Government 1760 Lecture Notes - Lecture 3: Security Dilemma, Autocracy, Ingroups And Outgroups
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Document Summary
Anarchy, no role of government, constrains states options when interacting with each other. No world government that could punish an aggressor if a nation gets attacked. States are similar regardless of their regime type and leader characteristics (fire in a theatre) Security dilemmas: increased military conflicts when one country sees another attempting to gain power. Starts as potential threat and turns into conflict. People identify with their in-group, think that the out-group might be threatening. Gives more room for human agents than structure. The more similarities you feel between you and a neighboring state, you feel less threatened by the other state. Long lasting territorial disputes --> realpolitik tradition (alliance and balancing as realist social inventions) --> war. War is more likely when there is an existing territorial dispute. Territory = not just a human nature but animal nature to protect your territory. States care about borders --> sensitive to threats.