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Department
Philosophy
Course
PHIL 100W
Professor
Dc Mc
Semester
Fall

Description
Type-identity theorist claims that mental properties are reducible to physical properties Believing that SFU is in Canada just is being in Brain State (say) 137. Which of these is the „is‟ of identity? Dr Mc is the prof of this class or Dc Mc is hilarious. 1 . Type identity = one-one relationship. Functionalist deny this. They believe that mental states are multiply realizable. Strong Al is a kind of functionalism. An appropriately programmed computer would have mental states. AND it would have them in the same way that we do. Human processing is a syntactical formation. Searle thinks that a computer will not pass the Turing test, and, If a computer did pass the TT, we would not be required to say that it has mental states, and, Even if we were, this would not help to explain how we have mental states. Strong Ai, says Searle, is just wrong that „mind is to brain as software is to hardware‟ Searle’s Chinese room thought experiment Input Rule book Output Since many of us here can read and write some form of Chinese, let‟s change the example. Ex: It‟s the winding room. Searle in the Chinese (Wingding) room does not understand Chinese (Wingding)  He is responding purely on the basis of syntax. Possible responses The systems reply:  It‟s not Searle in the room that understands Chinese, it‟s the whole system. o Searle says “Imagine I internalize all the rules and learn to write all the strings.”  In that case, I would include the system, and I still wouldn‟t understand Chinese.  Reply‟s to Searle‟s response “You wouldn‟t understand Chinese but part of you would.”  Yes, you would understand Chinese. Why think that you would be able to tell from the inside whether or not you understand. All thought is conscious thought  Is Searle committed to Descartes‟ idea? o The Robot reply - Place Searle in a robot that interacts appropriately with the world. It gets information from the environment, that information is processed by Searle, who causes the robot to act accordingly.  It can walk around things, talk in Chinese, answer questions in Chinese, read, pick up things etc. Keep in mind how amazing this would be. You might be sceptical that this could ever happen, but that‟s not the PHIL point.  Searle‟s response – I still wouldn‟t understand Chinese!  “Searle you‟ve misunderstood the claim.” The claim is that the robot would understand Chinese and be thinking. It would using be using you, so to speak.  Why think Searle is in a position to know whether or not the robot has mental states?  Sure, Searle has his own mental states, but how does that preclude the robot from having some, too? Regress problem Other questions How is that some of our mental states have intentional content?  Semantic externalists would say it‟s a matter of their being suitably related to the world. o Searle thinks otherwise, he things that is it something intrinsic to our brains – they produce intentionality. What about sensation?  Can only organic brains produce sensation? The other minds reply: If you don‟t grant a computer that passes the TT  I‟m not trying to deal with the solipsist. Type-identity th
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