POL 2103: Lecture #14 Nov 30th 2012
International Relations and the search for a Post 89 World Order:
In search of new narratives in the Post Cold War era
(re) definition of set of terms/lexicon
warfare, conflict , insurgency (war on terror)
International law (aggressive war, war of selfdefense, humanitarian intervention, humanitarian access)
state sovereignty (inviolability of state borders)
civil liberty /human rights
Which text is going to be the new “Article X”?
Who is going to be the next:
George Kennan – policy of containment
Henry Kissinger – rapprochement with China
Zbigniew Brzezinski – end of the Cold War (Poland, Afghanistan)
How new security concerns, trends, issues are going to defined and “framed”
Which are them are going to be prevalent/dominant in the XXI century Post War IR discussions:
Claim of “The End of History”
liberal democracy and market capitalism have prevailed
future politics will devolve around resolving routine economic and technical problems
What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a
particular period of postwar history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point
of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy
as the final form of human government. This is not to say that there will no longer be
events to fill the pages of Foreign Affair's yearly summaries of international relations, for
the victory of liberalism has occurred primarily in the realm of ideas or consciousness
and is as yet incomplete in the real or material world. But there are powerful reasons for
believing that it is the ideal that will govern the material world in the long run. To
understand how this is so, we must first consider some theoretical issues concerning
the nature of historical change.
“End of history"? Hegel and Marx
Hegel first historicist philosopher
understood human history as a coherent, evolutionary process.
Hegel saw this evolution as one of the gradual unfolding of human reason, leading eventually to the
expansion of freedom in the world.
Marx economically grounded theory means of production change as human societies evolved
theory of modernisation – not clear idea about its ultimate objective. Intellectual “dead end” of three main ideologies of the 1920 centuries:
1) Fascism 1945
2) Communism/socialism 1991
3) Nationalism – still work in progress
4) Variation of # 3 Religious fundamentalism
The end of history will be a ry sad time. The struggle for recognition, the willingness to risk one’s life
for a purely abstract goal, the worldwide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination,
and idealism, will be replaced by onomic calculation,
the endless solving of technical problems, environmental concerns, and the tisfaction of
sophisticated consumer demands.
In the posthistorical period there will be er art nor philosophy , just the perpetual caretaking of
the museum of human history.
I can feel in myself, and see in others around me, a erful nostalgia for the time when
history existed. Such nostalgia, in fact, will continue to fuel competition and conflict even in the post
historical world for some time to come. Even though I recognize its inevitability, I have the most
ambivalent feelings for the civilization that has been created in Europe since 1945, with its north
Atlantic and Asian offshoots. Perhaps this very prospect of centuries of boredom at the end of history will
serve to get history started once again.
“End of History” revisited:
“….The other won't notice that man has been denatured, domesticated, and
despoiled. They will not notice that man's savage instincts have given way to tame
civility. Men will occupy themselves mainly with the pursuit of animal comforts.
There will be no men willing to die for a god, an idea, or a flag. Men will no longer
be willing to rush naked into battle and headlong to their death.
Peace and happiness will prevail: but how dreadful it will all be.”
Source: Shadia Drury, 2006
you may consult http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vZWJETpfbzM&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qtcUPiX09a4 What does it mean to be:
How this process may affect
the so called “human nature”
in a sociological context of modernity?
Is this process the ultimate objective
of an “utopian” society based exclusively
on members with Beta character?
Who is going to be then the agency of change?
What are the implications of the end of history for international relations?
The claim of the “End of history” suggests:
a) radical social and political change has reached its dialectical conclusion
b) economic context globalization of neoliberal capitalism
c) status quo problematic social relations to remain
d) limited capacity for producing social justice “The Coming Anarchy”:
“How scarcity, crime,
and disease are rapidly
destroying the social fabric
of our planet.
(The Atlantic Monthly, Feb.1994)
Kaplan predicts catastrophe (s).
Kaplan looks at the bursting slums, the export of timber and oil, the erosion of soil and civil order, and sees
Nigeria breaking into ethnic violence a la Bosnia.
Kaplan sees Somalialike chaos engulfing the whole of West Africa.
“West Africa is becoming the symbol of worldwide demographic, environmental, and
societal stress , in which criminal anarchy emerges as the real " strategic" danger.
Disease, overpopulation, unprovoked crime, scarcity of resources, refugee migrations,
the increasing erosion of nationstates and international borders, and the empowerment
of private armies, security firms, and international drug cartels are now most tellingly
demonstrated through a West African prism.
West Africa provides an appropriate introduction to the issues, often extremely
unpleasant to discuss, that will soon confront our civilization.
To remap the political earth the way it will be a few decades hence—as I intend to do in
this article—I find I must begin with West Africa.” He looks not only at Africa but also at …
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh 1130 million people now, 28 million more next year, 1865 million
expected by the year 2025 and sees "ecological time bombs."
"Future wars will be those of communal survival, aggravated or, in many cases, caused by environmental
scarcity. These wars will be subnational, meaning that it will be hard for states and local governments to
protect their own citizens....
This is how many states will ultimately die."
To understand the events of the next fifty years, then, one must understand ironmental scarcity,
cultural and racial clash, geographic destiny, and the transformation of war.
The order in which I have named these is not accidental.
Each concept except the first relies partly on the one or ones before it, meaning that
the last two new approaches to mapmaking and to warfare—are the most
They are also the least understood. I will now look at each idea, drawing upon the work of specialists and
also my own travel experiences in various parts of the globe besides Africa, in order to fill in the blanks of a
new political atlas.
“We are entering a bifurcated world. Part of the globe is inhabited by Hegel's and
Fukuyama's Last Man, healthy, well fed, and pampered by technology. The other, larger,
part is inhabited by Hobbes's First Man, condemned to a life that is "poor, nasty, brutish,
and short." Although both parts will be threatened by environmental stress, the Last
Man will be able to master it; the First Man will not.”
Last footnote besides India, Pakistan, Bangladesh
Sri Lanka there is a New Political atlas of… Canada
This and many other factors will make the United States less of a nation than it is today,
even as it gains territory following the peaceful dissolution of Canada. Quebec, based
on the bedrock of Roman Catholicism and Francophone ethnicity, could yet turn out to
be North America's most cohesive and crimefree nationstate. (It may be a smaller
Quebec, though, since aboriginal peoples may lop off northern parts of the province.) "Patriotism" will become increasingly regional as people in Alberta and Montana
discover that they have far more in common with each other than they do with Ottawa or
Washington, and Spanishspeakers in the Southwest discover a greater commonality
with Mexico City.
Professor in Political Science
Harvard University & Columbia University
Wrote many texts
“The Clash Of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order” (1996)
Huntington polemicizes against Fukuyama’s “one world: euphoria and harmony”
For Huntington, the future holds a series of clashes between “the West and the Rest.”
Huntington rejects a number of models of contemporary history:
a “realist” model that nationstates are primary players on the world scene who will continue to form
alliances and coalitions that will play themselves out in various conflicts.
a “chaos” model that detects no discernible order or structure.
Huntington asserts that the contemporary world is articulated into eting civilizations that are
based on irreconcilably different cultures and religions.
For Huntington, culture provides unifying and integrating principles of order and cohesion, and from
dominant cultural formations emerge civilizations that are likely to come into conflict with each other.
Candidates for thiscultural clash are Islamic countries, China, Russia, and the West.
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be
primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and
the dominating source of conflict will be cultural.
Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal
conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different
The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future .
“In Eurasia the great historic fault lines between civilizations are once more aflame. This
is particularly true along the boundaries of the crescentshaped Islamic bloc of
nations, from the bulge of Africa to central Asia.
Violence also occurs between Muslims, on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbs in the
Balkans, Jews in Israel, Hindus in India, Buddhists in Burma and Catholics in the
slam has bloody borders.”
“The fundamental problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism.
It is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of
their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power.”
Religion in Huntington’s model is perhaps the central force that motivates and mobilizes people and is thus
the core of civilization.
Huntington’s model seems to have some purchase in the currently emerging global encounter with
terrorism, and is becoming a new dominant conservative ideology.
It tends to overly ogenize both Islam and the West, as well as the other civilizations he
Huntington’s binary model of inexorable conflict between the West and Islam is lytically
problematic. Furthermore, Islam itself is a contested terrain.
“In the emerging world of ethnic conflict and civilizational clash, Western belief in the
universality of Western culture suffers three problems: it is false; it is immoral; and it is
dangerous . . . Imperialism is the necessary logical consequence of universalism”.
The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order , p. 310.
Huntington’s contribution and the
EastWest dichotomy: “Distinct social and political factors” operating in Western and Eastern Europe created rent
concepts of nationalism :
one grounded in a liberal understanding of citizens' rights,
the other in messianic notions of the will of a people.
The first is a product of faith in the rational progress towards justice and freedom;
The second an understanding of history in romanticist and evolutionist terms, seeing the possession of a
homeland (Volkslaat) as the precondition for national fulfillment.
Robert Kaplan a particularly good example of the “relaxed” jargon dominating the mass media, ere a
new ethnic mythology was invented to account for the ethnic violence after the breakup of
Trivial generalizations and clichés on
the dark nature of the Balkans the European gunpowder cake, irrevocable animosity and
“ethnic hatred and enmities” of centuries
from “a distant tribal past” – led to the impression that the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was
ethnic “business as usual the onl”, nown way of life in the Balkans.
Failed nomination for membership to the National Academy of Science (Huntington was twice rejected)
Huntington “Political Order in Changing Societies” (1968)
Used pseudomathematical arguments
Unscientific methodological framework
... a type of language which gives the illusion of science without any of its
Source: Serge Lang "Academia, Journalism, and Politics: A Case Study: The Huntington
Case" 1998 Critique:
Trivializing ethnic nationalism
Policies mostly driven by ethnocentrism
Legitimizing dismantling of multiethnic states (Yugoslavia, Serbia)
Benjamin R. Barber
is Whitman Professor
of Political Science and
director of the Whitman
Center at Rutgers
University and the author
of many books including
Strong Democracy (1984),
An Aristocracy of Everyone
(1992), and Jihad Versus McWorld
(Times Books, 1995).
Barber captures both the sameness and conflicting elements of globalization .
Barber divides the world into modernizing, standardizing, Westernizing, and secular
forces of globalization controlled by multinational corporations, opposed to premodern,
fundamentalist, and tribalizing forces at war with the West and modernity. Just beyond the horizon of current events lie two possible political futures — h bleak, neither
The first is a retribalization of large swaths of humankind by war and bloodshed: a threatened
Lebanonization of national states in which ulture is pitted against culture, people against people,
tribe against tribe—a Jihad in the name of a hundred narrowly conceived faiths against every kind of
interdependence, every kind of artificial social cooperation and civic mutuality.
The second is being borne in on us by
the onrush of economic and ecological forces that demand integration and uniformity and that
world with fast music, fast computers,
and fast food—with MTV, Macintosh, and McDonald's, pressing nations into one
commercially homogenous global network : one McWorld tied together by technology, ecology,
communications, and commerce.
The planet is alling precipitantly apart AND coming reluctantly together at the very same
These two tendencies are sometimes visible in the same countries at the same instant: thus Yugoslavia,
clamoring just recently to join the New Europe, is exploding into fragments ;
India is trying to live up to its reputation as the world's largest integral democracy while powerful new
fundamentalist parties like the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, along with nationalist assassins,
are imperiling its hardwon unity.
States are breaking up or joining up: the Soviet Union has disappeared almost overnight, its parts forming
new unions with one another or with likeminded nationalities in neighboring states.
The old interwar national state based on territory and political sovereignty looks
to be a mere transitional development.
Four imperatives make up the dynamic of McWorld: a market imperative, a resource
imperative, an informationtechnology imperative, and an ecological imperative.