Class Notes (837,346)
Canada (510,232)
Philosophy (1,795)
PHI3170 (20)
Lecture 15

Lecture 15 - Skeptical arguments
Premium

2 Pages
30 Views
Unlock Document

Department
Philosophy
Course
PHI3170
Professor
Daniel Kofman
Semester
Fall

Description
Nov. 5, 2013  Any view of how our beliefs hang together is a view of skepticism – how they are justified together  Beliefs aspire to knowledge  When we say our beliefs hang together, it means they have a justificatory relation  Foundationalism is an answer to this relation  What foundationalism claims and its approach to skepticism 1. Two classical skeptical arguments: argument from error, and arguments from regress -you might be in error, but how could you know if you were in error? -regress – what justifies your belief. Inferred – how do you know that? Problem – infinite regress “ultimate answer” 2. Foundationalism: there is some ultimate or basic level of beliefs which are justified non- inferentially. Aristotle: two kinds of justified beliefs: self-evident and evidently inferred.  Foundationalism especially motivated to answer arguments from regress: there is a stopping point  But also typically takes into account the argument from err, by making phenomenal experience the stopping point. Thus, not: it looks like there’ a brown table, where ‘looks like’ implies a view of how things out there actually are, but: I am having the sensation of brownness, of a certain shape and surface texture. No commitment to…  Both rationalist foundationalists and empirical foundationalists locate the self-evident in the mind 3. The foundational beliefs: non-inferential, self-evident, self-justifying, indubitable (Dancy – “infallible”)  Kant: “the Given”  Sellars (and Quine): “The Myth of the Given” – he rejects foundationalism; you can’t have a private language (contrary to what the empiricists thought) – depends on the public agreement of linguistic terms  Having a sensation vs. having a belief about that sensation (propositional – employs concepts)  Sellars and Quine reject even the view that propositional knowledge about mental states is self-evident.  Sellars: difference between having a sensation and having a justified belief that one is having it  More often, critics reject possibility of moving from sensations to justified beliefs
More Less

Related notes for PHI3170

Log In


OR

Join OneClass

Access over 10 million pages of study
documents for 1.3 million courses.

Sign up

Join to view


OR

By registering, I agree to the Terms and Privacy Policies
Already have an account?
Just a few more details

So we can recommend you notes for your school.

Reset Password

Please enter below the email address you registered with and we will send you a link to reset your password.

Add your courses

Get notes from the top students in your class.


Submit