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Lecture

Lecture 5
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Department
Philosophy
Course
PHI3170
Professor
Daniel Kofman
Semester
Fall

Description
Sept. 19, 2013 Analytic Conditions Project and 1. RECAPITULATION: contemporary epistemology dominated by Conditions Project: attempt to identify the necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. Three very distinct approaches: 1.1- Analytic approach: attempts to identify conditions of inferential propositional knowledge (S knows the P) that are logically or conceptually necessary, by analyzing the concept of knowledge – this is thought to yield a priori knowledge of the conditions of knowledge. -Propositional knowledge that is inferred 1.2 - Naturalistic approach (Quine, Kornblith, Stroud) – conceived as empirical: scientific study: how human organism acquires knowledge about its environment; thus about the necessary conditions for human organism to know things. Supplanting, not complementary to analytic. 1.3 – Transcendental approach: the conditions of knowledge are epistemic – they “reflect the structure of the cognitive apparatus” (Allison) and are available only through ‘transcendental’ analysis. Conditions are a prior and can be investigated only by a priori means, not empirically. 2. Challenge for analytic approach: to identify conditions of fallibly justified (including empirical) knowledge that still jointly distinguish it from (mere) true belief that’s not knowledge. 3. Questions:  (3.1) - Do we need a conditional account of knowledge?  (3.2) - Is a conditional account of knowledge (analytically conceived) possible? Williamson: No to 3.2, hence to 3.1. Analysis need not preclude circularity if concept primitive. (Note analytic assumption: jointly necessary and sufficient conditions iff analyzed concept). Red  Colored ^ Red -Colored is a necessary condition for Red Knowledge  Belief + Knowledge -knowledge is a primitive concept 4. No Luck Constraint: The necessary condition of traditional analysis that true belief be justified (or for Ayer: one have a ‘right’ to be sure) aims to prevent lucky guessing. (e.g. Kant, Critique). 5. Gettier: one can have justified belief that is true –JTB analysis – but still only by luck (i.e. in relation to justification) Structure of Gettier counterexamples: (i) S justifiably believes P (ii) P is false (Assumption: internal justification fallible) (iii) (P  Q) (iv) Q (happens to be true, ‘luckily,’ i.e. not
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