PHIL 235 Lecture Notes - Lecture 6: Judith Jarvis Thomson, Fetus, Moral Treatment
14 May 2018
School
Department
Course
Professor
Lesson 6.1
Fisher
Introduction
• We understand that some fetuses must be given a degree of protection
if the human species is to continue and thrive, but which fetuses and
how much protection?
• However, there are times when the interests of the pregnant woman
conflict with those of the fetus for medical, financial, or personal
reasons.
• Pregnant women status= privacy, self- determination, and
Nonmaleficence
• But are these enough to override any right to life the fetus might
have
• What, then, is the moral status of the fetus? Does it have a full right to
life, and if so, what does that entitle the fetus to in a direct conflict
with the pregnant woman? Does it have a partial right to life, and if
so, what justifies it and when does it begin? Does it have no right to
life at all, and if not, why?
• Nancy Chenier’s (makes a final report of the Royal
Commission on New Reproductive Technologies)→ provides
the clearest statement we have in Canada about what medical
practices involving embryos and fetuses federal law should permit and
prohibit.
• Canada only country in the Western world without abortion
laws→ the supreme court of Canada in 1988 struck down the
1982 law making abortion a crime
• The Royal Commission’s report: identifying and defining key terms
and procedures, providing relevant statistics, and using HCP moral
obligations to dictate the permissibility of certain behaviours.
• It is intended to be a blueprint for practical application → the report
does not get into “respect for human life and dignity”
• To take about respect of human life and dignity, we must know what
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it means to be human
• Appearance alone does not make one a human being, and most
contemporary writers reject this definition in favor of one of the two
following views: that being “human” means “having human DNA” or
that being “human” means “possessing psychological properties or
capacities that make life meaningful.
• Human being= either (a) (according to the biological humanity
perspective) an individual with either human DNA or specific
physiological characteristics, such as a human brain or cardiovascular
system; or (b), (according to psychological humanity perspective) an
individual with psychological existence, specifically the ability to
know that it exists and has interests.
• They explain why having human DNA is enough to warrant moral
treatment and protection—in other words, they would have to explain
what’s so special about our DNA, especially when we share more than
99 per cent of it with other living entities. Somewhat more
promising is the second option, because “being conscious” or
“self-aware” seems to be a prerequisite for recognizing that one
has interests and a life to live and lose.
• The idea that what makes life valuable is the ability to be aware of
life’s experiences is compelling. It seems to account for why it is
acceptable to cut off the limbs of a tree but not those of an individual.
The individual knows that she has arms, she has an interest in keeping
them. Cutting them we will be doing a harm → intellectual/ moral
pain
• Tree has only physical interests→ grow, reproduce etc..
Mary Anne Warren
• Mary Anne Warren avoids this problem by making the question of
whether a fetus has a right to life dependent on whether the fetus is a
“moral person.”
• Takes idea from legal personhood→ law entitles individual to legal
rights & protection
• Warren argues that “being human” is not enough to warrant moral
rights & protection, something more is needed to justify that → the
status of a moral person
• Defines moral person as having consciousness, capacity to reason,
self-motivation, capacity to communicate, a concept of self.
• Therefore fetus, infants and ppl in vegetative state prior to 8 months
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not included
• Currently existing interests of the pregnant woman will always
override any potential but currently non-existent interests of the fetus.
• Doesn’t even talk about future potential → thinks bout it, each
undergraduate student is potentially an elder; does this fact entitle
them to their Old Age pension cheques right now? Our infants are
potential voters; does that entitle them to vote right now?
• What all moderate arguments share in common is the view that
abortions are permissible in some instances and not in others, usually
depending on the stage of fetal development. Typically these
arguments will allow all first-trimester abortions and disallow all
third- trimester abortions unless the woman’s life is in imminent
danger, at which point they will induce labour and separate woman
and fetus, rather than abort; in the second trimester they will allow
abortions for medical reasons.
Don Marquis
• “Moral person” means “an individual with a future of value,” which can
describe more than just human beings and raises questions about what
constitutes a “future of value” and how long it must last in order to really
be valuable.
• Don Marquis gives a compelling argument to explain why killing an adult
is prima facie wrong, then works backward to apply the same reasoning to
children, then infants, then fetuses.
• An important aspect of his argument is the fetus’s potential for having the
aforementioned “future of value,” or a “future like ours.” Other arguments
from the conservative perspective rely on the concept of “potential,”
typically potential for moral personhood.
• We shouldn’t interfere with its development because it can become
competent, autonomous, self-determining agent in the future.
• Positions on fetal moral status, if it has rights (right to live) or if it can
be aborted fall into 3 categories: Conservative, moderate and liberal.
• You can be politically liberal but conservative regarding abortion
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