PHL201H1 Lecture 5: Freedom and Moral Responsibility
Document Summary
Derk pereboom why we have no free will and can live without it. Accepts hard compatibilism we don"t have the type of free will required for moral responsibility. Thinks this view will improve our view of morality. Two objections: against event-causal libertarianism the luck objection. Events are indeterminate (unspecified) according to event-causal libertarianism. If events are indeterminate, there is nothing that makes you do something. Don"t have the control required for moral responsibility. Lack of causal determinism is only one precondition for moral responsibility, the other is agential control which event-causal indeterminism does give us: against agent-causal libertarianism an objection from our best scientific theories. If agent-causal determinism were true and the physical world were governed by causally deterministic laws then we would observe exceptions to these laws. Observed events would not match up with the predicted probabilities. Or if observed events conformed to this predicted probabilities it would be a coincidence.
