PHL100Y1 Lecture Notes - Semantic Holism, Empirical Evidence, Jargon
Document Summary
[1] recall from last time that quine argued against the analytic/synthetic distinction, or more exactly that there is no principled way to draw the distinction. In particular, quine charges that empiricism adopts what he calls radical reductionism : [2] quine argues in effect that there is no way to spell out a unique (set of) impression(s) to correspond to the ideas involved in matters of fact and experience, in hume"s language. The reason is that there is no sharp way to distinguish the analytic from the synthetic, as we have seen (38 39): The two dogmas are, indeed, at root identical. The factual component must, if we are empiricists, boil down to a range of con rmatory experiences. In the extreme case where the linguistic component is all that matters, a true statement is analytic. But i hope we are now impressed with how stubbornly the distinction between analytic and synthetic has resisted any straightforward drawing
