Class Notes (811,705)
Canada (494,883)
POLC38H3 (43)
Lecture 3

Corruption and Violence Lecture 3 Notes SEP 27.docx

5 Pages
Unlock Document

Political Science
Sheldon Ungar

1 Corruption and Violence Lecture 3 Notes SEP 27, 2011 (ALL MAIN POINTS ON SLIDES) Incentives to DIY • self-interest does not always lead to the best outcome Prisoners Dilemma • Example: this guy is arrested what should he do? Confess or keep his mouth shut? • If he confesses and names his accomplice he will get out on bail (A) • If he keeps his mouth shut he will get jail for a year (B) • But say the accomplice gets captured – what should he do? Now there’s two players in the game • So if one of them confess the other is in jail for 20 years, if neither confess they both get jail for a year (4 possible option – each individual has a choice of ½ things to do.) What is the best outcome for the collective? (collective is the pair of prisoners, not society as a whole that wants to put the crooks in jail) The best option is that they both stay silent – but that’s not in the individual’s best interest. If one knows that the other will remain silent the best option would be to rat out the other. So both staying silent is in society’s best interest, however not confessing knowing the other will not is not in the individual’s best interest. If they both confess they each get 5 years – therefore the 1 year is better for society (Per ado Optimal?) Clearly society benefits if everyone cooperates and works together towards collective good, but in the games each individual is better of pursing self-interest contrary to social good. There is no incentive in changing individual behavior unless they know that the others will cooperate. EXIT Strategy (take bus instead of train, leave country instead of fighting for justice) in contrast to TUNISIA’s peddler who lit himself on fire rather than paying bribe (most other peddlers pay the bribes) Sympathy for a cause is not enough for motivation to actively join causes they believe in 2 Like PD, a group would be better off if you join them, but each individual would rather be at home and watching tv – and enjoying outcome (THESE are called FREE RIDERS) Free Riders withhold their (fair) contribution to groups undertaking, common in large groups, especially common in politics So why join a group? They will succeed or fail without you? – COLLECTIVE ACTION Tragedy of Commons: What if everyone perused their self-interest? Analogy of free land and cows Hardin: Tragedy of the Commons: natural resources that could be divided among everyone will be ruined Corruption as a tragedy – one corrupt official, not a big deal – everyone takes money, big deal Principle Agent Problem: Opportunity exists People become corrupt because there is opportunity, and incentives to act in ones interest in contrary to society (principle) Prisoners Dilemma Who makes decisions, you or your boss? (Hierarchy – with each successive level able given more power) Authority in government – many political systems -> bureaucrats -> have certain legal authorities, try to avoid complaints because it looks bad and could lead to penalties The LDC Authority – all authority is concentrated in a ruler (or a group of rulers) Bureaucrats pass all key decisions up to rulers and rarely care if you do not like what they are doing because they serve one principle: the ruler. Even if there are free (ish) elections, politics are highly personalized and non-ideological. (Serve the ruler) Structural sources of corruption States, Ideal States & rational-leagal Authority, less than ideal states The personal, not-rational-leagal Patrimonialism, neo-partimonialism, clientalism (patronage vs prebends) Ideal State qualities: control a defined territory and population, have monopoly on use of force, have a set of rule bound institutions that perform governing tasks like regulation. Weber “Rational-legal authority” (Clapham, page.44) 3 Constitutional Authority: Clapham – page 45: constitution should provide the legal frame work through which rational legal behavior is defined But in many states, the constitution have been changed to suit whims of rulers – or applied narrowly if not ignored (Key test for democratic constitutions is whether the incumbent loses and respects election and leave peacefully? Example: John Adams: America) Characteristics in Less than Ideal States: lacks boarders, monopoly of use of force is not able to perform normal state functions (clapham) / state is extractive, taking resources from dom
More Less

Related notes for POLC38H3

Log In


Don't have an account?

Join OneClass

Access over 10 million pages of study
documents for 1.3 million courses.

Sign up

Join to view


By registering, I agree to the Terms and Privacy Policies
Already have an account?
Just a few more details

So we can recommend you notes for your school.

Reset Password

Please enter below the email address you registered with and we will send you a link to reset your password.

Add your courses

Get notes from the top students in your class.