Nov 26, 2013
• tendency towards cherry picking exists when there’s numerous intelligent services that
• admins have created separate institution (office of special plans) to sift through raw
intelligence to produce the kind of intelligence the political masters are looking for. (Obama
• producing intelligence is not gathering raw intelligence but checking the raw intelligence and
looking at the conflicting intelligence to see if it is contradicted or confirmed by the other
• Bush admin bypassed all these checks.
• the other means by which intelligence can be politicized is from the bottom up: the producers
of intelligence are usually career members in the service they are involved
• the way you get promoted is to provide bosses what theyre looking for
• strong incentive for intelligence agencies to shape their reports to the interest of the top to
promote their possible rise through the ranks of those institutions
• these combined tendencies explain the dismal records that can be easily seen by the
intelligence community in the US to provide policy makers with accurate information.
• they are caught off guard throughout events post WWII like the collapse of ally
governments, or collapse of soviet uniun (no indication of this verge of collapse)
• soviet uniun important (as text points out) some of intelligence if not majority were
created in 1947 with a sole purpose of gaining intelligence of the soviet uniun and watching
• tendency to push the CIAin the wrong direction.
• in reference to the CIAthe gathering of the intelligence is only one component like the CIAis
• the CIAhas a number of different branches that are involved in espianage and counter
• 2/3s of budget
• were not involved in the gathering of intelligence but rather covert action.
• within the CIAcovert action was under the control of the branch known as Director of
Operations. It was an outgrowth during WWII, which engaged in military activities behind
enemy lines. Important component of war for long periods of time and are seen as
clandestine experiences. different than covert actions the CIAwas involved in after the
• important and not as successful, most military tries to get as much info from their enemies.
once behind enemy lines, it makes sense these personal try to interfere in the capacities of
their enemy: like weaken them which will be less costly.
• limited to military organizations, office of strategic services (WWII)
• covert operations are different. clandestine operations only last until that sabotage.
• covert operations will never be tied to those who are authorized or engaged in them.
• such operations present us with the most clear example of the dominant theme the text
refers too: the trade off between liberty and security (or to be said differently democracy
and national security) Nov 26, 2013
• considerable controversy after WWII, when the offices of ____ were disbanded. highly suspect
of maintaining such capacities
• beginnings of cold war and tensions with Sov. Un. resulted in consideration for the need for
such organization which led to those capacities being integrated into the central intelligence
• viewed possibility of building a CIAwith dir. of oper. equivalent to the German Gestapo.
• for that reason it as insisted that this capacity not be in the military itself. Director of
intelligence had to be a civilian.
• kinds of activities that was authorized for director of operations were lined in 5412-i.
• most important component of covert activities not that foreign gov not be aware, but the US
citizens be aware of those activities, would cause problems for congress.
• most part they are covert primarily within the US which many US citizens are unaware o