transnationalism and permeability – the extent to which poli
ideas reverberate through arab world
Islam – another way where ideas and events in one region and one
country can have effects elsewhere too. Like alqaeda born in
Afghanistan and Pakistan but then cos of islam “medium’ spread to
geography – right next to Europe who are concerned
Israel –arab conflict – much higher profile conflict
terrorism (post-9/11) – in and from the middle east
WMD – weapons of mass destruction
Deal: iran will stop enriching more. It will remove some of which its highly enriched uranium in a form which
can not be used for weapons. It will allow increase inspection for a period of time during which they will
negotiate the actual deal. So this is like confidence building measure. It provides some very limited
sanctions relief to the Iranians which will prolly not have that much effect on Iranian economy although it
may slightly improve bsns confidence in iran. But there public support for this in iran that rohani was
actually able to move forward even though it was being opposed internally. It postpones the point key
suddenly iran might get a bomb. Increases confidence. The Iranian position is that they have a right like
everyone else to enrich uranium. They are signatory to NPT. The US position is like security council told u
to stop enriching secondly the NPT doesn’t say u can enrich uranium but it says u can have a nuclear
scene for civilian purposes. Its basically how you interpret this thing.
Israel: they have been critical of the deal. Its interesting that vast bulk of Israeli military which has retired
don’t think it’s a bda bad deal. Its ok.
Irony: ahmedinijad was actually a soft liner. But he was so opposed within the system that he dint have any
leverage. On the other hand rohani was a former head of irani air defence. He is close to the supreme
leader. He has managed in a sense to get approval of people and the regime too cos he is more on a good
level with them. Kuwait (they don’t love Iranians but they have other things they have to worry abt like they are more about
hating Iraq) Qatar (just wanna irritate Saudi) and oman (not surprising cos oman facilitated one of the back
channels) came out in favor of agreement
Saudi is not happy
What goes on in domestic scene often has implications for foregin policy. Iran scene is a good example.
Both US and Iran have to think about selling their deal to their domestic populations. From Iranian point of
view is that they wanna improve domestic standing, regime stability etc.
Frequency of watching news about Palestine
resources (oil) IR linkages
Theres a lingkage between foregin policy and domestic politics. part of it is:
foreign policy used as a tool of domestic politics
legitimacy: countries might conduct foreign policy in a way which creates
popular support for the leader and the regime. Limits: Syria uptill 2010 how syrias
foregin policy was a source of legitimacy (by standing upto Israel etc) but it dint do very
well when the rebellion broke out and its foreign policy was then used against it as ppl
were holding signs that why are you shooting at us and not liberating the Golan heights.
resources: non oil monarchies using their relations with GCC countries to get
resources like morsi trying to get money from guld, Qatar in particular. The current
Egyptian regime trying to get money from saudia. Resources to improve domestic
economy or fuel patronage systems etc
impact of regional conflict: implications for domestic politics. not just for the country
where the conflict occurred. Syrian example where the conflict has had implications for
Arab Israeli conflict. Contributed to military coups in Egypt and Syria to some extent.
Displacement of palestenians. Movement to Jordon and lebonan led to civil wars in
those countries. This conflict is also used rhetorically by other regimes.
democracy promotion: during cold war no interest in democ promotion in middle east
After cold war: a lil bit more interest. Genuine interest of the west in middle east. After
9/11 more cos they thought that non inclusion led to radicalism which was in turn
targeted to US and other western countries and that poli reform will be beneficial for
this. But this interest in democ post 9/11 was relatively short lived and peaked around
2005 and declined after. But it was real. Arab spring generated this in a new way. But it raised questions key whether other countries actually influence democracy in other
countries and have actual effects or not. And to what extent.
regional and international politics of the Arab Spring
foreign policy and regime legitimacy
Palestine issue: used by regimes to buttress their support, Syrian certainly did so
major ramifications in 1950s and 1960s
regime efforts to exploit issue
regime efforts to insulate from issue: blame others for non achievement of
palestenian efforts of self deteremination
other issues: used to build legitimacy
Iraq, Afghanistan, and GWoT
is impact overstated?
foreign policy and regime resources
foreign policy and foreign aid
sources of aid: GCC countries, West
aid recipients: Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Palestine
For much of middle east the proportion of aid to GDP is actually small. It matters
in Jordan, yemen, Egypt, morocco a lot. Particularly before the arab spring.
We don’t always know what gulf money is cos they don’t really declare it and
show it. They can deliver a lot of money or they can also stop it all suddenly. Jordan econ austerity move and riots in 1989 occurred in part cos gulf
countries stopped delivering
interstate wars: 1948, 1956, 1967, 1967-70, 1973, 1982
other wars: Israeli occupation of WBG, Golan 1967-present;
occupation of south Lebanon 1982-2000; intifadas 1987-1990,
2000-2004; 1978, 1982, 2006, 2008, 2012
Iran-Iraq War (1980-88): impacts for econ and social development in these 2
countries. Beginning of Iranian revo women proportion of women in labour force was
rapidly declining cos of the conservative Islamic regime. But then obvio during war they
needed them to work and so after words it just stuck and so gender dynamics changed.
So Iranian women are employed in larger proportions in some areas then they are in
Iraq-Kuwait War (1990-91)
no fly zone, sanctions (1991-2003)
Iraq War (2003-) us is out but still theres a low grade civil war
Moroccan occupation of Western Sahara (1974-)
Libya in Chad (1978-87)
cost of regional conflict
deaths in major regional conflicts
1) Sudanese civil war (1955-72, 1983-2005): 2.5 million dead ??
2) Iran-Iraq war (1980-88): 1 million dead – SO MANY WOUNDED
3) Iraq sanctions (1991-2003): perhaps 300,000+ dead ???
4) Algerian War of Independence (1954-6): 250,000 dead ??
5) Darfur (2003-2010): 200,000 dead ??
6) Iraq repression of Kurds, Shi’ites, others (1987-2003): 200,000 dead 7) Arab-Israeli conflict (1947-present): 125,000 dead
8) Syrian civil war (2011-present): 120,000 dead
9) US intervention in Iraq, Iraqi civil war, terrorism (2003-present): 115,000 dead
10) Yemeni civil war (1962-70): 100,000 dead
11) Lebanese civil war (1975-90): 100,000 dead
12) Algerian civil war (1992-2000?): 100,000 dead
13) Iraq-Kuwait war (1990-91): 75,000 dead
deaths in other regional conflicts
Jordanian civil war (1970-71): 2,000 dead
Libyan civil war (2011): 20,000 dead ??
Western Sahara (1975-present): 10,000 dead ??
Hama uprising (1982): 20,000 dead ???
impact of regional conflict
guns vs butter: you are spendin money on war and not on domestic
militarization of domestic politics
large security establishments: became more imp poli actors
justification for domestic repression: how dare you dissent from regime when
we face these external threats. Like in iran: the regime would accuse the green
movement ppl key these ppl are in league with our enemies and so play on the basis of
foreigh threats saying that these people are in league with our enemies.
Syrian regime would argue that Syrian rebels are not only being s