EMREAS 13 Lecture Notes - Lecture 1: Presentment Clause, Amartya Sen, Closed List
26 Jun 2018
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EMR 13: Analyzing Politics: Lecture Notes
Lecture 1: Tuesday Jan 26th: Introduction
Four components to the grade
oMidterm – 35% (March 10th in class)
oSection/Experiments – 20%
o1000-word essay – 10%
oFinal Exam or Paper (3000-5000 words) – 35% (May 5th 9:00 am)
Thinking strategically about situations – theme of this class
Politicians are professionals at thinking strategically
Some people think about an opportunity for cooperation for the greater good, but it is hard to
enforce (cannot always be guaranteed)
Lecture 2: Thursday Jan 28th: Individual Choice: Models of Choice
Ec10, Summarized:
Agent Endowment (Constraint) Objective
Consumers $ “Happiness”
Workers time labor/leisure
Producers inputs profit
Investors $ long-run return
Can we make assumptions about individual behavior to make assumptions for group behavior?
Makes sense to start with small units of analysis
oMethodological individualism
Take a generic individual: Ms. or Mr. I
oA= {x, y, z}
oPi
oN= {1, 2 3, ….., n}
x Pi y “x preferred to y by i” STRICT
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x Ii y “I is indifferent between x and y” INDIFFERENT
x Ri y “either “x Pi y” or “x Ii y” WEAK
oAssumption 1: Connectivity (completeness)
Either x Pi y or y Pi x or x Ii y
oAssumption 2: Transitivity (coherence)
Either x Pi y and y Pi z then x Pi z
Where do preferences come from?
oPossibly genetic (Darwinian Evolution)
oPersuasion
oSource of preferences in Ec10 are entirely in terms of material well-being
oRegardless, preferences can have many different factors, and this course looks at more
than just material well-being
{x, y, z, u, v, w,…}
oWe are assuming individuals can select preferences, PREFERENCE ORDER
oThe assumptions above mean he or she can construct preference ordering
Rational Behavior
o“pick the top rank” (in your preference order)
Utility
oui(x) > ui(y) if and only if x Pi y
“Maximize utility”
Decision Making Under Certainty
oA = {a1, a2,…. am} ACTIONS
oO = {o1, o2,…. om} OUTCOMES
A O
a1 -> o1 and so on…
Decision Making Under Risk
oaj: (p1j, p2j,…, pnj)
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3
o ≤ p ≤ 1
E p = 1
Decision Making Under Uncertainty
o“I have no idea”
oDomain studies by game theory
Strategic interaction
Choices partially determine an outcome but other people’s choices also
determine outcomes
oDecision making under risk is a special kind of decision making under uncertainty
IN ALL OF THESE DECISION MAKING CASES: we assume all people make RATIONAL decisions
oPreferences, beliefs about the world, combine them to make choices
Lecture 3: Tuesday Feb 2nd: Group Choice and Arrow’s Theorem
Iowa Caucus
oDifference between primary and caucus
oWhat is the meaning of participation in a caucus?
Review of last Thursday’s lecture
oCompleteness (comparability) and Transitivity (coherence)
Suppose there are three alternatives: {Trump, Cruz, and Rubio}
oWith {a, b, c}
oSuppose we give these three individuals (or three groups of people) two different
preferences (IN ORDER below)
oa prefers: Trump, Cruz, Rubio
ob prefers: Cruz, Rubio, Trump
oc prefers: Rubio, Cruz, Trump
oCOMPARE in the group:
C P T {b, c}
R P T {b, c}
C P R {a, b}
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Document Summary
Four components to the grade: midterm 35% (march 10th in class, section/experiments 20, 1000-word essay 10, final exam or paper (3000-5000 words) 35% (may 5th 9:00 am) Thinking strategically about situations theme of this class. Some people think about an opportunity for cooperation for the greater good, but it is hard to enforce (cannot always be guaranteed) Lecture 2: thursday jan 28th: individual choice: models of choice. Makes sense to start with small units of analysis: methodological individualism. I: a= {x, y, z, pi, n= {1, 2 3, , n} x pi y x preferred to y by i strict. 2 x ii y i is indifferent between x and y indifferent x ri y either x pi y or x ii y weak: assumption 1: connectivity (completeness) Either x pi y or y pi x or x ii y: assumption 2: transitivity (coherence) Either x pi y and y pi z then x pi z.
