PHIL1011 Lecture Notes - Lecture 5: Compatibilism, Quasi
Lecture 5
• Freedom is doing something that you want to do.
• Free when you act on your own desires
• Compatibilist: you can have free will, even is determinism is true
• What makes a desire genuinely yours? Some things can be told why you
have desires, past experience.
Harry Frankfert, 2 kinds of desires
- First order desires: ordinary desires
- Second order desires: desires about what desires you have, the desires to
have certain desires, or desire not to have desires second order desires,
- Second order desire cant make you do anything, no one ever acts on a
second desire, but they influence the first order desire
Act unfreely if the second order desire is clashing with the first order desire
Desire not to desire not to kill people. (You want to not want to kill people)
=third order desire.
Qualitative Identity: if they are exactly similar, but not in the same place
Numerical Identity: if they are exactly the same thing
The Physical Identity Theory
• Theory of what it takes to be the same person across time
The Sole Identity Theory
• They don’t share physical attributes, but the soul is numerical identical
The soul is a bare fact of identity
What matters is being physically qualitative similar
Physical Continuity theory: unbroken chain of physical similarity. Ancestral of
physical similarity, relation that holds between any numbers of links
Genuine memory of Identity
• If you physically experienced it yourself
• Quasi memory + it happened to you
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
Document Summary
Some things can be told why you have desires, past experience. Second order desires: desires about what desires you have, the desires to have certain desires, or desire not to have desires second order desires, Second order desire cant make you do anything, no one ever acts on a second desire, but they influence the first order desire. Act unfreely if the second order desire is clashing with the first order desire. Desire not to desire not to kill people. (you want to not want to kill people) Qualitative identity: if they are exactly similar, but not in the same place. Numerical identity: if they are exactly the same thing. The physical identity theory: theory of what it takes to be the same person across time. The sole identity theory: they don"t share physical attributes, but the soul is numerical identical. The soul is a bare fact of identity. Physical continuity theory: unbroken chain of physical similarity.