Political Science 2231E Lecture Notes - Lecture 9: Elie Wiesel, Janice Stein, Zbigniew Brzezinski
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Lecture 9: NATO in the Twenty-First Century
- NATO Enlargement; NATO‟s wars in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya; and NATO‟s
deterrence strategy, 1999-2008
- What are some benefits and costs of expanding NATO membership? What are some of the risks of
extending ‗Article 5‘ protection to the newer allies? What are some of the issues surrounding
NATO‘s ‗out-of-area‘ operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Libya? What are the implications of
the debate surrounding NATO‘s continual reliance on nuclear deterrence?
II. Future Issues:
- Withdrawal and Defeat in Afghanistan; Civil War in Libya; Ballistic Missile Defence;
Defending the Imperial Palace against the Global Village; Alternatives to Canada‟s NATO
- Could NATO lose in Afghanistan due to opium? What might be the implications of saying no to
BMD? What are the implications of the new war on terrorism for a ‗global‘ NATO? What are our
alternatives? Should Canada continue to commit to NATO and how?
What are some benefits and costs of expanding NATO membership?
- 1st Round of NATO Enlargement:
o Czech Republic
o For example, expansion is seen by some as a fall-back to regional alliance formations and
balance of power politics. There are fears it represents a reversal back to the policy of
containment, to the focus on military force, to collective defense. Fears about the dangers
of extended deterrence.
U.S. President Bill Clinton promoted NATO‘s Partnership for Peace (PfP), formerly the North Atlantic
Cooperation Council (NACC).
- It leads to other questions of priorities and preferences – expanding a regional collective defense
organization--possibly at the expense of efforts to reform a universal collective security organization,
like the UN
- 2nd Round on May 1, 2004
o Other would-be NATO allies--Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Lithuania,
Latvia—they undoubtedly will spend a great deal of money to upgrade their defence
systems. As members of NATO‘s Partnership for Peace, they will try to abide by official
(and unofficial) guidelines in order to be invited into the NATO club.
o One RAND Corporation study estimated that combined spending by the newer and would-be
allies could rise to $130 billion over the next 10 years. How could they afford to spend $130
billion on defense, when their own economies are lagging? RAND says if they lack funds,
loans and grants could be provided by ―friendly‖ governments.
- 3rd Round in April 2008 at NATO Summit
o Croatia invited into NATO Club and joined in 2009
o Albania invited into NATO Club and joined in 2009
o Georgia and Ukraine told they will eventually
What are some of the Benefits and Risks of Expanding NATO membership?
- Could decisions to increase our security decrease Russian security, possibly leading to arms spirals
and renewed confrontation?
- Could we be caught in a new ‗security dilemma‘?
- We can probably all agree that NATO expansion, will also have implications for future conflict
prevention, management, and resolution; that it will influence international security and national
defense policies. It could mean entrapment in arms spirals and a security dilemma.
- It may not be close to us here in Canada, but we can‘t ignore it. As a NATO member, we are partners
in this and we want to remain constructively engaged.
- But just ask anyone within a relationship and they can tell you that any commitment entails
obligations – challenging obligations that may be comforting at times, while very trying at others –
sometimes even grounds for separation in more demanding circumstances – not an option that I want
- Most Russians opposed NATO enlargement
- Every political party in Russia opposed NATO expansion
- Moreover, there appear to be several contradictions or dilemmas in NATO policy that may be
difficult to reconcile.
- For example, while we pursue greater cooperation with Russia, NATO expansion may risk another
security dilemma, greater tension, and possibly military competition?
- There may be risks that expansion—the first—or second round—could lead Russia to eventually
move some of its conventional—or nuclear--arsenal into defensive positions along a newly-defined
border, along a new Central Front.
Do we run the risk of inciting old hatreds, new insecurities and more paranoid leadership?
The Costs of Insecurity: Spheres of influence and Renewed Arms Race?
- Could NATO expansion incite Russia to extend its sphere of influence into the ‗near abroad‘ (e.g.
Georgia, Belarus, Ukraine)?
- Could the rearmament of Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland contribute to a new arms race in
- Will NATO enlargement create new dividing lines in Europe?
The Costs of Insecurity: Spheres of Influence and a Renewed Arms Race?
- Article V: An attack against one is an attack against all
o As well, there may be risks of undermining the credibility of NATO‟s Article V, the
guarantee that ―an attack against one member is an attack against all. I call this the Three
Musketeers article: an attack against one of us is an attack against us all. It means that if the
Hungarians attack Romania over Transylvania, a disputed area in Romania, then the entire
NATO alliance could be involved. It means an attack on Turkey implies that Canada is
involved…as well as France and Germany (which was an item of contention before the U.S.
attack on Iraq)
o In September 2001 NATO declared its full backing for the United States in its war against
terrorism and invoked Article 5, raising questions about how NATO would translate this
decision into operational action.
- What might be the benefits and costs of extending Article 5 protection?
The Costs of NATO expansion in the Twenty-first century
- The Direct Financial Costs of NATO Expansion:
o Will the alliance‘s defense costs jump with NATO expansion? Could NATO enlargement
over the next decade cost billions of dollars?
o Will Canada‘s defense costs jump with NATO expansion? What are our alternatives?
o So, maybe for that reason, or maybe for other reasons, since 1997 and the Madrid summit,
many high-level American officials have asserted that the cost of NATO expansion will be
approximately $27-billion to $35-billion (US) over the next 13 years.
o Nearly half of that would be paid by the 3 new member states. The United States‘ share,
according to the United States, would be two billion dollars, leaving the rest, or some $16
billion dollars (US) to the 15 current members.
o I should mention that this estimate stems from a Congressional report released by the State
Department on behalf of President Clinton and the defence Department in February 1997.
o Then just before NATO enlargement was to be ratified in the US last fall, just before the
whole debate in the Senate, the NATO authorities took another look at the military
requirements and the commonly-funded budgets of NATO.
o A few weeks prior to ratification of the enlargement decision in Congress, the US State
Department suddenly agreed with NATO's drastically revised assessment.
o They suggested that enlargement could cost only $1.5 billion. Down from $27-35 billion!
o The State Department also suggested that the American share of the costs of enlargement
would only be about $400 million over the next ten years.
o These wide variations in estimates, among the US Congressional Budget Office, the
Pentagon, the State Department, and NATO headquarters, should concern us. If anything, the
lesson is that economic statistics can be fudged, depending on the issue at hand, and the
political interests at stake.
o Most importantly, all these estimates may be too low.
o It seems ludicrous to me that US President George Bush has increased the defence budget in
2003 to $380 billion--more than double that of the rest of NATO combined. That is $377
billion more than the UN‘s annual budget which just topped $3 billion.