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Lecture 3

Poli244 Week 3 Readings.pdf

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McGill University
Political Science
POLI 244
Jason Scott Ferrell

LIBERALISM & WORLD POLITICS – DOYLE The aggressive instincts of authoritarian leaders and totalitarian ruling parties make for war When citizens who bear the burdens of war elect their governments, wars become impossible. • Citizens appreciate that the benefits of trade can be enjoyed only under conditions of peace Differences between kinds of liberalism are rooted in differing conceptions of the citizen and the states Liberal Pacifism • Joseph Schumpeter • Pacifying effects of liberal institutions and principles • Foundation: interaction of capitalism and democracy o Tested in a sociology of historical imperialisms o Imperialism: objectless disposition on the part of a state to unlimited forcible expansion ▯ Roots of objectless imperialism have 3 sources ▯ Modern imperialism resulted from the combined impact of… • War machine • Warlike instincts • Export monopolism ▯ Created by the wars that required it, the machine now created the wars it required ▯ Export monopolists push for imperialist expansion as a way to expand their closed markets • They are an atavism of the absolute monarchies , for they depend completely on the tariffs imposed by the monarchs and their militaristic successors for revenue • Without tariffs monopolies would be eliminated by foreign competition o Modern imperialism rests on an atavistic war machine • Capitalism and democracy are forces for peace o They are antithetical to imperialism o Capitalism produces an unwarlike disposition ▯ Its populace is “democratized, individualized, rationalized” • Democratic capitalism leads to peace o Contemporary capitalism is associated with peace parties o Industrial worker of capitalism is vigorously anti-imperialist ▯ Only war profiteers and military aristocrats gain from wars ▯ No democracy would pursue a minority interest and tolerate the high costs of imperialism • Schumpeter’s arguments are difficult to evaluate • “Free” states are shown to have considerably less conflict at or above the level of economic sanctions than “nonfree” states. Three extreme assumptions • Schumpeter’s materialistic monism leaves little room for noneconomic objectives, whether espoused by states or individuals o Non-material goals rarely shape policy o Little room for positive-sum gains • The political life of individuals seems to have been homogenized at the same time as the individuals were “rationalized, individualized, democratized”. o Citizens seek material warfare • World politics are homogenized o Materially monistic and democratically capitalist, all states evolve toward free trade and liberty together Civilized nations govern culturally backward regions ▯ Humans are rationalized, individualized, democratized, homogenized. They pursue material interests “monistically” Liberal Imperialism • Machiavelli • Republics are not pacifistic, but they are the best form of state for imperial expansion o Best way to guarantee survival of a state • Machiavelli’s republic = Classical mixed republic o Not a democracy o Characterized by social equality, popular liberty, political participation • Liberty results from “disunion” o Disunion: the competition and necessity for compromise required by the division of powers among senate, consuls, and tribunes • Liberty results also from popular veto o The powerful few threaten the rest with tyranny because they seek to dominate • Liberty encourages increased population and property • “Necessity” (political survival) calls for expansion “We are lovers of glory”” We seek to rule or to avoid being oppressed • We want more than just material welfare • Because we feel threatened, we prepare for expansion ▯ Citizens are diverse in their goals, but fundamentally unequal: they seek rule and fear being dominated. They call for imperial expansion. Liberal Internationalism • Kant Two legacies • Pacification of foreign relations among liberal states o Liberal states do exercise peaceful restraint and a separate peace exists among them ▯ This foundation offers the promise of a continuing peace among liberal states ▯ As liberal states increase, possibility of global peace o If world war, liberal states would end up on the same side o No proof that stability among liberals exists, but seems like there exists a separate peace among themselves • International imprudence o Peaceful restraint only works between liberals o War and conquest have characterized the careers of many authoritarian rulers and ruling parties ▯ Liberal states invade weak nonliberal states and display striking distrust in dealings with powerful nonliberal states No theories explain 150 years of peace between liberal states Cant study the systemic relations or states and varieties of state behavior separately • Perpetual peace will be guaranteed by the ever-widening acceptance of his three articles Fellow liberals benefit from a presumption of amity Nonliberals suffer from a presumption of enmity Mutual nonaggression ▯ Citizens are diverse in their goals, individualized, rationalized. They appreciate the moral equity of all and treat all as ends rather than means. ▯ The state is governed publicly according to law, as a republic. It solves the problem of governing individualized equals. ▯ Republics are capable of achieving peace among themselves; they exercise democratic caution and appreciate international rights of foreign republics. ▯ Republics remain in a state of war with nonrepublics COOPERATION UNDER THE SECURITY DILEMMA – JERVIS 1) Anarchy and the Security Dilemma Lack of international sovereign permits wars to occur • Makes hard for states satisfied with status quo to arrive at goals they deem common o Policies of cooperation that will bring mutual rewards if other cooperated will bring disaster if they do not o Anarchy encourages depleting behavior o Unless think all will cooperated, you won’t ▯ Cant voice suspicion, because others will fear him to defect ▯ Theyre then more likely to defect also • More rational for him to defect ▯ Although actors may know they seek a common goal, they may not be able to reach it. Main difficulties • The potent fear that even if the other now supports the status quo, it might be dissatisfied later. o Cant bind yourself and your successors to the same path; many things can change • To protect possessions, states often seek to control resources/land outside their territory (assure necessary supplies will continue to flow in wartime) o If there was international authority that could guarantee access, motive for control would disappear o To protect, seek control of area on borders ▯ Attempts for buffer zones can alarm others, who will feel more vulnerable ▯ With greater power comes greater responsibility, which requires greater power ▯ Retreats on certain issues will be taken as an index of weakness inviting predation • Security dilemma: many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others 2) What makes Cooperation more likely? It would be in the interest of each actor to have others deprived of the power to defect; each would be willing to sacrifice self ability if other were similarly restrained Mutual Cooperation (CC) One cooperates, Other doesn’t (CD) (DC) Mutual Noncooperation (DD) • To increase mutual cooperation… o Increase incentives to cooperate by increasing gains of cooperation o Decreasing the loss of cooperating when the other doesn’t o Decreasing the incentives for defecting by decreasing gains of taking advantage of the other o Increasing loss of mutual noncooperation o Increasing each side’s expectation that the other will cooperate Costs of Being Exploited • Fear of being exploited (CD) drives the security dilemma • The easier it is to destroy a state, o The greater the reason for it either to join a larger and more secure unit, ▯ or else be especially suspicious of others, o To require a large army, o And to attack at the slightest provocation rather than wait to be attacked • If costs of CD are lower, they are more relaxed about threats o Transforms the game from one in which both made choices simultaneously ▯ one in which an actor can make his choice after the other has moved • States that can afford to be cheated in a bargain can more easily trust others and don’t need to act at first menace o Margin of time and error • If costs of CD are tolerable o Security easier to attain o Low level of arms and relatively passive foreign policy to adopt aren’t threatening to others o Easier to act on common interests if hard to conquer • A world of small states feels the effects of anarchy more than a world of large states • Low DD cost leaves others with few hostages for good behavior o More vulnerable states will grow apprehensive ▯ Arms race • Best situation = Low CD cost + High CC benefit • Ultimate cost of CD = lost of sovereignty Act in terms of felt vulnerability, which can differ from actuals ▯ Subjective Sec
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