Why Regional Peacemaking Begins With States and Ends.docx

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Department
International Affairs
Course
INTA 2XXX
Professor
Murat
Semester
Spring

Description
Why Regional Peacemaking Begins With States and Ends With Societies: Case Studies from the Middle East and Beyond By Norrin M. Ripsman - The relative role of states and societies in the peacemaking process - Can the state be a driver or obstacle? Can society be a driver or obstacle? - Book builds upon 2005 International Quarterly article - The transition to peace pursues a realist, top-down logic o Common soviet threat o US hegemonic leadership - The endurance of peace pursues a liberal logic due to o Entrenchment of democratic regimes o Liberal regional institutions - Builds upon Ripsman (2005) in 2 key ways: o Addresses a broader range of state and societal explanations of regional peacemaking o Examines additional cases to see if European pattern is exportable across regions or if it is unique - 3 Case Studies of agreements b/w regional rivals o France-Germany after WWII o Egypt-Israel 1979 o Israel-Jordan 1994 o Analysis of the universe of 20 century cases I. Bottom Up-Approach a. Liberal and constructivist approaches i. Democratic Peace Theory 1. Democratic states will not wage war with each other 2. Public is more peaceful than the leaders and controls the government; public is unwilling to wage war unnecessarily and will restrain gov’t if given any power 3. Democratic regimes that share norms do not want to violate these norms 4. Rivalries could be resolved through democratization a. If states can be democratized, a zone of democratic peace can be formed ii. Commercial Liberalism 1. When economic interdependence is high, they are less likely to wage war 2. High opportunity cost since war interferes with trade patterns and profitability 3. Comparative Efficiency a. When trade and investment flow between nations, they are a more inefficient means of obtaining resources in a region than conquest/war b. War requires much higher costs than trade 4. These costs restrain war efforts 5. Deepening trade relations and extending them could maintain peace 6. The possibility of significant likely gains through peacemaking could pressure government to engage in peace efforts iii. Institutionalism (Constructivist) 1. Societies are shaped by the institution in which states belong 2. The state begins to see a common identity with states that belong to the same institution 3. Regional peacemaking can be reached if states are embedded in cooperative institutions iv. Combination of all three 1. Pluralistic Security Community can be formed by combining all three 2. Makes conflict unthinkable as states begin to think of themselves as an integral part of a whole a. (Russet and O’Neal 2001) 3. Since society is the driver of peacemaking, societal paths to peacemaking work best within systems of non-autonomous states (governments) b. The Underlying Logic of Miller (2007) i. What causes war and peace has nothing to do with power; it has to do with state to nation imbalance ii. Too few states and too many nations – secessionist desires iii. Too many states and too few nations – state to state balance iv. Population shifts can rectify this imbalance v. Cold Peace 1. Without societal change 2. Warm peace requires societal change II. Top-Down Approach to Peacemaking between Regional Rivals a. States are the drivers of peacemaking and society is the obstacle b. Realist Approaches i. The state is more willing to engage in peacemaking than the public since it is more practical ii. Balance of Power/Balance of Threat Theory 1. In an anarchic international system, states cannot afford the luxury of permanent rivalries or alliances 2. When it faces a significant threat, it is rational to engage in peacemaking with a former enemy to counter this threat 3. No set strategy iii. Hegemonic Stability Theory 1. Order derives from a concentration of power 2. When one state possesses more political and economic resources, it can use this power to maintain order through motivation or coercion a. Security guarantees b. Incentives c. Threats d. All this could compel smaller regional rivals to cooperate c. Other Rationalist/Statist Approaches i. Regime Survival Motives 1. When the leadership of a state is threatened for several reasons (dwindling resources, lack of technology, etc.) , the state may conclude that its power position can be secured by negotiating peace even if society opposes it d. Both approaches recognize that the state must be insulated from society in order to pave a way for peace III. Ripsman Hybrid Approach a. Transition is top-down b. Endurance is bottom-up i. Must be entrenched in society IV. The Evidence: Middle East a. Bottom-Up i. DPT 1. Israel-Egypt a. Doesn’t really fit b. Neither Egypt nor Israel are democracies c. No elections at the time of Saddat d. The public has no influence e. The public was also not more peaceful than its government 2. Israel-Jordan a. Doesn’t fit either b. No democratic influence c. Very little public influence on government d. Israeli public was on board; greater hostility on the Jordanian side ii. Commercial Liberalism 1. Israel-Egypt a. There were some economic gains but very little enthusiasm from Egyptian businesses b. Several economic normalization initiatives were never put into practice c. Peace was not driven by business community 2. Israel-Jordan a. No enthusiasm from either side b. Israeli businesses believed Jordan lacked sufficient resource
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