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Lecture

PHL lecture, nov. 29.doc

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Department
Philosophy
Course
PHL100Y1
Professor
Peter King
Semester
Fall

Description
Meditations 3 Preliminaries  The broad outlines of the argumentative strategy for this meditation and the next is laid out here o The Meditator now seeks a criterion to go on with:  A rule that will allow him to decide what is certainly true o Begins by reviewing his progress in 3.01:  He is certain that these modes of thinking qua modes “do exist within me” o The Problem of the Criterion is introduced in 3.02  Since the meditator is certain he is a thinking thing, he asks whether he also knows what is required to be certain of something  Only thing he has to go on is “a clear knows and distinct perception” that he is a thinking thing, but that seems good enough; he concludes at the end of 3.02:  So I seem now to be able to lay it down as a general rule that whatever I perceive very clearly and distinctly is true  The Meditator then raises doubts about the Clarity-and-Distinctness Rule (CDR), on the grounds that he seemed to clearly and distinctly now things about which he was able to raise metaphysical doubt o Eventually based on a possibility (3.04):  Indeed, the only reason for my later judgment that they were open to doubt was that it occurred to me that perhaps some god could have given me a nature such that I was deceived even in matters which seemed most evident  The Meditator finds this hypothesis hard to sustain o (i) The few examples he has of clear and distinct truths are entirely persuasive o (ii) He has no reason to think there is a deceptive God or for that matter a God o There follows a crucial passage at the end of 3.04:  But in order to remove even the slight reason for doubt, as soon as the opportunity arises I must examine whether there is a God, and if there is, whether He can be a deceiver. For if I do not know this, it seems that I can never be quite certain of anything else  The meditator, then, wants to establish the existence of a non-deceptive Deity in order to…what? o Two different answers:  (a) To rule out the reason for doubting based on the Deceptive- Deity hypothesis  (b) To validate CDR  (a) And (b) are equivalent under the assumption that the DD- hypothesis is the only reason to doubt CDR The meditators Proof of the Existence of God  To prove: God exists o The proof of God‟s existence here is a causal proof: it begins from facts about what there is and infers the existence of God as the (only possible) cause the facts o Meditator begins obliquely, by considering how truth and falsehood can arise in the understanding-presumably because it is only in these cases that “deception” has a foothold o This point emerges from the discussion and isn‟t stated as such o Begin with a distinction”  Some ideas are simple and others complex (3.05)  Descartes‟s way of putting this point is hopeless: he says that some thoughts are like “images of things” and others “have various additional forms”  What he means is that ideas in the strict sense have only putative representational content, whereas other mental phenomena-violations, emotions, judgments-have something in addition to putative representational content  Simple ideas are not true or false as such (3.06)  Descartes will eventually qualify (2) with his doctrine of „material falsity,‟ but for now he is content with the point that ideas qua ideas are just so much thinking  Complex ideas that are violations of emotions are not true or false as such (3.06)  The nonexistence of their objects does not invalidate violations or emotions from being “about” the things they are about: a desire for a unicorn is no less a desire than (say) my desire for the bread crust before me  Meditator concludes:  Truth and falsity pertain primarily to judgments  The proof of (4) is by disjunction-elimination. Falsehood crops up in the following way:  Judging that “the ideas which are in me resemble, or conform to, things located outside me” is the chief and most common mistake” in judgments (3.06)  The Meditator here assumes a stronger claim, namely:  The existential error sketched in (5) is the only way falsehood enters into judgments  (At least we never hear of any other way) the replacement of (5) by (5*) explains why the argument suddenly changes direction to look at the possible causes of the ideas one has, with the eventual aim of returning to their liability to existential. This move, or course, presupposes the following:  Ideas are caused  Now (6) has two distinct readings in light of the later distinction between formal and objective being, and the Meditator endorses both (although it is only plausible for the former):  Ideas as formal beings are caused  Ideas as objective beings are caused  We‟ll come back to this point. Given that ideas (in either sense) are caused, we can inquire about their causal origin. The meditator proposes a trichotomy:  Ideas are either innate, adventitious, or invented by me (3.07)  This is, apparently, an exclusive and exhaustive division, and the Meditator is careful to state that for all he knows his ideas are all one kind or another; he gives examples of such. o The next several paragraphs are devoted to the possibility of error in adventitious ideas (3.08-11). o Presumably the Meditator isn‟t tempted to believe that ideas he produces actually “resemble” anything in the external world o It‟s a little harder to see why innate ideas are bypassed  One possibility is that the Mediator‟s examples-“what a thing is, what truth is, and what thought is” might be considered devoid of putative representational content; o Then get a brief argument that although adventitious ideas, i.e. ideas the Meditator believes “to be derived from things existing outside me,” don‟t support the conclusion that they are so derived and accurately represent the items from which they are derived  The grounds for thinking that such adventitious ideas do accurately represent external things (3.08): o (a) The Meditator has been so taught by Nature o (b) They do not depend on the Meditators will o (c) “The most obvious judgment” for the meditator to make is that “the thing in question transmits to me its own likeness rather than something else”  There are clear objections to each o (A): this is no more than a spontaneous impulse to believe the claim, not a reason for doing so (3.09)  Get a contrast with the “light of nature” aka “the natural light (of reason)” o (B): being independent of the Meditator‟s will isn‟t sufficient grounds to conclude that the source of these ideas is outside the Meditator, since they could be generated by “some other faculty” within the Meditator (3.10) o (C): even if ideas are generated by external items it doesn‟t follow that they resemble those items-as instanced by the sensory and astronomical ideas of the Sun (3.11) (At least one of these ideas has to be wrong)  Seems to shut down this line of inquiry (3.12) o But the Meditator brings in a pair of definitions (3.13) and a causal principle (3.14) to hep him out  Formal reality=the reality possessed by s
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