Boethius notes that by (f4), whatever god knows must be so; hence it is not possible for it to be otherwise. Yet that is just to deny any freedom, or more exactly, to deny that there is any genuine alternative possibility. Thus there is no human freedom; providence should make fatal- ists of us all. Boethius is a believer in freedom, though, and therefore takes another approach: he maintains that foreknowledge neither compels nor necessitates (5. 4. 4 9). 5. 4 6 working out the details of this approach, which he does by considering two dif culties at length. Before turning to the details, though, we should be clear on his strategy. His move is to deny that foreknowledge has the consequence of being freedom-cancelling. Boethius, to his credit, keeps (a) and (b) distinct, and you should keep them in mind as when considering his responses to the two main dif culties.