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PHIL 2170 (52)
Lecture

Goldman

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Department
Philosophy
Course
PHIL 2170
Professor
Samantha Copeland
Semester
Winter

Description
Friday, February 18, 2011 Goldman The alternative, simpler analysis with which I will begin is that sexual desire is desire for contact with another person’s body and for the pleasure which such contact produces; sexual activity is activity which tends to fulfill such desires of the agent. (268) • Definition backwards – trying to define desire but needs to start with activity • In Goldman, he defines perversion as statistical normality – what normal people don’t do • Emphasis on the bodily aspect; a physical activity – very little mental going on (vs. Lawrence) • Can’t separate pleasure of contact from contact itself – a particular kind of physical contact (one which creates pleasure) Pleasure and contact are interconnected because you can’t have one from the other. Technically distinct things, but sexual desire comes specifically from that contact. Raises the question, has he defined pleasure specifically enough? (Loophole: friendly hug?) Only thing separating that physical desire from sexual physical desire is pleasure. Maybe too broad? Refined: “It is not a desire for a particular sensation detachable from its causal context, a sensation that can be derived in other ways. (268) • We know things if the knowledge is caused by the truth of that thing Our definition of sex in terms of the desire for physical contact may appear too narrow in that a person’s personality, not merely her or his body, may be sexually attractive to another, and in that looking or conversing in a certain way can be sexual in a given context without bodily contact (270). • Body aspect – more ways to be attracted to someone than their body (i.e. personality). By being too narrow in activity aspect he’s arguing against letting in personality (ex. Sexy mind, personality); restricts it to only bodies • Need to include personality in desire • An arbitrary definition by excluding things? What’s wrong with sex as a reproductive activity? “What this may be ‘nature’s’ purpose, it certainly need not be ours…the development of contraception rendered the connection weak.” (271) • Theory came out when every sex act was a moral decision – used to be a moral act. Theory is outdated. Contains a moral aspect because we couldn’t change the context in which it was happening • Excludes too much (i.e. kisses). Also have to exclude homosexuality, One common position views sex as essentially an expression of love or affection between the partners (272) • Love and sex are not the same thing – love is a long term slow experience. Requires constancy, level of trust, know each other – things sex does not require • Love and sex sometimes conflict – sometimes have to sacrifice sex desires to keep love desires alive • Defining sex as love has negative consequences – sexual desires don’t always correspond to love. All the analyses examined seems to seek a distance from sexual desire itself in attempting to extend it conceptually beyond the physical. Solomon explicitly argues that sex cannot be a ‘mere’ appetite…This fails to recognize that sexual desire can be focused or selective at the same time as being physical (279) • Sexual desire may be only physical; problem – keep adding in more morals. Wants to get to ‘plain sex’ There is no morality intrinsic to sex, although general moral rules apply to the treatment of others in sex acts as they apply to all human relations. (280) • Sex act itself is not moral or immoral – just an act based on physical desires • Not just any body – even animals are selective in choosing a partner • Just because it’s all about the body, doesn’t mean our body takes over ourselves in our sexual desires. We’re still who we are, still have standards and things we like. These things are specific. Not just any body, but this body. Not personalities – but specificities. • Moral element that applies to all human behaviour. Shouldn’t harm them or use them – nothing to do with sex. • Not the act itself but what the act does (ex. Pedophilia) Monday, February 28, 2011 Goldman …False conceptual analyses of the means-end form cause confusion about the value of sex to the individual. My account recognizes the satisfaction of desire and the pleasure this brings as the central psychological function of the sex act for the individual. (Goldman 283) • Wants to takes principles/values/morality out of sex acts • We need to define the sex act as the intended physical contact that comes out of a particular desire – not just any pleasure or contact – connects to sexuality and sexual desire (ex. Not just a desire for affection) • “Means-end” – people who theorize about sex acts but build morals into the definition o Fails to get the barebones of what a sex act is o Because it builds values into the concept of sex
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