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University of Toronto St. George
Peace, Conflict and Justice Studies
Nancy Bertoldi

Arms Races and Zero Sum Games Women in House -> [email protected], FEB 15 4PM -strategic interactions actually matter; helps shed light on outcomes, actors may face unanticipated surprising results they weren't expecting because of the features of the interaction themselves - Barnett and Zurcher 1) observation that peace building nations usually successful in ending violence but not effective in realizing possible peace (involving liberal reform; democracy and market) - STRATEGIC Interaction between peace builders and local elites in the context of peace building nations; context is a post-colonial and post-conflict context, summary of theories of state formation and how post-colonial state is different from Western nations ; divergent trajectory occurs in aftermath of colonialism, aftermath of decolonisation : colonization: interests of colonizers, cut to elites to ensure cooperation and those patterns carry over, play part of shaping state; delegitimize, doesn’t have enough capacity no tax capability,, weak in institutional terms but strong in despotic terms, lacks security, legitimacy and lacks capacity > violent conflict then exacerbates conflict> relies on coercive means to influence population, leads to revolution and conflict, after have a dual crisis of legitimacy and security -> lies in strategic interactions of PB, SNE , SE MODELS: (Assumptions) -> actors are unitary and goal oriented, don’t overlap in a significant matter (can separate actors) elites are more important than mass public in context, mass public have no significant impact > focus on elites not unusual peace agreement that key parties are committed to implementing (but violence not a distant memory, are patterns associated with security dilemma ambiguity between offense and defense) -> Security dilemma used in a variety of contexts 4 OUTCOMES possible -> cooperative peace building, compromised peace building (elites have own goals of survival, post-colonial conflict where survival of state is not secure, so have a symbolic acceptance of reforms to take resources and enhance own survival) , conflictual peace building (elites say no way, fight it out) and captured peace building (elites have own goals, Bargain is struck where elites realize own goals without compromising wants) > common is compromised, with SNE have captured peace-building (peacebuilders care about security and stabilizing post-conflict context, don’t want city elites instead of central govt elites to realize goals, give SNE almost all the they want , little incentive to defect because it is a stable solution? (PEACEBUILDERS CONTRACT) SYMBOLIC peacebuilding emergences, no changes in state society relations (shaped by post-conflict context, despotic state and infrastructural weak -> end up ratifying existing state society relations) > shows under which conditions that the contract will change in favour of more genuine reforms as long as state elites willing to put their survival on the line and if sub national elites are weak, PB must have significant resources to back them > compromised peace building might not be such a bad thing, [perhaps peacebuiulders don't know how to reform a context, is not appropriate and agenda is compromised and that it doesn’t work > actors are chosen by the PB to rebuild state, not always the person that public wants that gets involved in building, which state elites? Bias? How to choose; grassroots? But need to rely on state elites, but how do you get to the population? In despotic states that collapse, elites eradicate competitors and rival sources of civil power and elites force cooperation and influence; how do you deal with states like that? Intervention; local populations sick of other people, population would rather have elites than other people (peace builders legitimacy, lack of conflict): but race also a source of cleavage, we are comfortable with who is the peace builders? - new elites even when they come in are weak, no connection to society terms of infrastructural power, need to rely on PBs in order to survive > once PB legitimacy changes than local elites can even more challenge PBs, negotiations change > long time, sick of foreign occupation _____________________________________________________________________________________ _____________________________________________________________________ ARMS RACES: Richardsons models try to formalize the impact of the security dilemma on levels of armament ; (security dilemma; should arm or should not, feel insecure and thus want to arm) ; how much? Optimal level of armament? - resource allocation, opportunity costs> armaments are costly, so what motivates states? Key is strategic interaction; determine how much in response to armament levels of opponent; starts with an initial level of suspicion even if opponent has none, then there is an armament response > two groups or states, presence of security dilemma, suspicion of opponent, armament factions AMRMAMNET FUCTION begins with a basic equation - more responsive the two sides are (steeper slope), more unatstable the system - final armamnet levels given by intersection of both lines - reults can often be surprising because of features of system of interaction> unstable system, must be very careful - once system in in equilibirum, impact of chaes in suspicion or responsiveness depens on whether stable or instable -in stable system, increased responsivess or suspicion gives rise to initial increase in arms until a new equilibirum is reached -in unstable system whern equlibrium rep I impact of arms races on war is not clear > ARMS COSTLY seems like models apply better in arms races in conventional weapons than nuclear weponsm regional rivalries and certain historical rivalries etc. (certain contextsbut not in others) - > don’t explian nature of superpower rivalry in Cold War - stron
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