For unlimited access to Class Notes, a Class+ subscription is required.
China's Strategy for Southeast Asia and the Region's Response
Finishing up Nationalism
But this week focus is on China's strats vs Southeast Asia
and then course evaluation
Nationalism Finish Up
-important, underlies china-taiwan cross strait relations we talked about before
-underlines china's foreign domestic policies talked about 2 weeks ago
-and has somethin to do with today's lecture too
-with onset of market liberal reforms durin deng era, marxism and leniniusm
faded as legtiimizing forcee for the party, so insteaad nationalism emrged as
major piollar supporting CCP and its legtimacy
-also functions as glue to hold people together, but theres kind of 2 views
about nationalism in China, Western ppl view China nationalism as top down
party propaganda where as Chinese nationalists describe Chinese nationalism
as bottom up process of mass people movement
-the truth is somewhere in between, it is both top down and botton up, and it is
-top down as result of CCP indcotirnation of doctirne of humilaition by western
and japs and portrayal of how party has susceesfuly liberated the country ,
ending centuries of humiliation
-on other hand, nationali sentiment can be independent force on its own,
outside state control. Popular nationalists regularly speak of mother land
without reference to party. Once it is independent force on its own, it lies
outside paety;'s control.
-in a way, it can also threaten party legitimacy when that happens, when the
party can be seen as too weak in midst of natioanli sentiments
- so natiaonlism is double edge sword for CCP. Popular natioanlists can support
or challenge state's claim to legtiimacy
-diaoyu island: think about it. Soverignty disputes between japan, china taiwan.
So when anti-Japanese sneitment doesnt challenge the state, it is positive. by
contrast when protesting take to the streets and demand the state to take
tough actions on Japan, implying the state has been weak on former
imperialists, they threaten the state's legitimacy on nationalistic gruonds. As
result, the party both sppresses and as well as responds to popular nationalist
-its presses natioanlist demands when it gets too high or out of contro,, it
responds to it wand tries to accomdate it when it is playable to CCP's
-so apart from Daoyu, think 90s, the 2 books published, 2 natioanlist books..
"China can say No" and then "CHina can still say NO"... its mirror of Japanese
books made in 80s called Japan can say No. It's saying taht China can say no
to imperialists foreign powers, expression of nationalist sentiments.
-the first book briefly supports China's anti-american policies, remained in
bookstores for years, the party allows it cause it supports state, but the 2nd
book was critical of CCP's japan policies, the book came out and banned in1
montha fter release even though both volume touched on similar issues.
-the state or party has tried to suppress or coopt popular natioanlism, the state
chooses a strategy of suppression when it doesnt have monopoly of natiaonlis
or when the movement has momentum on its own or when party is
marginalzed in the movement.
-public opinion in Authoratiran China, you assume opinions don't matter and
can clam down on opinions, but actually that's not true.. with advaent of
internet, we have looked at twitter etc where ppl can post controversial on
twitter and can go viral and can invoke enormous sentiments that could
mobilize popular supports against the state. So public opinion is not toally
ignored by CCP, so example in this case is nationalist sentiment. That is why
mass nationalism is double-edged sowrd for the state. Suprress when
senitment is too strong but state allows it for certain extent.
China's strategy for SE Asia and the Region's Responses
-we have spent a lot of time on domestic politics, and domestic sources of
China's foreign policy and cross strait relations between Tw and Cn.
-but standing outside China, today we wil stand out of China and see how
China affects the smaller mdium sized countries in SE Asia.
-what are the SE A doing to cope with rise of China, what's the deal bro?
-check the map on slide, so SE A consist of SG, filipines, indonesia, indo-
chinese countries, etc, they border or neighbor China, they are smaller in every
-so they feel threatened in a way by rise of China, economically militarily, etc.
-so what are they doing in resposne????
-why is China embracing multiateralism in East Asia
-How are the SE A countries responding to a rising China?
*multilaterialism: when you join some multilaterla forum, trading
blocs, or dialogues or solutions that are acceptable to a group of
-is rising power one of status quo powr? does it accept current rule of the
game, does it accept the rules based norm driven international order? or is it a
revisionist country, or does ti seek to change the rule of the game (bulldozer its
way through things for example, trying to change rule of game to its
-Prof thinks Chinas engagement with SE A provides us a lense to see if China is
revisionist power or status quo power.
-*status quo*: current status quo for example, US dominate, and international
industrialied countries set rule, so thus China play status quo , observe those
rules or make rules on its own?
South EAST Asia's Response to Rising China?
-to look at how SEA deals with China, need to know few defintions, to think of
them as obscure political terms, think of them as common psychology
-think of IR as psychology, think of how countries formulate strategies to deal
with othr countries.
-we can use simple analogies of 2 kids, 1 being bullied, bringing big brother to
-Hedging: keeping open strategic options against a future security threat....
Don't put all your eggs in 1 basket. Hedging is basically keeping open more
than 1 strategic options against the possibily of future security theat, the key is
that its not a current threat but a future threat. So you hedge against a future
-Balancing: so the comon understanding of balancing is you think about, hear
the term balancing, you think of image comes to my mind is that of a scale. So
a state baloances against current threat, a percieved current threat either
internally shitfiting resource allocation to strentgth defenseive capoalitbes or