PHIL 200 Lecture Notes - Lecture 10: Type Physicalism, Outline Of Physical Science, Physicalism
19 Jun 2018
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Department
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Professor
Behaviorism: mental states are behavioral dispositions
Any time we talk about mental states, we can reduce it to
physical talk
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Identity theory: mental states are brain states
Nothing more to the mind than just a brain
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When we are in a particular mental state, we are in a particular
brain/neural state
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Functionalism: mental states are functional states
Function that mental state has (example: function of pain - to
produce belief that there is something wrong in body and desire
to get out of the painful situation)
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Theories are identifying mental states in the mind with something
physical
Any time we undergo a conscious experience, we are vividly
aware of the characteristics of that experience
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Conscious experience
We seem to have a privileged access to our conscious
experience (private, direct, authoritative - you can not be wrong
about what you are feeling/your mental states)
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Others' conscious experience (indirect - can only tell state of
mind based on linguistic behaviour, inferential, neurological
correlation - observe brain, but still not direct access to
someone else's brain)
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Dilemma
Science is limited to the pursuit of knowledge concerning
objective, "public" state of affairs
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But the contents of my mind are observable only by me
Seeing a certain shade of red - brain state R
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Consciousness
An organism is conscious (=has conscious mental states) if and
only if there is something that it is like to be that organism
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A human being is conscious if there is something that it is like to
be a human being
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For any phenomenal conscious experience E there is something
that it is like to have E
There is something that it is like to be tickled, to be
hungry, to feel a smooth window, to feel sandpaper.
There is something it is like to be too hot or cold, There is
something that it is like to crave chocolate.
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Easy problems: problems that can be solved by specifying a
mechanism that can perform a function
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The hard problem: why we have consciousness, phenomenal
experiences
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Main claim
Physical science is incapable of accounting for consciousness
Consciousness is not captured by any of the reductive
analyses of the mental. In fact "all if them are logically
compatible with its absence"
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Functionalism: we cannot analyze consciousness in terms of any
explanatory system of functional states, or intentional states,
since these could be ascribed to robots or automata that
behaved like people though they experienced nothing
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Behaviourism: we cannot analyze consciousness in terms of
causal role of experiences
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The trouble: when we explain ordinary physical phenomena (example:
an infection healing) we explain the phenomenological features of
that phenomenon (example: feeling relief) as effects on human
observers
Example: the phenomenological features of feeling relief is the
effect caused by the infection healing
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But when it comes to consciousness we want to explain those
effects themselves
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If physicalism is true then it must be able to explain those
effects physically
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Physics doesn't have the right tools to explain consciousness
Mores far away from any given point of view as possible, while
the subjective character of experiences is accessible from one
point of view
What it is like to be a human being is only accessible only
from the point of view as a human being
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Argument
All subjective phenomena are connected with a single point of
view
Bats have experience because there is something that it is
like to be a bat
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Consciousness is the subjective character of experience (what it
is like for an organism to…)
Stipulative qualification: what things are like for a subject
is subjective
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What it would be like for me to behave as a bat behaves is
not the same is what it is like for a bat to be a bat
Consciousness is connected with a single point of
view (conclusion)
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Physics, which is concerned with objectivity,
abstracts from a single point of view
Physics deals with objective facts that can be
observed and understood from many points
of view and by individuals with different
perceptual systems
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A Martian who doesn’t have vision can learn
about lightening
Physical theories cannot account for
consciousness
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In physics the process of reduction reduces our
dependence on individual points of view
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In this way physics moves towards a greater
objectivity and brings us closer to a more accurate
view of the nature of things
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But consciousness…doesn't fit the pattern. In physics greater
objectivity gives a more accurate view of the real nature of
phenomena, but with consciousness it takes us further from
the real nature of human experience
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We need to accept that there exist facts that are beyond our
grasp. That is, our consciousness is beyond our grasp.
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Lecture 10 -What is it like to be a bat?
Wednesday, October 11, 2017
12:32 PM
Document Summary
Any time we talk about mental states, we can reduce it to physical talk. Nothing more to the mind than just a brain. When we are in a particular mental state, we are in a particular brain/neural state. Function that mental state has (example: function of pain - to produce belief that there is something wrong in body and desire to get out of the painful situation) Theories are identifying mental states in the mind with something physical. Any time we undergo a conscious experience, we are vividly aware of the characteristics of that experience. We seem to have a privileged access to our conscious experience (private, direct, authoritative - you can not be wrong about what you are feeling/your mental states) Others" conscious experience (indirect - can only tell state of mind based on linguistic behaviour, inferential, neurological correlation - observe brain, but still not direct access to someone else"s brain)
