SOUL THEORY DUALISM SWINBURNE
Intro Two Questions
1. What makes a person at one time the same person as a person at another time?
▯what makes the claim true
2. What evidence can we have that a person at one time is the same person as a person at
▯how to identity
Ex: Soul Theory can claim 1. But can’t be identified, 2.
Empiricist Theories say that the questions receive a common answer. So the body
theory, mind, soul, theory are empiricist theories.
> Swinburne thinks that Empiricist Theories are false!
Thompson & Williams (body theory): Swinburne:
implausibly deny the possibility of We may not be able to tell whether body
bodyswitching switching happens
Parfit (mind theory):
implausibly insists that survival is a matter of We may have reason to go each way
degree and that identity isn’t at issue
implausibly insist that a double success can We may become unsure of where you are
turn a success into a failure when the 2 “survivor” appears on the scene
You are your soul. (you go where you soul goes).
Evidence for a Soul
(1) Persisting through body switching is possible.
(2) Persisting through body loss is possible
(2a) You are a mental substance with two essential properties, consciousness & will.
(2b) Consciousness can occur without a body.
> imagine the color without the body.
(2c) Will can occur without a body.
> keep the body still, willfully switch your experience from one to another 2
Argument for Soul Theory
(1)Persisting though body switching is possible.
(2)Persisting through body loss is possible.
(3) Survival doesn’t require bodily continuity. [1, 2]
(4) Persisting through amnesia is possible.
(5) Persisting through character changes is possible.
(6) Survival doesn’t require mental/brain continuity. 
(7) What makes a person persist is nothing physical. [3, 6]
(8) What makes a person survive is a nonphysical soul. 
The Nature of the Soul
o The soul is a mental substance with two essential properties, consciousness & will.
o The soul is indivisible. (After all, while we can imagine body switching, amnesia, etc,
what we can’t imagine is you surviving as two distinct people!)
o The soul isn’t extended. (After all, anything extended can be halved but the soul is
o The soul may or may not be immortal. (Some have thought that the soul must be
immortal if it is indivisible. For, goes the idea, destruction requires division. Swinburne
rejects this idea.)
•Your argument supposes that it is always definite whether someone survives or not, even in
fantastic cases. But, since our concept of personal identity evolved to deal with only ordinary
cases, there’s no reason to suppose that it applies to fantastic cases, whi