# EMREAS 13 Lecture Notes - Lecture 1: Presentment Clause, Amartya Sen, Closed List

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26 Jun 2018

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EMR 13: Analyzing Politics: Lecture Notes

Lecture 1: Tuesday Jan 26th: Introduction

Four components to the grade

oMidterm – 35% (March 10th in class)

oSection/Experiments – 20%

o1000-word essay – 10%

oFinal Exam or Paper (3000-5000 words) – 35% (May 5th 9:00 am)

Thinking strategically about situations – theme of this class

Politicians are professionals at thinking strategically

Some people think about an opportunity for cooperation for the greater good, but it is hard to

enforce (cannot always be guaranteed)

Lecture 2: Thursday Jan 28th: Individual Choice: Models of Choice

Ec10, Summarized:

Agent Endowment (Constraint) Objective

Consumers $ “Happiness”

Workers time labor/leisure

Producers inputs profit

Investors $ long-run return

Can we make assumptions about individual behavior to make assumptions for group behavior?

Makes sense to start with small units of analysis

oMethodological individualism

Take a generic individual: Ms. or Mr. I

oA= {x, y, z}

oPi

oN= {1, 2 3, ….., n}

x Pi y “x preferred to y by i” STRICT

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2

x Ii y “I is indifferent between x and y” INDIFFERENT

x Ri y “either “x Pi y” or “x Ii y” WEAK

oAssumption 1: Connectivity (completeness)

Either x Pi y or y Pi x or x Ii y

oAssumption 2: Transitivity (coherence)

Either x Pi y and y Pi z then x Pi z

Where do preferences come from?

oPossibly genetic (Darwinian Evolution)

oPersuasion

oSource of preferences in Ec10 are entirely in terms of material well-being

oRegardless, preferences can have many different factors, and this course looks at more

than just material well-being

{x, y, z, u, v, w,…}

oWe are assuming individuals can select preferences, PREFERENCE ORDER

oThe assumptions above mean he or she can construct preference ordering

Rational Behavior

o“pick the top rank” (in your preference order)

Utility

oui(x) > ui(y) if and only if x Pi y

“Maximize utility”

Decision Making Under Certainty

oA = {a1, a2,…. am} ACTIONS

oO = {o1, o2,…. om} OUTCOMES

A O

a1 -> o1 and so on…

Decision Making Under Risk

oaj: (p1j, p2j,…, pnj)

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3

o ≤ p ≤ 1

E p = 1

Decision Making Under Uncertainty

o“I have no idea”

oDomain studies by game theory

Strategic interaction

Choices partially determine an outcome but other people’s choices also

determine outcomes

oDecision making under risk is a special kind of decision making under uncertainty

IN ALL OF THESE DECISION MAKING CASES: we assume all people make RATIONAL decisions

oPreferences, beliefs about the world, combine them to make choices

Lecture 3: Tuesday Feb 2nd: Group Choice and Arrow’s Theorem

Iowa Caucus

oDifference between primary and caucus

oWhat is the meaning of participation in a caucus?

Review of last Thursday’s lecture

oCompleteness (comparability) and Transitivity (coherence)

Suppose there are three alternatives: {Trump, Cruz, and Rubio}

oWith {a, b, c}

oSuppose we give these three individuals (or three groups of people) two different

preferences (IN ORDER below)

oa prefers: Trump, Cruz, Rubio

ob prefers: Cruz, Rubio, Trump

oc prefers: Rubio, Cruz, Trump

oCOMPARE in the group:

C P T {b, c}

R P T {b, c}

C P R {a, b}

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