Midterm: do the readings and study from the lectures. 2 parts: no essay questions. Part A:
trivia questions (fill in the blanks, names, dates). Part B: long answer: definitions, concepts,
theories, explanations. Part A: worth 1 mark each. Part B: worth 10 marks each. 10
questions Part A, 4 question Part B. how much to include: no material from the lecture on
Wednesday before the Midterm.
Assignment: will be given on Wednesday.
Conventional weapons and course of diplomacy: Traditional security studies
The mere existence of nuclear weapons does not necessitate an automatic political response.
MAD: the way in which it was connected to theory, and where it came from. It came largely
from the realist but particularly from neo-realism. The notion that states are rational actors, as
well as notion of power as a material concept. Waltz said that the most stable international
system is one where two superpowers are balancing one another. Why are nuclear weapons still
important today? With nuclear weapons still in existence today do they pose a threat? Since the
Cold War we no longer view the Soviet Union as the same enemy, and a threat to international
security. Nor do we view the Soviet war heads as a potential threat to North America. During the
cold war where the nuclear weapons were, and what side they belonged to. After the cold war
this notion of knowing where the nuclear weapon is becomes less concrete. After the cold war,
countries started getting nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, Israel (has it but does not openly talks
about it, particular security strategy). What about North Korea and Iran- both have nuclear
ambitions and active nuclear programs. What threat do the nuclear weapons pose and to whom?
How so? How do we adopt a guiding security strategy to meet those threats?
South Asia: when India and Pakistan got nuclear weapons, it got public reaction, scholarly
attention, and international attention.
Waltz‟s optimism on nukes (Box 23.1): point 3- Waltz is basically saying that the gradual spread
of nuclearized states is a good thing so India and Pakistan good thing according to Waltz because
it will make that region and the international community as a whole more stable. It will make the
cost of war unacceptably high. Point 4- emphasize that states are perfectly rational actors, and
the guys who have their finger on the trigger, have perfect control over their states. Thinking
about India and Pakistan, Iran and North Korea, do we agree or disagree with Waltz. Point 5- this
is Waltz‟s thesis; a strong view within much of the US foreign policy establishment. If certain
states require a response like North Korea or Iran (if you disagree with Waltz‟s thesis) how do
you response to it.
Scott‟s Sagan pessimism (Box 23.2): states are perhaps not as rational, not as cohesive as Waltz
makes them out to be. Think about the nature of nuclear weapons there is no re-do, once it is
done it‟s done. Point 2- what we know if we look within the „black box‟. Because Waltz is being
a realist, he doesn‟t care about domestic power, as he says that they are reductionist power. Sagan is saying that that „black boxing‟ is not useful and responsible, we do have to look at
regime types and domestic politics. Example: Pakistan, the civilian leadership does not control
the nuclear weapon despite who is the President; the military has quiet harsh control over that
program and its use. Nuclear deterrence rests on the supposed logic of MAD (it is state A has
second strike capability, such that if they were attacked it would have enough nuclear weapons
even in the event of suffering from the strike to retaliate). India and Pakistan have problems with
MAD: they don‟t have enough bombs, India being a relatively large country despite the
destructiveness of nuclear weapon you will not destroy India. Can you deliver the nuclear
weapon accurately? India has a slight upper hand in terms of the delivery system; they sent
rockets to space so the rockets are more advanced.
Patrick Morgan: not a security expert, but expert of deterrence. Secre