Being is always disclosed to us in our activities. In our concrete Dasein, it'd always the
relationship to being that matters. What does it mean being is always disclosed?
Disclosure is phenomenon, that which shows itself in its disappearance. The way being
is disclosed is unthematic ally, it hides itself in everyday life. It's not manifest to us as
being manifest. The issue here for h is for some sort of moment in which being is
thematicized, in which we can experience being as a whole. H is saying that it is on the
basis of these experiences that a more philosophical investigation on being becomes
possible. It's because we exist by and large as our inauthentic self. Idle talk, boredom,
these are the primary modes of Dasein. Only in death and angst is being authentically
Levinas. Attended h's lectures. Bringing phenomenology to France. More importantly, he
takes phenomenology in a new direction, and this is ethics. Jew.
Existence and ethics.
Published in German in 1963, high point of existentialism. One thing to think about is the
and here, the and here in the title is separating out existence in the form of religious
belief from ethics. Christianity and judaism is the context. This split between existence
and ethics is impossible for Levinas philosophy? The discourse of faith is so dominated
by the kierkegaardian view. In the forward to proper names, Levinas says the following:
proper names in the middle of these common names......perhaps they will allow us to
define.....a rationality tied exclusively to the said.... Here he is saying something
about the ethics of reading, reading the others not simply as something to be
deciphered, but understanding the faith of the other. K's intelligibility of the said. K is part
of the questioning of that. Levinas wants to acknowledge him in that context. But does k
give a new form of intelligibility? Levinas thinks differently.
The self as secret tension and truth's triumph over it.
K gives two contributions. Subjectivity is understood as inwardness is absolute. K is not
a relativist. Though he defines truth relative to the subject. Truth that is merely related to
the subject would be relativistic, k is saying that the absolute truth is relative to the
The first way is through disembodied logical activity. Subjectivity is that which is
correlated to the object. The other way to do this, to get rid of the subject, which is the
identity of thought with thinking. The thinking becomes the content, and you lose the act
of thinking in the context of the thought. Levinas follows up, what remains with the
subjectivity of the subject? And he tells us of the two things that k rejects. One of this is
The inner life of the subject could achieve fulfillment in institutions or in human communications. Such institutions will never understand the inexpressability of the
inwardness. What becomes of the subject is the inner life of the subject. Truth, in the
sense of rational truth, is not triumphant, because it cannot incorporate the secrets of
the subject and the inner world of the subject. Truth being triumphant is in the Hegelian
sense. Truth is triumphant when it becomes universal. Truth trumps subjectivity. It
becomes universal. K is saying that it cannot contain the subjectivity of the subject.
The common ground of existential and idealistic subjectivity
On the surface, k's existential subjectivity is different from idealistic subjectivity. Egoism
of the subject, subject or self concern, the point