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Political Science
Clifford Van Der Linden

BALANCING VS. BANDWAGONING UNDER THE SECURITY DILEMMA TWO PLAYER GAME OUCTOMES - Mutual cooperation (cc) - Being exploited (cd) - Exploiting the other (dc) - Breakdown (dd) ; each player defects SECURITY DILEMMA - Many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others - I international politics, one state’s gain in security often inadvertently threatens others - International system is anarchy, how we look at this anarchic system is debated - Mutually assured destruction; Cold war literature, nuclear deterrent, if one states launches an attack against another state, then that state has the right to retaliate, if the American launch attack against Soviet with the objective to take out the Soviet military infrastructure as much as possible, but if you don’t know where it is and knowing that they will retaliate it will deter the US from attacking - By the end of the cold war the amount of nuclear stockpiles was able to destroy the world...the notion that these powers continue to attain nuclear stockpiles after the need of them is over, creates a security dilemma and creates the arms race - Built into relative gain assumption (realist); if one states makes gain over another, then that is assumed to be a threat/security risk to others SUBJECTIVE SECURITY DEMANDS - Valuation of security o The more states value their security above all these (That is, see a prohibitively high cost in CD), the more they are likely to be sensitive o even minimal threats, and to demand high levels of arms; if there is a possibility of being exploited it triggers security arms race depending on how important security is to a state - Perception of threat (Jarvis) o State that is predisposed to see either a specific other states as an adversary, or others in general as a menace, will react more strongly and more quickly than a state that see its environment as benign; how states evaluate the other is relevant - Walts; security is an objective reality, specific ALLIANCES AS A RESPONSE TO THREAT - How do states respond to threats? o Balancing  Join alliances in order to avoid domination by stronger powers/principle source of threat  States more secure because aggressors face combined opposition  Status quo states eschew threatening foreign policies; powerful states will try to maintain the way of the international system that benefits them  If you can increase the cost of invasion/attack to the point that its no longer utility maximizing you can change the game, by changing the distribution of resources and allocation of power you can change the gamemanipulates the actor o Bandwagoning; instead of allying against major power/ threat, you ally WITH them  Ally with the powerful state/major threat  Security scarce because aggression is rewarded  States adopt more belligerent foreign policies ; belligerence is rewards (Walt), after 911 Bush = you’re with us or against us, powerful states must continue to exude ideas of power because if they lose that power other powerful states will abandon them, by appearing powerful and perceptions of power and states perceive you as that way, other states are more likely to bandwagon with you, and willing to give up power to ensure that they won’t be targeted, thus trust is important WALTZ AND BALANCE OF POWER - Balancing and bandwagonign framed solely in terms of power - Balancing is alignment with the weaker side; Bandwagoning means to choose the stronger - No separation between power and threat in convention (neo)realist accounts; states balance against rising powers as power is equated with threat; because the way states act in international system, if a state has a certain amount of power it is automatically a threat - Rational calculus - Exclusively in terms of material power WALT AND BALANCE OF THREATS - Distinguishes between power and threats, with the latter being the motivation for balancing - E.g. balancing of states against Germany, EU balancing with the US against Iran and North Korea - Threats are more important than distribution of power - Rather than allying in response to power alone, it is more accurate to say that states will ally with or against the most threatening power - States may also COPY FROM LECTURE FACTORS AFFECTING LEVEL OF THREAT 1 (Wa
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