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Lecture 6

Reading week 6

6 Pages
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Department
Psychology
Course Code
PSYC21H3
Professor
David Haley

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Gallagher article
Interaction theory (IT) as an alternative to both theory theory (TT) and stimulation
theory (ST)
Various capacities for primary and secondary intersubjectivity found in infancy and
early childhood should not be thought of as precursors to later developing capacities
for using folk psychology or simulation routines
Continue to operate as our ordinary and everyday basis for social cognition
Enactive perception rather than implicit simulation is the best model for explaining
these capacities
We would need come sense of the circumstances or some narrative framework to guide
us
These approaches reflect the theory of mind explanations offered by the standard
and dominant models of social cognition: TT and ST
Folk psychology theory to formulate the inference
Simulate what must be going on in the others mind by imagining ourselves in his or
her shoes.
Three suppositions
Social cognition is a problem (problem of other minds) because we lack direct
access to other mind. We need some special cognitive process (theorizing,
simulating) that will allow us to infer mental states in others
Our normal everyday stance toward the other person is an observational stance.
We observe their behaviours with some degree of detachment, and we use those
observations as evidence for our theorizing, or as starting points for our
simulating
These mentalizing processes constitute our primary and pervasive way of
understanding others (supposition of universality)
IT
Rejects the mentalizing supposition, that is, the Cartesian idea that other minds
are hidden away and inaccessible, and cites evidence that in many cases knowing
the other persons intentions, emotions, and dispositions is simply a matter of
www.notesolution.com
perceiving their embodied behaviour in the situation. In most cases of everyday
interaction no inference is necessary
IT rejects the spectatorial supposition that we are primarily spectators or
observers of others’ behaviours. Our normal everyday stance toward the other
person is not third-person, detached observation; it is second-person interaction.
For the most part we are interacting with them on some project, or in some
communicative practice, or in some predefined relation
IT rejects the supposition of universality in regard to mentalizing, either by
theory or by simulation. Rather, mentalizing or mindreading are, at best,
specialized abilities that are relatively rarely employed, and they depend on more
embodied and situated ways of perceiving and understanding others, which are
more primary and pervasive
IT is posed as a challenge to both TT and ST, no by denying the possibility of folk
psychological theorizing or the running of simulation routines in certain (and
relatively rare) circumstances, by shifting the very framework, by questioning the
very suppositions that TT and ST assume to be in place when it come to
understanding others.
Interaction theorists deny that everyday social cognition happens the way that TT
and ST suggest
IT focuses on three sets of capacities
First set of capacities is anchored in an embodied intersubjective perception that
is manifest from early infancy
Second stats to develop around the age of one year and is signalled by the
phenomenon of joint attention, which brings with it the importance of context
Third set of capacities is based on the acquisition of narrative competency that
has its developmental start as the child gains language and comprehends stories.
These capacities are not precursors, but are basic and continuing parts of the
phenomenon of social interaction and understanding
Evidence for IT
At minimum newborn infants are in some sense turned to others and are building on
an implicit orientation to other persons.
www.notesolution.com

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Description
Gallagher article Interaction theory (IT) as an alternative to both theory theory (TT) and stimulation theory (ST) Various capacities for primary and secondary intersubjectivity found in infancy and early childhood should not be thought of as precursors to later developing capacities for using folk psychology or simulation routines Continue to operate as our ordinary and everyday basis for social cognition Enactive perception rather than implicit simulation is the best model for explaining these capacities We would need come sense of the circumstances or some narrative framework to guide us These approaches reflect the theory of mind explanations offered by the standard and dominant models of social cognition: TT and ST Folk psychology theory to formulate the inference Simulate what must be going on in the others mind by imagining ourselves in his or her shoes. Three suppositions Social cognition is a problem (problem of other minds) because we lack direct access to other mind. We need some special cognitive process (theorizing, simulating) that will allow us to infer mental states in others Our normal everyday stance toward the other person is an observational stance. We observe their behaviours with some degree of detachment, and we use those observations as evidence for our theorizing, or as starting points for our simulating These mentalizing processes constitute our primary and pervasive way of understanding others (supposition of universality) IT Rejects the mentalizing supposition, that is, the Cartesian idea that other minds are hidden away and inaccessible, and cites evidence that in many cases knowing the other persons intentions, emotions, and dispositions is simply a matter of www.notesolution.com
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