$(458)

TRUE-->$IN$THE$ABSENCE$OF$INSTITUTIONS,$ELECTIONS,$HELD$

OFFICES,$TERMS,$ETC.$THE$ONES$WITH$THE$MOST$INFLUENCE$

AND$WEALTH$RULE$AND$REWARD$THOSE$AROUND$THEM$IN$

RETURN$FOR$POLITICAL$SUPPORT

□

Theobold:$"some$of$the$new$states$are,$properly$speaking,$not$

states$at$all;$rather,$they$are$virtually$the$private$instruments$of$

those$powerful$enough$to$rule."

Ciapham:$"neopatrimonialism$is$the$'most$salient$type$(of$

authority)'$in$the$Third$World$because$it$'corresponds$to$the$normal$

forces$of$social$organization$in$precolonial$societies'"$(459)

Thus,$personal$relationships$are$a$factor$at$the$margins$of$all$

bureaucratic$systems,$but$in$Africa$they$constitute$the$

foundation$and$superstructure$of$political$institution.$The$

interaction$between$the$"big$man$and$his$extended$retinue$

defines$African$politics,$from$the$highest$reaches$of$the$

presidential$palace$to$the$humblest$village$assembly.$As$such,$

analysts$of$African$politics$have$embraced$the$neopatrimonial$

model.

□

Neopatrimonialism$has$important$implications$for$the$analysis$

of$political$transitions.$On$the$one$hand,$one$would$expect$

transitions$from$neopatrimonial$rule$to$be$distinctive,$for$

example,$centering$on$struggles$over$the$legitimacy$of$the$

discretionary$decision$making$by$dominant,$personalistic$

leaders.$On$the$other$hand,$one$would$also$expect$the$

dynamics$of$political$change$to$be$highly$variable,$

unpredictably$reflecting$idiosyncratic$patterns$of$rule$devised$

by$strongmen.$Hence$the$need$to$emphasize$both$the$

commonalities$and$variations$in$transition$dynamics$and$out$

comes

□

Neopatrimonialism$as$the$core$feature$of$African$politics

S&0"#4<-0"#-31$01'/01[#-1'$0106012'&.-"&..%&4H-2:-9:41/&'-4#M1%#$-1$-

'#25&041%2'1&.1$%

○

9:41/&-[$Y-0"#-S#$0-2:-0"#-O24.3•

USE$THIS$WHEN$TALKING$ABOUT$THE$DIFFERENCE$IN$THE$

BREAKDOWN$OF$AUTHORITARIAN$VS.$NEOPATRIMONIAL$

REGIMES$-->$AND$SHOW$WHY$WITH$AN$ABSENCE$OF$

INSTITUTIONS$IN$AFRICA,$THERE$IS$NO$AVENUE$FOR$FOR$

SOCIETY$TO$COMMUNICATE$DESIRES$FOR$SOCIAL$PEACE$AND$

ECONOMIC$DEVELOPMENT,$AND$MORESO,$NO$

OPPORTUNITIES$FOR$IMPROVING$GUARANTEES$OF$CIVIL$AND$

POLITICAL$RIGHTS$AND$DISALLOWING$FREE$AND$FAIR$

ELECTIONS

□

The$transition$begins$when$a$moderate$faction$within$the$state$elite$

recognizes$that$social$peace$and$economic$development$alone$

cannot$legitimate$an$authoritarian$regime.$These$soft-liners$

promote$a$political$opening$by$providing$improved$guarantees$of$

civil$and$political$rights$and$later$conceding$the$convocation$of$free$

and$fair$elections.$The$greatest$threat$to$democratic$transition$

comes$from$a$backlash$by$elements$of$a$hard-line$faction,$most$

commonly$when$the$military$executes$a$reactionary$coup.$To$

forestall$hard-liners$and$complete$the$transition,$government$and$

opposition$leaders$meet$behind$the$scenes$to$forge$a$compromise$

"pact"$to$guarantee$the$vital$interests$of$major$elite$players

Recent$literature$on$democratization$in$Europe$and$LA$converges$on$a$

modal$path$of$political$transition

○

Practices$of$neopatrimonial$regimes$cause$chronic$fiscal$crisis$

and$make$economic$growth$highly$problematic$(no$

institutions$to$fight$this,$and$wealth$and$power$and$

concentrated$among$a$leader$and$his$homies)

□

Leaders$construct$particularistic$networks$of$personal$loyalty$

that$grant$undue$favor$to$selected$kinship,$ethnic,$or$regional$

groupings

□

Mass$popular$protest$likely$to$break$out

Unlikely$that$neopatrimonial$leaders$has$

benefited$society$in$any$way$to$legitimize$their$

rule

◊

Unlike$corporatist$rulers,$personal$rulers$cannot$point$

to$a$record$of$stability$and$prosperity$to$legitimate$their$

rule

X&H#'-02M#0"#4<-$"41'H1'M-#/2'2%1/-2552406'101#$-&'3-

#P/.6$12'&48-5&00#4'$-2:-4#7&43-&4#-&-4#/15#-:24-$2/1&.-6'4#$0

□

Political$transitions$from$neopatrimonial$regimes$originate$in$social$

protest$(Due$to$absence$of$other$ways$to$express$disconent)???

How$are$neopatrimonial$regimes$different?

○

UNLIKE$IN$NON-PATRIMONIAL$REGIMES,$THERE$IS$USUALLY$

ENOUGH$ORGANIZATION$THROUGH$EXISTING$INSITUTIONS$

TO$ORGANIZE$AN$OPPOSITION$PARTY$(esp$among$people$high$

up$in$govt$that$have$an$opportunity$to$take$over),$NOT$THE$

CASE$IN$AFRICA….$SO$TURNS$TO$CIVIL$UNREST$AND$PROTEST

□

THIS$IS$THE$REASON$FOR$COLLAPSE

Regimes$built$on$personal$loyalty$rather$than$bureaucratic$

authority$are$susceptible$to$institutional$collapse$when$

patronage$resources$run$out$-- and$if$it$fails$there$may$not$be$

an$organized$opposition$offering$a$programmatic$alternative

□

THIS$IS$NOT$AS$LIKELY$TO$HAPPEN$IN$RUSSIA$BECAUSE$

YOU'LL$BE$FUCKED???$-->$do$readings$on$Russia$before$

sayiign$this

As$a$result$of$twin$political$and$economic$crises,$political$

transitions$are$more$likely$to$originate$in$society$than$in$the$

corridors$of$elite$power

□

Endemic$fiscal$crisis$also$undercuts$the$capacity$of$rulers$to$manage$

the$process$of$political$change.$When$public$resources$dwindle$to$

the$point$where$the$incumbent$government$can$no$longer$pay$civil$

servants,$the$latter$join$the$anti-regime$protesters$in$the$streets.$

Shorn$of$the$ability$to$maintain$political$stability$through$the$

distribution$of$material$rewards,$neopatrimonial$leaders$resort$

erratically$ to$coercion$which,$in$turn,$further$undermines$the$

regime's$legitimacy.$The$showdown$occurs$when$the$government$is$

unable$to$pay$the$military

Przeworski:$the$stability$of$any$regime$depends$not$so$much$on$the$

legitimacy$of$a$particular$system$of$domination$as$on$the$presence$

of$a$preferred$opposition$alternative.$It$may$be$true$that$a$powerful$

autocrat$can$coerce$unwilling$popular$compliance$over$very$long$

periods$of$time$if$he$retains$control$over$the$executive$and$military$

bureaucracies$(460)

MAKE$SURE$I$TALK$ABOUT$THIS$-->$EVEN$THOUGH$POWER$

HAS$BEEN$CONCENTRATED$TO$SO$FEW$INDIVIDUALS,$WHEN$

ONE$LEADER$RUNS$OUT$OF$POWER/WEALTH,$IT$IS$UNLIKELY$

THAT$ANYONE$BELOW$HIM/AROUND$HIM$WOUD$BE$ABLE$TO$

RECONSILE$THE$SITUATION,$AND$THEREFORE$IT$BECOMES$A$

BOTTOM-UP$OPERATION

□

HOWEVER$IN$LA,$WE$HAVE$SEEN$MANY$INSTANCES$OF$

LEADERS$GETTING$FORCED$OUT$OF$POWER,$EVEN$LOSING$

THEIR$LIVES$IN$THE$PROCESS

□

"One$might$be$tempted$to$predict$that$neopatrimonial$regimes$

would$undergo$elite-initiated$transitions,$since$personal$rulers$

concentrate$so$much$decision-making$power$in$their$own$hands.$

But$in$an$earlier$ analysis,$we$found$instead$that$transitions$in$Africa$

seem$to$be$occurring$more$commonly$from$below.$Of$twenty-one$

cases$of$transition$in$sub-Saharan$Africa$between$November$1989$

and$May$1991,$the$initiative$to$undertake$political$ reform$was$taken$

by$opposition$protesters$in$sixteen$cases$and$by$incumbent$state$

leaders$in$only$five$cases$In$general,$neopatrimonial$rulers$are$

driven$by$calculations$of$personal$political$survival:$they$resist$

political$openings$for$as$long$as$possible$and$seek$to$manage$the$

process$of$transition$only$after$it$has$been$forced$upon$them"$(461)

Leaders$become$disillusioned$about$the$workings$of$a$

political$system,$and$there$are$no$institutions$to$help$

support$this$or$alert$them$of$their$popular$support$-->$

people$tell$leaders$what$they$want$to$hear.$Even$skillful$

personalistic$leaders$lack$the$resources$and$flow$of$

reliable$ informaton$to$make$judgements$about$the$

need$for$political$liberalization.$Leaders$then$resort$to$

familiar$tactics$of$selective$reward$and$political$

repression,$which$leads$the$masses$to$increase$volume$

of$demand$and$protest

The$structure$of$political$incentives$in$neopatrimonial$regimes$

helps$to$explain$why$state$elites$rarely$initiate$political$

transitions.$When$rule$is$built$on$personal$loyalty,$supreme$

leaders$often$lose$touch$with$popular$perceptions$of$regime$

legitimacy.$They$lack$institutional$ties$to$corporate$groups$in$

society$that$could$alert$them$to$the$strength$of$their$popular$

support$(462)

□

Underdeveloped$civil$society$combined$with$leaders$

demobilizing$voters$and$eradicating$popular$

associations$while$the$regime$is$headed$by$hand-picked$

loyalists,$results$in$spontaneous,$sporadic,$disorganized$

political$protest

Neopatrimonial$leaders$are$sensitive$to$threats$to$their$

administration,$so$aim$to$weaken$all$independent$centers$of$

power.$Fear$of$rivals$drives$dictators$to$emasculate$the$very$

state$institutions$that$could$institutionalize$their$rule

□

These$opponents$grasp$for$control$of$popular$protest$

movements,$usually$by$promoting$symbols$(such$as$

multiparty$democracy)$that$can$convert$economic$

grievances$into$demands$for$regime$change.$(463-464)

Because$they$(insiders)$face$the$prospect$of$losing$all$

visible$means$of$support$in$a$political$transition,$they$

have$little$option$but$to$cling$to$the$regime$and$to$sink$

or$swim$with$

The$more$complete$their$exclusion$from$economic$

opportunity$and$political$expression,$the$more$strongly$

outsiders$are$motivated$to$oppose$the$incumbent$regime.

□

NEOPATRIMONIALISM$LEAVES$NO$OPTION$FOR$

OUTSIDERS$OTHER$THAN$TO$REVOLT

THIS$IS$WHY$IT$IS$SO$COMMON$WHY$THE$

OPPOSITION$IN$AFRICA$IS$SO$OFTEN$LED$BY$

FORMER$INSIDERS$WHO$HAVE$FALLEN$OUT$OF$

THE$OFFICIAL$FAVOR

◊

THIS$IS$THE$ARGUMENT$FOR$WHY$SOCIAL$CLASSES$

DON'T$PLAY$AS$LARGE$OF$A$ROLE,$BUT$RATHER$WHO$IS$

AN$INSIDER$AND$WHO$IS$AN$OUTSIDER$

Thus,$the$operations$of$neopatrimonialism$tend$to$create$

simultaneously$a$defensively$cohesive$state$elite$ and$a$

potential$pool$of$alternative$leaders$outside$of$the$state. The$

neopatrimonial$practice$of$expelling$rather$than$

accommodating$dissenters$is$a$primary$cause$of$the$

emergence$of$organized$opposition.

□

Why$do$these$regimes$fall$short$of$political$transitions?

How$neopatrimonial$regimes$collapse:

○

Comparing$Regimes$and$Transitions•

PACTS$SUCCESSFUL$IN$SPAIN,$BRAZIL,$VENEZUELA

Slim$possibility$that$moderate$factions$from$either$side$can$

negotiate$an$agreement,$as$incumbent$and$opposition$leaders$

are$usually$so$polarized$as$a$result$of$winner-take-all$power$

struggles

□

So,$this$is$why$transitions$unfold$along$a$path$of$escalating$

confrontations$until$one$side$loses$decisively

□

Likelihood$of$pacts$also$a$result$of$the$function$of$the$degree$

of$formal$political$institutionalization$in$a$regime

□

Pacts$are$only$likely$between$well-developed$

institutions

In$neopatrimonial$regimes$political$leaders$may$represent$no$

more$than$a$tiny$coterie$of$clients$and$may$be$unable$to$build$

a$political$ consensus$around$any$intraelite$ agreement.$The$

emerging$political$par$ties$and$civic$organizations$typically$

lack$traditions,$experience,$ and$funds,$and$find$it$difficult$to$

escape$factionalism$$(465)

□

Some$conditions$conducive$to$pact$making,$such$as$the$inability$of$

any$single$political$ actor$to$impose$a$preferred$outcome,$are$

present$in$the$late$stages$of$neopatrimonial$rule.$But$other$

conditions$are$absent.

Pacts$are$ultimately$compromises$as$a$result$of$no$political$group$

sufficiently$dominating$to$impose$its$ideal$project,$so$this$is$the$second$

best$solution$(464)

○

Legitimizing$any$type$of$regime$takes$state$building$and$establishing$

institutions$for$peoples$political,$social,$and$economic$concerns$to$

be$addressed

Under$neopatrimonialism,$the$prospect$of$political$compromise$depends$

more$on$the$personality,$management$skills,$and$M2[#4'1'M-1'$0106012'$ of$

the$incumbent$ruler.$A$leader$who$has$attempted$to$legitimate$a$

personalistic$regime$with$populistic$rhetoric-for$example,$of$"peoples"'$

democracy$or$"African"$socialism-is$more$likely$to$respond$positively$to$

demands$for$political$liberalization$than$is$a$leader$who$has$ruled$on$the$

basis$of$claims$of$traditional$paternalism$or$revolutionary$purity$(465)

○

A9-/2%%2'-/2'31012'-2:-52.101/&.-04&'$1012'-1$-0"&0-0"#-$042'M%&'-&'3-

"1$-#'0264&M#-"&[#-02-M2A-;QEE(

○

Elite$political$ pacts$are$unlikely$in$neopatrimonial$regimes•

In$neopatrimonial$regimes$-->$do$rules$even$matter?

○

Part$of$the$opposition's$objective$in$establishing$legal$rule$is$to$gain$

access$to$resources$monopolized$by$the$ruling$elite

In$the$context$of$a$democratic$transition,$the$opposition$is$most$

immediately$interested$in$the$regime's$control$of$the$media$and$

other$electoral$ campaign$assets

Thus,$the$struggle$over$political$rules$is$often$a$pretext$or$a$prelude$

to$even$more$fundamental$economic$struggles$that$are$laid$bare$in$

efforts$to$strip$neopatrimonial$rulers$of$their$power

At$some$moment$in$the$struggle,$the$contents$of$the$constitution$and$the$

electoral$ laws$become$key$points$of$contention.$In$other$words,$the$

opposition$attempts$to$reintroduce$rule-governed$behavior$after$a$

prolonged$period$in$which$such$niceties$have$been$suspended.$

○

In$neopatrimonial$regimes,$political$transitions$are$struggles$to$establish$legal$

rules

•

The$relationship$between$state$and$capital$in$Latin$America$and$Southern$

Europe$is$very$different$from$that$in$African$countries

○

Unlike$in$Latin$America,$governing$alliances$between$military$rulers$and$

national$bourgeoisies$are$uncommon$

○

Thus,$instead$of$demanding$that$property$rights$be$ruled$out$of$bounds,$

would-be$capitalists$want$to$use$a$transition$from$neopatrimonial$ism$as$

an$opportunity$to$include$them$in$the$new$rules$of$the$political$game

○

In$transitions$from$neopatrimonial$rule,$the$threat$of$backlash$comes$

mainly$from$the$military$acting$alone,$with$the$emergent$middle$classes$

being$the$strongest$and$most$articulate$advocates$of$civilian$politics.

○

During$transitions$from$neopatrimonial$regimes,$middle-class$elements$align$

with$the$opposition

•

Regime$variation$can$be$traced$to$the$political$ dynamics$of$the$

immediate$postindependence$years.$The$circumstances$in$which$

different$leaders$consolidated$power$partly$determines$the$degree$

of$pluralism$that$came$to$characterize$ the$existing$regime.$When$a$

dominant$party$emerged$early$during$the$period$of$competitive$

party$politics$at$independence,$that$party$was$typically$able$to$

integrate,$co-opt,$or$eliminate$ other$political$parties$and$to$install$

stable$civilian$single-party$rule,$at$least$until$the$first$leader$retired.$

In$the$absence$of$a$dominant$party,$ensuing$regimes$have$been$

characterized$by$instability$and$a$greater$reliance$ on$coercion,$

notably$through$military$intervention$(468)

this$first$set$of$factors,$distinct$variants$of$neopatrimonial$regimes$

emerged$as$a$result$of$specific$historical$attempts$to$over$come$

tensions$created$by$ethnic,$linguistic,$and$regional$heterogeneity.

BECAUES$OF$THIS,$SOMETHING$LIKE$A$SOLID$LEADER$IN$

FUJIMORI$COULDN'T$HAPPEN,$AS$AFRICANS$WOULDN’T$LET$

SUCH$AN$OUTSIDER$INTO$POWER

□

Governments$have$agreed$to$ethnic,$communal,$or$regional$quotas$

for$official$positions$and$rent-seeking$opportunities,$and$traditional$

chiefs$have$been$allowed$to$retain$at$least$limited$authority$over$

their$domains

Hence,$recognizing$that$not$all$African$leaders$govern$in$identical$ ways,$

we$now$explore$variations$on$the$theme$of$neopatrimonial$rule.$

Meaningful$variants$exist$within$the$general$type$of$African$regime.$These$

differences$are$due$in$part$to$the$proclivities$ of$individual$leaders$but,$

more$importantly,$to$institutional$structures$that$have$evolved$historically$

in$response$to$political$crises$and$needs$(468)

○

Nonetheless,$decision$making$in$public$affairs$in$African$

regimes$is$typically$restricted$to$elites$ with$a$narrow$social$

base

□

In$contrast$to$the$historical$record$in$Europe$or$Latin$America,$

women$in$Africa$have$generally$enjoyed$the$same$formal$political$

rights$as$men.$Nor$have$African$states$instituted$literacy,$property,$

or$income$requirements$for$the$right$to$vote

Actual$African$regimes$reflect$their$own$peculiar$histories,$which$

even$during$the$postcolonial$period$may$encompass$shifts$from$one$

regime$variant$to$another.$In$part$as$a$result$of$these$changes,$

actual$regimes$may$display$characteristics$of$more$than$one$variant,$

with$combinations$of$personal$dictatorship$with$military$or$single-

party$structures$being$quite$common.$In$fact,$this$possibility$is$

inherent$in$the$logic$of$our$framework,$which$proposes$

neopatrimonial$rule$as$a$master$concept$that$embraces$a$variety$of$

subsidiary$regime$variants$(472)

Following$Dahl's$classic$formulation,57$we$find$it$is$useful$to$distinguish$

the$neopatrimonial$regimes$in$sub-Saharan$Africa$according$to$two$

distinct$dimensions:$the$extent$of$competition$(or$contestation)$and$the$

degree$of$political$participation$(or$inclusion).$(469)

○

Multiparty$polyarchies$display$relatively$high$levels$of$both$

participation$and$competition$and$have$already$completed$a$

democratic$political$transition.$A$plurality$of$political$parties$contest$

open$elections$and$voters$enjoy$guarantees$of$a$universal$franchise$

and$equality$before$the$law.$African$regimes$that$have$sustained$

this$type$of$regime$for$at$least$a$decade$include$Botswana,$Gambia,$

Mauritius,$Senegal,$and$Zimbabwe. (472)

SO,$COUNTRIES$THAT$EXPERIENCED$EUROPEAN$SETTLEMENT$

EXPERIENCE$MORE$STRUCTURE$AND$STABLE$INSITUTIONS$

THAT$LEAD$TO$A$BUREAUCRATIC$REGIME

□

South$Africa$is$the$classic$contemporary$case□

Settler$oligarchies$approximate$exclusionary$democracy.$This$form$

of$bureaucratic$regime$is$found$in$places$in$Latin$America$and$Africa$

where$European$settlers$gained$independent$control$of$the$state.$

We$consider$the$settler$variable$to$be$just$as$formative$of$the$

institutional$structure$of$postcolonial$politics$as$the$culture$of$the$

colonizer

The$other$African$countries

○

Variations$in$Neopatrimonial$Transitions$in$Africa•

This$regime$variant$is$the$quintessence$of$neopatrimonialism$$(474)

○

Highly$exclusionary$since$strongman$rules$by$decree

○

Insitutions$of$participation$exist$in$name$only$and$cannot$check$the$

absolute$powers$of$the$chief$executive

○

Regime$disallows$even$a$semblance$of$political$ competition$-- either$by$

physically$eliminating$or$indefinitely$incarcerating$opponents

○

The$strongman$may$even$preempt$his$own$removal$from$office$by$

declaring$himself$"president$for$life"

○

Controls$flow$of$public$revenues$and$selective$disbursing$rewards$to$

a$narrow$entourage$of$familial,$ethnic,$or$factional$clients

Takes$exclusive$charge$of$policy-making$(rather$than$relying$on$

technocratic$planning)$and$implements$instrutions$through$personal$

emissaries$(rather$than$formal$institutions)

A$personal$dictator$can$emerge$from$either$the$army$or$a$dominant$

political$party$but$then$consolidates$power$by$weakening$these$formal$

political$structures$or$by$asserting$total$control$over$them

○

In$recent$times,$the$archetypal$personal$dictators$in$Africa$have$been$Idi$

Amin$of$Uganda,$Bokassa$of$Central$African$Republic,$and$Macias$Nguema$

of$Equatorial$Guinea.$Of$those$still$in$power$and$currently$confronting$

demands$for$political$transition,$we$refer$below$to$Mobutu$Sese$Seko$in$

Zaire$and$Hastings$Banda$of$Malawi$(475)

○

Personal$Dictatorship•

Transitions$are$likely$to$be$driven$almost$completely$by$forces$outside$of$

the$state,$either$in$domestic$society$or$from$the$international$arena

○

Either$through$death,$deposition,$or$flight$of$the$strongman

THIS$IS$THE$PRIMARY$OBJECTIVE$OF$THE$OPPOSITION$

THROUGHOUT$THE$TRANSITION,$AS$OPPOSED$TO$OTHER$SYSTEMS$

WHERE$COMPETITION$AND$GATHERING$A$POPULAR$POLITICAL$

SUPPORT$BASE$IS$THE$MEANS$OF$A$TRANSITION

X"1$-/2':6$12'->#07##'-$#.:-&'3-'&012'&.-1'0#4#$0-1$-'20-

6'1=6#-02-5#4$2'&.-31/0&024$"15$<->60-10-"&$-%24#-$#4126$-

1%5.1/&012'$-0"#4#<-M1[#'-0"#-1'$0106012'&.-4#&.101#$-2:-0"#$#-

4#M1%#$

□

Because$personal$dictators$can$deploy$public$revenues$

(however$limited$these$may$be)$in$support$of$personal$

survival,$they$can$avoid$accountability$to$the$state's$own$

institutions.

□

For$his$part,$the$supreme$leader$tends$to$identify$the$sustainability$

of$the$regime$with$his$own$political$survival$and$is$likely$to$make$

major$efforts$to$ride$the$wave$of$protest

Fear$prosecution$or$never$being$safe□

Even$when$friendly$powers$promise$protection$from$extradition$

demands$as$an$inducement$to$accept$retirement,$leaders$with$a$

poor$human$rights$record$and$a$history$of$state$violence$may$

hesitate$to$give$up$the$protection$of$office$(476)

Real$political$change$is$unlikely$as$long$as$the$ruler$remains,$since$he$has$

made$all$the$rules.

○

USE$THIS$ARGUMENT$AND$EXAMPLE$OF$PRESIDENT$MOBUTU$OF$

ZAIRE$TO$SHOW$THE$SHORTCOMINGS$OF$NEOPATRIMONIAL$RULE$

BECAUSE$THERE$ARE$NO$INSITUTIONS$TO$HOLD$ACCOUNTABLE$

WHAT$HE$DOES,$OR$TO$CLEAR$HIS$POLICIES

As$a$result,$the$demise$of$personal$dictators$is$usually$protracted$and$

painful,$with$incumbents$tenaciously$attempting$to$control$the$transition.$

President$Mobutu$of$Zaire$provides$perhaps$the$best$example$of$this$

process.$Although$officially$acceding$to$popular$and$Western$pressures$to$

democratize,$he$has$exercised$considerable$guile$to$manipulate$events$

and$maintain$effective$power.$He$has$flouted$his$own$reforms,$subverted$

the$constitution,$manipulated$the$electoral$ process,$and$tried$to$bribe,$

intimidate,$and$co-opt$the$opposition;$he$has$been$willing$even$to$destroy$

his$nation's$economic$and$political$structures.$Over$time,$the$state's$

authority$over$territory$and$the$very$existence$of$the$state$as$an$

organized$body$may$become$a$fiction.$The$leader$shrinks$to$little$more$

than$a$local$war$lord$who$survives$by$controlling$residual$resources$and$

retaining$the$loyalty$of$a$segment$$of$the$old$coercive$apparatus$(476)

○

Becomes$all-or-nothing$power$struggle

Personal$dictatorships$are$characterized$by$an$absence$of$civic$

associations

True,$opposition$parties,$human$rights$organizations,$and$trade$

unions$mushroom$as$soon$as$the$regime's$repressive$capabilities$

weaken,$but$they$are$fragmented,$impoverished,$and$themselves$

lacking$traditions$of$participatory$politics

The$absence$of$institutions$and$habits$of$competition$and$

participation$combine$virtually$to$eliminate$the$changes$that$a$

transition$from$personal$dictatorship$will$end$in$the$consolidation$of$

power$(477)

Transitions$in$personal$dictatorships$are$also$conditioned$by$the$

weaknesses$of$political$institutions

○

Implications$of$this•

While$more$inclusive,$plebiscitary$one-party$systems$are$nevertheless$

decidedly$undemocratic$because$they$preclude$genuine$political$

competition.

○

One-party$plebiscitary$systems$in$Africa$are$usually$headed$by$first-

generation$leaders,$whether$civilian$or$military.$If$civilian,$the$leader$ is$

usually$the$"grand$old$man"$of$nationalist$politics$who$won$independence$

in$the$early$1960s;$if$military,$he$commonly$came$to$power$in$the$first$

round$of$coups$in$the$late$1960s$or$early$1970s.$This$latter$group$of$

leaders$typically$tries$to$civilianize$ and$legitimize$the$regime$by$

abandoning$military$rank$and$uniform$and$attempting$to$construct$mass$

mobilizing$political$ parties.$Examples$include$Presidents$Eyadema$in$Togo$

and$Bongo$in$Gabon

○

Even$though$a$national$conference,$still$ very$exclusionary$and$

usually$only$elites$involved

In$these$regimes,$national$conferences$are$the$distinctive$institution$and$

watershed$event$of$the$transition.$Patterned$on$both$traditional$village$

assemblies$and$the$Estates$General$ of$the$French$Revolution,$national$

conferences$bring$together$national$elites$ to$address$the$country's$

political$problems$and$attempt$to$formulate$new$constitutional$rules.$

National$conferences$have$been$held$in$over$half$a$dozen$West$and$

Central$African$states,$resulting$in$governmental$changes$in$Benin,$Congo,$

and$Niger,$and$the$exertion$of$intense$political$pressure$on$incumbent$

rulers$in$Zaire$and$Togo

○

In$particular,$specific$leaders$have$learned$from$the$transition$experiences$

in$neighboring$countries.$Initially,$leaders$in$Benin$and$Congo$quickly$

agreed$to$national$conferences$in$the$belief$that$their$regime$would$

survive$largely$unscathed.$In$each$case,$however,$the$conference$turned$

into$a$devastating$public$inquisition$into$patrimonial$malfeasance$and$

incompetence:$it$ultimately$stripped$the$leaders$of$executive$powers.

(479)

○

Plebiscitary$One-Party$Systems•

Exclusionary$regimes$where$all$decisions$are$made$by$a$narrow$elite$

behind$closed$doors

○

Military$oligarchies$in$Africa$tend$to$be$led$by$a$younger$generation$of$

junior$military$officers$that$came$to$power$in$a$second,$third,$or$later$

round$of$coups$during$the$late$1970s$and$the$1980s.$Political$participation$

is$severely$circumscribed$because$there$are$no$elections$of$any$kind,$

especially$in$the$early$years$of$military$rule

○

Managed$transitions$from$above$are$more$likely$in$a$military$oligarchy

○

le.$Yet$the$eventuality$of$a$polit$ical$transition$is$inherent$to$the$logic$of$

most$military$regimes:$military$oli$garchs$can$respond$to$the$crisis$by$

renewing$promises$of$a$managed$tran$sition$and$agreeing$to$a$more$

precise$and$perhaps$shorter$timetable.$Thus,$in$Guinea$and$Ghana$

popular$discontent$in$1990$and$1991$compelled$the$regimes$to$speed$up$a$

managed$transition$that$had$been$allowed$to$lapse.$Military$regimes$as$

varied$as$Burundi,$CAR,$Guinea,$Ghana,$Lesotho,$Nigeria,$and$Uganda$

have$all$been$undergoing$managed$transitions$since$1991.$On$the$other$

hand,$the$annulment$of$the$May$1993$Nigerian$elec$tions$by$General$

Babangida$indicates$dramatically$that$many$of$these$promises$to$hand$

back$power$may$be$less$than$genuine.77$And$the$reac$tionary$coups$that$

followed$elections$in$both$Nigeria$and$Burundi$empha$size$that$military$

forces$are$loath$to$abdicate$power$and$may$easily$reverse$democratic$

gains.

○

A$managed$transition$appeals$to$the$military$for$several$reasons.$First,$it$

flatters$the$military's$idealized$view$of$itself$as$a$rational,$orderly,$and$

orga$nized$force$trying$to$impose$order$on$a$discordant$civilian$political$

process.

○

Second,$the$military's$near$monopoly$on$the$means$of$coercion$sig$

nificantly$enhances$its$control$over$the$dynamics$and$outcomes$of$the$

tran$sition

○

Military$Oligarchies•

Elections$in$these$systems$allow$for$two$or$more$candidates$in$party$

primaries$or$parliamentary$elections

○

HOW$SUCCESSFUL$HAVE$THESE$REGIMES$BEEN?

As$an$aspect$of$institutional$longevity,$competitive$one-party$regimes$are$

often$headed$by$nationalist$founding$fathers$like$Kaunda$of$Zambia$and$

Houphouft-Boigny$of$Ivory$Coast.$(482)

○

These$regimes$are$vulnerable$to$collapse$when$economic$crisis$and$donor-

mandated$economic$policy$reform$programs$cut$the$resources$avail$able$

to$the$ruler$for$managing$the$political$game$(483)

○

Despite$these$very$real$obstacles,$the$prospects$for$a$democratic$process$

are$greater$for$transitions$from$competitive$one-party$regimes$than$from$

other$forms$of$neopatrimonial$regime

○

The$reason$lies$in$the$structure$of$political$ institutions$in$which$

competitive$one-party$elections$laid$a$foun$dation$for$both$political$

participation$and$contestation.$While$incumbent$and$opposition$forces$in$

a$transition$distrust$each$other$deeply$and$squab$ble$over$constitutional$

and$electoral$regulations$until$the$eleventh$hour,$they$also$are$in$

sufficient$agreement$on$the$rules$of$the$political$game$to$allow$an$

election$to$take$place,$with$each$side$betting$it$has$a$chance$to$win.$Even$

if$the$losers$of$a$transition$election$complain$about$malfeasance,$they$will$

often$eventually$and$reluctantly$accept$its$results$and$begin$to$organize$to$

organize$to$win$the$next$one$(484)

○

Competitive$One-Party$System•

In$this$essay,$we$have$argued$against$the$prevalent$view$that$political$

transitions$are$driven$contingently$and$unpredictably$by$the$initiatives$

and$responses$of$key$actors

○

Instead,$we$think$that$the$institutional$characteristics$of$the$preexisting$

political$regime$impart$structure$to$the$dynamics,$and$to$a$lesser$extent$

the$outcomes,$of$political$transitions

○

Intervals$of$dramatic$political$change$likely$to$be$driven$from$below$

than$initiated$by$elites

Marked$by$factional$struggles$over$patronage$rather$than$by$

divisions$of$political$ideology

Usually$backed$rather$than$resisted$by$emerging$middle$classes

Evidence$for$these$arguments$is$found$in$the$dynamics$of$current$

transitions$in$sub-Saharan$Africa,$in$which$the$relations$between$

state$and$society$are$shaped$by$personal$authority,$the$absence$of$

stable$property$rights$and$opportunities$for$capitalist$accumulation,$

and$the$weakness$of$civic$associations$and$political$ organizations

(485)

"When$subjecting$Africa$to$comparative$analysis,$we$have$tried$to$

avoid$reducing$a$complex$continent$to$a$single,$undifferentiated$

category.$Instead,$we$draw$attention$to$variants$of$political$

regime."

"On$the$basis$of$this$schema,$we$argue$that$the$dynamics$of$

political$transition$and$the$likelihood$of$a$peaceful$transition$to$

democracy$are$shaped$by$the$amount$of$formal$political$

participation$and$competition$allowed$by$the$ancien$regime"

Political$transitions$from$neopatrimonial$rule$display$distinctive$features

○

Transitions$from$personal$dictatorships$are$driven$by$spontaneous$

street$protests,$focus$on$the$fate$of$the$ruler,$and$in$the$absence$of$

effective$political$ institutions$to$channel$political$ participation$and$

contestation,$tend$to$dissolve$into$chaotic$conflict

Distinctive$tendencies$in$Africa

○

First,$a$consolidated$democracy$is$much$less$likely$to$

eventuate$from$the$abrupt$collapse$of$a$personal$dictatorship$

than$from$the$gradual$reform$of$a$competitive$one-party$

system

□

Because$political$transitions$in$Africa$are$ongoing$at$the$time$of$

writing,$we$insist$that$it$is$too$early$to$make$definitive$judgments.$

But$there$are$beginning$to$emerge$a$few$tentative$trends$that$can$

serve$as$hypotheses$for$further$research

K2-&'8-2:-0"#$#-542/#$$#$-.#&3-02-3#%2/4&/8c

○

Democracy$is$possible$only$in$the$presence$of$a$set$of$political$ institutions$

that$allows$protagonists$to$propose,$negotiate,$and$win$popular$

acceptance$for$political$ accommodations;$even$then,$it$is$never$

guaranteed. ;QdE(

○

F2.101/&.-/2%5#01012'-1$-#$$#'01&.-:24-&-04&'$1012'-02-3#%2/4&/8

The$particularly$vexatious$nature$of$transitions$from$dictatorial$and$

plebiscitary$regimes,$both$of$which$generate$unregulated$political$conflict.$

This$is$because$in$both$regime$variants,$52.101/&.-/2'0#$0&012'-1$-260.&7#3-

4&0"#4-0"&'-/"&''#.#3-0"426M"-52.101/&.-1'$0106012'$

○

This$is$so$because$greater$progress$has$been$made$in$other$regimes$

in$routinizing$participation$and$(especially)$competition$in$formal$

political$institutions

There$is$already$evidence$that$former$settler$colonies$tend$to$

become$somewhat$more$democratic$regimes$than$do$nonsettler$

colonies:$for$example,$Zimbabwe$and$Namibia$became$multiparty$

competitive$polyarchies$after$independence;$and$Zambia$and$Kenya$

adopted$competitive,$rather$than$plebiscitary,$forms$of$one-party$

rule.$These$observations$suggest$that$although$political$transition$in$

South$Africa$may$be$protracted$and$punctuated$by$violence,$it$may$

well$ultimately$occur$by$negotiation.$And$the$long-term$prospects$

for$democratic$consolidation$may$be$better$there$than$in$other$

parts$of$contemporary$Africa.$(487)

"Finally,$if$our$logic$is$correct,$the$prospects$for$democracy$are$better$in$

transitions$from$regime$types$other$than$neopatrimonial$ones"$(487)

○

In$fact,$our$argument$links$institutional$characteristics$only$tangentially$to$

the$outcomes$of$transitions$but$directly$to$their$internal$dynamics,$so$this$

criticism$is$best$only$partly$on$the$mark

○

Our$argument$suggests$that$organizations$both$within$and$outside$the$

state,$and$the$interaction$between$them,$provide$critical$arenas$for$this$

learning.$It$will$be$difficult,$that$is,$to$institute$new$rules$of$accountability,$

tolerance,$and$participation$if$political$parties$or$trade$unions$are$missing$

or$underdeveloped$and$if$judicial$and$legislative$bodies$have$no$tradition$

of$independence$from$the$executive

○

in$the$final$analysis,$only$formal$institutions-such$as$trade$unions,$human$

rights$organizations,$and,$especially,$political$ parties-can$force$recalcitrant$

governments$into$amending$constitutions$and$calling$elections,$and$

appear$to$populations$as$plausible$alternatives$to$the$government$in$

power.

○

the$structure$of$the$preceding$regime$provides$only$a$template$that$

predisposes,$but$does$not$fully$determine,$particular$results.$The$

remainder$of$the$explanation$of$political$ change$must$be$derived$from$

other$factors.$We$consider$that$the$effectiveness$of$contending$state$and$

societal$organizations$at$achieving$preferred$outcomes$is$largely$a$

function$of$the$political$and$economic$resources$at$their$disposal$during$

the$transition

○

the$strength$of$state$organizations$depends$on$the$ability$of$leaders$to$

maintain$a$flow$of$discretionary$spoils$and$to$sustain$prebendal$networks$

of$support.$Within$the$opposition,$the$strength$of$unions$and$parties$

depends$on$achieving$a$significant$funding$and$mem$bership$base$

independent$of$the$state$and$an$organizational$network$that$extends$

outside$of$the$capital$and$into$the$countryside

○

Conclusions$and$Implications•

Week$11$Readings

Monday,$April$2,$2018

2:15$PM

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