Nozick “tracking” account of knowledge has 4 conditions
- S knows that P iff
1. P is true
2. S believes that P
3. ~P -> ~(S believes P)
- This condition handles standard Gettier cases.
- If both cases, if P had been false, S would still have believes P.
- Nozick uses the notion of “possible worlds” to marshal our intuitions.
- The actual world is a possible world.
- Everything actual is possible; not everything actual is possible.
- Non-actual possible world is not exactly like the actual world.
Ex: there is a possible world in which I have blue hair.
- Some possible worlds will be “closer” to the target world (actual or
story) than others.
- Those worlds have fewer differences compared to worlds that are
- So, we are to image the Gettier story with as few changes as
possible except for ~P.
- If it had been false that „Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona‟,
Smith would still have believed it anyways.
- In which ~P, Smith would still have believed P.
It‟s reasonable to think the consequent would be true if the
antecedent were, when that involves the fewest differences with the
world outlined by Gettier.
- Nozick is not saying that it is logically necessary that if p were false,
Smith would have believed it.
- Necessary truths are true in all possible worlds.
- Contingent truths are true in some possible worlds but false in
-It is the truth of the antecedent and the assumption that we are
considering the closest possible world that leads to the consequent.
- This is just a small adjustment in how we‟v