POLB91H3 Lecture Notes - Lecture 8: Neocolonialism, Developing Country, Westminster System
POLB91 – Lecture 8
China: neo-colonialism in Africa?
China became the first developing nation to give aid
Why? They poor they need to help themselves? → its for red diplomacy. Buy support of African
countries to recognise Taiwan is a part of china
The author argues that it would be very stranfge for a non-democratic nation like china to make
democracy a condition for aid
With aids they give concessional loans
4.1 Regulatory Bureaucracy We will explore issues of bureaucratic structure by focusing on
agencies en gaged in the regulation of business. Regulation is obviously a major function of all
modern states, important to politicians, parties, and interest groups alike. So if there is something
to our theory, it should certainly show up here. The American separation of powers system, for
reasons of political protec tion, should tend to bury its regulatory agencies in excessive
bureaucracy and deny them the discretion they need to do their jobs well. Regulation should be
relatively formal, legalistic, adversarial - and ineffective. The British parliamen tary system, by
contrast, should produce agencies that are relatively free from burdensome bureaucracy, and
granted far more discretion to exercise their professional judgment in accommodating the
complex contingencies that arise over time. By comparison to the American, British regulation
should tend to be more informal, cooperative - and effective.
Good evidence on these counts is difficult to come by, but the studies we've seen suggest that our
portrayal is on target. Some of the most relevant work is drawn from environmental regulation.
Of these, perhaps the most instructive is carried out by Vogel [1986], who offers an extensive
comparative analysis of American and British environmental agencies. Vogel notes that both
nations developed policies with similar objectives at roughly the same time, backed by
movements of roughly the same strength and producing similar outcomes in degree of pollution
reduction. Yet their approaches to environmental regulation "differ from each other more than do
those of any other two industrialized (Vogel [1986, 21]). They represent polar cases of what he
calls two national styles of regulation. Specifically, Vogel finds that environmental regulation in
the U.S. is rigid and rule-oriented, leaving little discretion for regulators. Congressional
legislation makes heavy use of uniform emissions and quality standards, requires elaborate
environmental impact statements, and specifies timetables for achievement of goals. Not
coincidentally, the Environmental Protection Agency has little flex ibility to take account of the
special circumstances of individual firms, is prone to adversarial relations with them, and relies
heavily on prosecution to enforce its standards. Firms use mechanisms for public access and
judicial review to fight the EPA, and are continually disgruntled. Environmental groups, granted
rights to information, participation, and access to the courts, push for action through the same
mechanisms. Conflict is interminable. British regulation looks strikingly different. Vogel finds
that it is highly flexible, leaving more case-by-case discretion to bureaucrats than they have in
any other Western nation. Legislation does not impose uniform standards for emissions and
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
Document Summary
China became the first developing nation to give aid. Buy support of african countries to recognise taiwan is a part of china. The author argues that it would be very stranfge for a non-democratic nation like china to make democracy a condition for aid. 4. 1 regulatory bureaucracy we will explore issues of bureaucratic structure by focusing on agencies en gaged in the regulation of business. Regulation is obviously a major function of all modern states, important to politicians, parties, and interest groups alike. So if there is something to our theory, it should certainly show up here. The american separation of powers system, for reasons of political protec tion, should tend to bury its regulatory agencies in excessive bureaucracy and deny them the discretion they need to do their jobs well. Regulation should be relatively formal, legalistic, adversarial - and ineffective.
