Two arguments from Frege:
1) The meaning – in some full sense – of a proper name is given by an
associated definite description
Frege: the sense of a proper name is given by a definite association.
Hence, Frege's first thesis is associating the term sense to the conception of
Kripke believes that this is wrong.
Accepting this implies a trivial truth. That is, it conveys no new information. If
“Aristotle” was defined by its definite description – the teacher of Alexander the
Great – then the sentence “Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander the Great” does
not say anything new.
This is a case of necessity. The problem isn't so much that this theory leads to
analytic truths, but rather, that it leads to necessary truths. “Aristotle was
necessarily the teacher of Alexander the Great.”
2) The reference of a proper name is fixed by some associated definite
Kripke believes that this, too, is wrong.
The difference between a priori and a posteriori is epistemologica