PHIL 204 Lecture Notes - Lecture 7: Bertrand Russell, British Idealism, Logical Truth
2 Oct 2018
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Analytic philosophy and metaphysics: goltlob frege 1848-1925, platonism, rejection of psychologism in logic and mathematics, bertrand russell 1872-1970, mind-independent material objects, g. e. Moore 1873-1953: non-natural moral properties such as goodness. Platonism returns: numbers, logical truth and thought are not material objects or merely properties of material objects, they are not merely mental, describing particular thoughts with individuals. Moore and russell: moo(cid:396)e"s (cid:862)(cid:272)o(cid:373)(cid:373)o(cid:374) se(cid:374)se(cid:863) (cid:396)ealis(cid:373): agai(cid:374)st b(cid:396)itish idealis(cid:373) (cid:449)hi(cid:272)h (cid:272)lai(cid:373)ed that everything was one substa(cid:374)(cid:272)e, (cid:374)a(cid:373)el(cid:455) (cid:862)idea(cid:863). Our statements are meaningful because they are about these atomic propositions. Moo(cid:396)e"s ethi(cid:272)al realis(cid:373): while some pleasant things are good, pleasant is not a definition of good, for any pleasant thing, it is possible for us to ask, (cid:862)(cid:271)ut is it good that is pleasa(cid:374)t(cid:863). These (cid:396)e(cid:373)ai(cid:374) (cid:862)ope(cid:374) (cid:395)uestio(cid:374)s(cid:863) (cid:271)e(cid:272)ause good (cid:272)a(cid:374)(cid:374)ot (cid:271)e defi(cid:374)ed i(cid:374) (cid:374)atu(cid:396)al te(cid:396)(cid:373)s: fo(cid:396) a(cid:374)(cid:455) (cid:374)atu(cid:396)al p(cid:396)ope(cid:396)t(cid:455) (cid:449)hi(cid:272)h (cid:449)e su(cid:271)stitute fo(cid:396) (cid:862)pleasa(cid:374)t(cid:863), the (cid:395)uestio(cid:374) (cid:396)e(cid:373)ai(cid:374)s ope(cid:374) Co(cid:374)(cid:272)lusio(cid:374): (cid:862)good(cid:863) (cid:272)a(cid:374)(cid:374)ot (cid:271)e de(cid:374)ied i(cid:374) te(cid:396)(cid:373)s of, o(cid:396) reduced to, any natural property.
