ECON204 Lecture Notes - Lecture 6: Liquidity Trap, Deflation, Monetary Policy
Topic 6
Financial crises
After 2008, much of the world economy suffered an intense economic crisis. Output falls in
advanced countries (not Australia) were the largest since the Great Depression. The recovery has
been slow, and is still modest.
We will examine:
• The triggers in US housing price falls, and the impact on banks
• The monetary and fiscal policy responses – restricted by the liquidity trap and the build up of
government debt
• Why the recovery has been so slow.
• What to expect from 2017 onwards.
From a housing problem to a financial crisis
What caused the sharp rise in house prices form 2000-6?
• Very low interest rates
• Mortgage lenders were lending more to risky borrowers: sub-prime mortgages. All bad? Not
necessarily --- it expanded home ownership, which was good so long as prices always went
up.
But
• But house prices started to fall after 2006.
• Ma otgages et udeate hee the otgage eeeds the house alue.
• The mortgages turned out to be riskier than investors or borrowers realized.
• Many borrowers defaulted, and banks incurred big losses.
• In mid-2008, the losses were thought to be US$300bn (2% of GDP), which the financial
sector could easily absorb.
• The losses turned out much bigger, and were amplified throughout the financial system
The role of banks in the crisis
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Baks keep apital the ak oes o fuds as a uffe agaist shoks.
Banks get into trouble if:
• Assets (like mortgages) suddenly decline in value – if liabilities (not including capital) exceed
assets, this bank is insolvent.
• Depositors want to withdraw too much of their money (liabilities). The bank could sell some
assets, but it may take too long. The bank may then be solvent but illiquid.
In 2008, banks suffered from all of these factors: too little capital, big declines in mortgage-related
asset values; too liquid liabilities that were being withdrawn; and illiquid assets that were difficult to
sell.
Leverage
• Capital Ratio = Capital / Assets
• Leverage Ratio = Assets / Capital
o Banks with a high leverage ratio are at higher risk of bankruptcy, even from smaller
losses.
o But, high leverage means higher expected profit.
▪ Let R(A) be the % return on assets, R(L) the % cost of liabilities
▪ Expected rate of return on capital =
In 2000s, many US financial institutions decided to get a higher expected return, but then took on
much more risk. This was because:
• They underestimated the risk
• Compensation and bonus system encouraged risk-taking
• Banks found clever ways to avoid regulations --- Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs)
Structured Investment Vehicles (SIVs)
To aoid apital atio egulatio, aks set up “IVs as itual aks at as legth. They were not
directly (legally) linked to the parent banks. So the parent banks did not have to report them. Since
the “IVs did ot appea o the paet aks alae sheet, the esaped egulatio. This eat
higher leverage ratios and greater expected etus though this shado akig sste.
The first was created by Citigroup in 1988, and grew rapidly in 2000s. (By October 2008, all were
gone)
Liabilities: short term debt borrowed from investors (with a guarantee from parent bank)
Assets: various securities e.g. securitised mortgages, including sub-prime ones! (with accompanying
insurance against default using credit default swaps – CDSs – mainly provided by AIG).
When housing prices fell, mortgage-based securities went bad, SIVs and their parent banks had too
little apital, ad the uegulated default isue AIG ouldt oe the losses. The U“ goeet
had to step in.
Complexity
Very complex financial instruments were developed in the securitisation process.
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