PHIL 100 Lecture 9: Lec9
Document Summary
Locke: i reject the soul criterion of personal identity. Soul criterion: a person now is the same person in the past iff she has the same soul. Epistemic/metaphysical claim: we don"t know if the mind is material or immaterial or if minds can be shared . Moral claim: the soul criterion (and the bodily criterion) isn"t consistent with why we care about pi in the first place. Locke: i endorse the memory criterion of personal identity. A person p2 at t2 is the same person p1 at t1 iff p2 has the same consciousness as p1. A person now is the same person in the past iff she has the same consciousness. This view of pi is agnostic between dualism and materialism. It makes sense of our concern for pi as persons who care about our fate and want to take moral responsibility for our actions. Locke"s arguments in defense of the memory criterion: the prince and the cobbler argument.