PHL275H1 Lecture 6: PHL275H1 Lecture : Week 5/1
Document Summary
Relativists deny universality but not moral truths being true/false. Concern: expressivism makes morality less serious than we normally take it: according to it there are no objective moral truths. So its not true that whether something is wrong depends on attitude. Hume"s argument assumes two mental states: beliefs (reasons) that are not motivating but can be true/false, emotions/sentiments so motivating but not true or false, attitudes (sentiments) Hume"s view of there only being two kinds of mental state has virtue of simplicity: neater diagram: non- naturalist view with three mental states looks more like arbitrary maneuver just to save a theory. Follows hume but with a slight twist: non naturalist reply to mackie from nagel (non naturalist) Mackie"s main arguments on objectivity of value: argument from scientific world view (248-249), altered, moorean non natural properties don"t fit into scientific picture of the world, emphasizes action guiding nature of moral judgements like hume.
