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POL208 Lecture Six.docx

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Political Science
Lilach Gilady

Lecture Six International RelationsNonCooperative Games It has conflicting and competing preferences and it sometimes turns to zerosum gamesIt includes prisoners dilemma and chickenPrisoners Dilemma Two outlaws they can cooperate or defect It becomes interesting when there is a tension good for community or individualthis is the dilemmaEach actor does what is rational for him or herselfTherefore they will rat on their friend so the individual can walk freeThis ordering of preferences is the prisoners dilemma This can relate to international relations instead of individuals it turns into countries DCCCDDCDprisoners dilemmaRegardless of what the other team does the best response is to defectThe most stable outcome is DDthis is known as Nash equilibrium NENash Equilibrium is trying to denote is an outcome that is very likely and stable outcomeactor is very unlikely to change its strategyThis was named after Nashwhat is going to be more stable and more likelyNash Equilibrium His theory is that a pair of strategies for which neither player gains by changing her own strategy unilaterallyOnce you get a DD you cannot get a higher pay off by changing your strategyNo one has the incentive to change their decision unilaterallyunless both teams decide to change their strategies to CCThe problem is trust It is selfenforcing because actors will not change their policy unless they can agree to do so mutually and simultaneously requires mutual trust Defect in a prisoners dilemma is a dominant strategyThis means no matter what the other actor does defect should always be the answer because it gives the best individual outcomeThe Evolution of Cooperation Axel was very interested in the Prisoners dilemmaHe asked the question what would happen if we play the prisoners dilemma over and over again The best strategy is the simplest one from UOFT which is tit for tatWe start by cooperate and continue to do so until the other team defectWe do what the other team doesThis teaches the opponent to cooperateif you play this over and over tit for tat is the winning strategyThis analysis is dealing with iterated gamestheir strategy in playing prisoners dilemma changes The problem of finite games backwards induction if we use backward induction the entire argument collapsesit brings the world back to DDAs long as we do not know the number of games we are playing this wont happen We can ask ourselves What institutional design can facilitate tit for tat
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