It seems trivially obvious that a property such as “going to the cinema” is not a
necessary property of a person, since she/he could very well have done
It is also important to carry this ordinary intuition back to situations in the past.
When one does htis extrapolation, it becomes clear that no ordinary property one
can ascribe to, say, Aristotle, is a necessary property. It is neither necessary for
Aristotle to have written Politics, nor was it necessary for him to have taught
Alexander the Great, etc.
If one thinks that the very meaning of the name is necessarily associated with a
definite description, then one is really asking for a necessary property that can
always be ascribed to the name. Kripke says that this is not possible.
Names are rigid designators.
Descriptions are generally NOT rigid designators.
Ex. The name “Aristotle” is a rigi