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POLI 244 (300)
Lecture

POLI 244 Lecture Notes - Worst-Case Scenario Series, Security Dilemma, Strategic Dominance


Department
Political Science
Course Code
POLI 244
Professor
Stephen Saideman

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Actors and Interests
Leaders
Interest of staying in office
States
Realism: power vs security
Liberalism: maximizing welfare
No single issue dominates
Actors have many common interests which lead to cooperation
Constructivism: socially constructed
Interactions socialize actors to hold particular interests
Dominant discourse may reflect the interests of one or many interacting
actors
Groups
Ethnic
Class
Intl organizations
Interactions
Realist view
Outcomes are about combinations of interests/choices
All about bargaining
The better your coercion force is, the more chances there are of you getting
whatever you want
Strategic means more than maximizing utility
Liberalist view
Strongly believe in cooperation
Conflict is not inevitable, happens when people act out of personal interests
Lack of interest or creditability too
Constructivist view
Norms and understanding of social problems change
Defines identities
Game Theory (interaction cont'd)
Cooperation
Coordination
No incentive not to comply
Collaboration
Cooperation but tempted to cheat
Prisoner's dilemma
DC > CC > DD > CD
Cheating > Coop > Conflict > Suckkkkeeerr
Tendency to engage in conflict when coop is preferred
Benefits of cooperation over long run are greater than short term gains
of exploitation
Repeated play leads to cooperation
Chicken game
DC > CC > CD > DD
Winning > Coop > Sucker > Conflict
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