PHIL 2540 Lecture Notes - Lecture 4: Multiple Realizability, Dan Casey, Philosophical Zombie
27 Sep 2016
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Rational account v. substance account of personal identity. Dualism: says the soul is un-extended substance (non-physical, doesn"t exist in the material world), the body is extended and is not conscious. The mind is indivisible: there are no separate pieces of the mind, it is a whole independent thing. Mental states (dbi"s) are privileged: they are not attributes of a physical material substance, you only have access to your own mind. Descartes explains phantom pains : the pain is a property of the mind while injury gave rise to it is a separate event occurring in the body. Descartes explains why we can"t be corrected about our mental . X at t1 is the same person as y at t2 i x"s soul is the same as y"s soul. 3rd person con rmation is obscured: no way to re-identify souls. Solipsism: only one mind exists and that"s mine, other people would be a philosophical zombie.
